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Conversation memory of humorous-nonhumorous 
and congruent-incongruent version of conversation 
under different shades of listener's mood. 
In view of the importance of conversation memory in the 
development of interpersonal attraction, interpersonal relationship and 
formation of impressiqn; the present research was undertaker to study 
"Conversation memory of humorous-nonhumorous and congruent-
incongruent versioi^i&f'conversation linde/different shades of listener's 
mood". The main objectives of the study were (1) to invesiigate the 
impact of humorous-nonhumorous version of conversation on 
conversation memory, i.e. to what extent humorous and nonl umorous 
versions of conversation facilitate or inhibit conversation memo); (2) to 
investigate the influence of congruent-incongruent version of 
conversation on conversation memory, i.e. to what extent congruent and 
incongruent versions of conversation facilitate or inhibit com ersation 
memory; (3) to investigate the effect of listener's mood on con\ ersation 
memory, i.e. to what extent Elated, Depressed, and Neutral mood of the 
listener facilitate or inhibit the conversation memory; and (4) to examine 
the various interactional effects of independent variables i.e. humorous-
nonhumorous, congruent-incongruent versions of conversation and mood 
on our dependent variable i.e. conversation memory. 
A 2X2X3 factorial design in which two task variables (two 
versions of conversation i.e. humorous-nonhumorous and congruent-
incongruent) and one personality variable (listener's mood) were used in 
this experiment. The two values of first task variable were (a) humorous 
version of conversation and (b) nonhumorous version of conversation. 
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Similarly the two values of second task variable were (a* congruent 
version and (b) incongruent version. The third variable i.e. personality 
variable was varied in three ways. The three values of personality 
variable i.e. listener's mood were (a) elated mood, (b) depressed mood 
and (c) neutral mood. Thus there were twelve groups of subjects as given 
below: 
Group I Elated mood, Humorous and Congruent versions of ccnversation. 
Group II Elated mood, Humorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group III Elated mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group IV Elated mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group V Depressed mood. Humorous and Congruent vt;rsions of 
conversation. 
Group VI Depressed mood. Humorous and Incongruent vi-rsions of 
conversation. 
Group VII Depressed mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group VIII Depressed mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group IX Neutral mood, Humorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group X Neutral mood, Humorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group XI Neutral mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group XII Neutral mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Each group consisted 15 subjects, hence there were 180 subjects in 
all. Modified Velten Mood Induction Technique (MVMIT) developed by 
Sinclair et al. (1994) was used to induce different shades oi" mood i.e. 
elated, depressed, and neutral to form the above mentioned twelve groups 
of subjects. 
A fictional conversation was prepared by the author which was 
used in the present study. This fictional conversation consisted of large 
number of statements forming conversation between two peisons (Mr. 
Ahmad and Mr. Sharma). The content of conversation focused on two 
issues namely 'health' and 'business deal'. The conversation on the issue 
of health was so prepared that either the conversation was hu norous or 
nonhumorous. The conversation on the issue of business deal was so 
prepared that it was totally nonhumorous. These conversations on the 
issues on 'health' and 'business deal' were given to a group of 50 
subjects who were asked to rate humorousness and nonhumorousness of 
each statement on five point rating scale. On the basis of these ratings 
only those statements were retained which were rated either as humorous 
or as nonhumorous. The mean rating of humorous statement was 4.0, 
whereas the mean rating of nonhumorous statements was 1 25. It is 
important to mention that this group of subjects did not participate in the 
actual experiment. 
Humorous-congruent version of conversation was prepared by 
using all the statements which were humorous in nature and were on the 
same issue i.e. 'health'. Humorous-incongruent version of com ersation 
was prepared by using the statements half of which were humorous (on 
the issue of health) and the remaining half were nonhumorous (on the 
issue of business deal). Nonhumorous-congruent version of conversation 
was prepared by using all the nonhumorous statements about one issue 
i.e. 'business deal'. Nonhumorous-incongruent version of conversation 
was prepared by using the statements half of which were cone erned with 
the issue of health and remaining half were concerned with the issue of 
business deal and both types of statements were nonhumorous. 
In each four versions of conversation 20 statements were 
considered as target statements uttered by Mr. Ahmad. These were the 
statements which were to be recalled by the subjects. 
As dictated by the design of the experiment, each group of subjects 
read the conversation ten times and recalled in writing 20 target 
statements within 10 minutes uttered by Mr. Ahmad after a retention 
interval of 5 minutes which was filled with a distractor task. The purpose 
of distractor task was to prevent the subjects from rehearsing the; stimulus 
material. 
The recall protocols of the subjects were coded by two coders. 
These two coders worked independently to code the protocols for the 
presence of target items, i.e. whether a statement recalled by subjects was 
one of the twenty targets. Coders were instructed to use a gist or general 
meaning criterion. That is, a recalled statement was to be coded is one of 
the targets if it conveyed the general meaning of the target, regardless of 
the wordings. Thus all of the recall protocols were scored for the number 
of the target correctly recalled (regardless of the recalled wording). The 
numbers of target correctly recalled, as given by the two coders, were 
added and divided by 2 to get mean number of target correctly lecalled. 
This was done to remove any discrepancy if it exists between two coders 
with respect to the number of targets correctly recalled. The data so 
obtained was tabulated groupwise and statistically analyzed by three way 
analysis of variance to draw necessary inferences. 
The findings revealed that (a) humorous version of conversation 
was better remembered than nonhumorous version of conversation; (b) 
incongruent version of conversation was better remembered than 
congruent version of conversation; (c) mood had no inpact on 
conversation memory and (d) all the four interactional effect Mere found 
insignificant. Different alternative explanations of the findings were 
offered and implications of the findings were discussed and suggestions 
for future research were also made. 
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Memory issues are extremely important to communication iaquiiy 
Conversational interaction requires participants to utilize their mcmorv 
for a great variety of tasks.' Everyday people meet, converse vviih each 
other, and depart with memories of their interactions. These mtmories 
affect future interactions, feelings about others, and even judgmeni of selr" 
and others. 
Stafford and Daly (1984) highlighted the demands madi upon 
memory in conversation: "A critical requirement for succt^ssfulh 
completing any interaction is a functioning memory that peimits people 
(1) generate relevant topic from the store of memories they ha\e from 
previous interactions with others involved in the current excharge; (2) 
access and use diverse psychological schemes that hold and integmte both 
general and specific topical information; (3) recall general rules of social 
interaction and mesh them with the particular conversation; (4) aijust to 
nev>' messages that arise as the conversation progress within the frame of 
remembered materials; (5) devise expectancies and trajectories for likeh 
directions the conversations may take; and (6) Store in some suitable 
fashion, impressions and memories of the conversation for future ise". 
It has been observed that sentences spoken in natural conversation 
convey to fundamentally different type of information: propositional 
information and pragmatic information. Propositional infonnation is 
characterized as information about the objects and events referrei to b\ 
the sentence. Pragmatic information is defined as information about Ihe 
contents of the sentence in the social interaction, includina information 
about the speaker and his intentions, beliefs and his relations \A iih the 
speaker. Sentences that convey a lot of pragmatic information rtfening 
the speaker-listener interaction are said to be rich in interactional t onteni. 
It has been found that sentences with high interactional content were 
remembered much better than sentences with low interactional content 
(Keenan, McWhinney, and Mayhew 1977). 
Since interactions must be capable of storing and retrieving a great 
deal of information from memory in order to engage in communication, 
theories of interaction must be sensitive to the capabilities and limitations 
of memory. An exemplar is Capella and Folgar (1981) account of 
inconsistencies in attitudes and behaviours which is based on tiie 
distinction between semantic and episodic memory. Cognitive theories of 
communication appear promising (Planalp and Hewes, 1982) hut will 
require careful consideration of the cognitive capacities of human beings, 
including their ability to retrieve information from memory to guide then-
own behaviors and inteipret the behavior of conversational partners. 
Planalp and Hewes (1982) argued that retrieval issues have for reading 
implications for the communication scholars. 
Moreover, an adequate conception of memory is also criiical for 
communication research, which frequently employs verbal reports as a 
form of data. Limitations of subject's ability to remember information 
bear directly on the veracity of verbal reports. Self report data is- quite 
common in our literature. For example we ask subjects to rellect m their 
relationships, recall their viewing habits, remember critical incidents, or 
rate how likely they are to use various compliance gaining stiategies. 
Despite the importance of the verbal report data to communication 
inquiiy we know little about human infomiation retrieval capacities or the 
accessibility of particular kinds of information. 
Conversation Memory - The information we acquire about pe )ple or 
environment is often conveyed in informal conversations. A person mav 
tell us about someone he met or we may listen to people exchanging 
anecdotes about mutual acquaintance; later we may be called to convey 
our own impression of the individual who was described. We pres jmably 
do this on the basis of cognitive representation we had formed of the 
person while listening to the conversation. So conversation memory may 
be defined as "The ability of an individual to correctly recall or recognise 
the contents of the conversation either verbatim or semantic". 
Stafford and Daly (1984) investigated the conversational nemory 
of the participants in conversation. They used free recall and reported that 
only 10% of all ideas units in the conversation were recalled by 
participants (The best subject only 40%), prompting the conclusion that 
people abilities to recall something as complex as conversations are 
limited. 
However other researches obtained results showing higher r3call vi" 
conversation than Stafford and Daly's results. MacWhinney, Keenan and 
Reinke (1982), using both participants and observers as subjects, reported 
that recognition memory ranged from 71% to 82%). Kintsch and Bates 
(1977) indicated that students were able to recognise a considerable 
amount of information from a lecture even after 5 days. Benoit and 
Benoit (1986) employing a recognition test reported that conversation 
interactants were able to remember over 90%o of specific verbal 
communicafive behavior. These studies demonstrated that a considerable 
amount of conversational information is stored in memory and subjecls 
are able to retrieve it accurately. 
The obvious difference between these studies that carried out by 
Stafford and Daly (1984) and that of other studies is that Staffc>rd and 
Daly used a form of recall (free recall), whereas other researche s used 
recognition test and hence reported a great amount of reteniion of 
conversation. Recognition tests are generally accepted to be more 
sensitive than recall, as Bahrick (1964) notes "It has been found in most 
instances that recognition performance is superior to recall perfo niance 
of the same target items." The free recall procedure employed by Stafford 
and Daly (1984) instructed the subjects at the end of their conversation 
"to write down (or orally report) everything that he or she could 
remember about the conversation. Stafford and Daly argued recognition 
tests are less usefiil because memory structures are not isomorph c with 
the form of these tests. They suggested that free recall procedures "more 
clearly tap mechanisms that operate during everyday Conversation''. 
Because interactants must access information quickly by drawing 'ti-ecK 
from his or her store of memories". 
Irrespective of the differences in the findings obtained by different 
researches, the importance of conversation memory can rot hv 
underestimated. In fact conversation memory has for reaching 
implications in the social network. Some of the major implicatiois and 
significance of conversation memory may be summarized as foUov^ s 
1. Conversation memory for various aspects of conversation is an 
important component of social interaction. Impressions art often 
formed and social judgement made on the basis of what is 
remembered from verbal interactions. 
2. Conversation memory may play a crucial role in social bonding, 
exchanging and concurrin; on reactions and prospective pn)babl\ 
makes an interaction more enjoyable and a partner more likerble. 
3. The descriptive studies of conversation memory (Eduard & 
Middleton, 1986a, b; Tenny, 1986) support the importance of 
personal reactions; exchange of personal information, teacf others 
about what the person is: What one likes, dislikes, cares about etc. 
4. The purpose of conversation memory is to search for meaiing to 
learn about others and explain ourselves; and to build and n aintain 
social bonds. 
Verbal communication is a central and ubiquitous features of social 
interaction, and researcher have paid increasing attention to tht social 
psychology of language in recent years (e.g. Clark, 1985; Higgin.s 1981; 
Kraut and Higgins, 1984). 
A consideration of language is important because, as Kraut and 
Higgins (1984) have suggested, verbal communication represents a rich 
intersection of social and cognitive processes. The social cognitions of 
speakers and listeners play a crucial role in many different aspects of 
language use. For example, the successful use of referential expression 
depends on social knowledge that is shared by the interlocutors (("lark & 
Carlson, 1982; Clark and Marshall, 1981; Krauss, Vivekananthan, and 
Weinheimer, 1968). Moreover, social cognition also plays an important 
role in the interpersonal aspects of language use. Speaker often talks 
differently as a function of various aspects of the social situations (Bloni 
& Gumperz, 1972; Giles & St. Clair, 1979) and certain characteristics of 
the listeners such as relative status (Cansler & Stiles, 1981) and age 
(DePaulo and Coleman, 1986). Thus various features of language use 
may reflect the speaker's view of his or her relationship with the listeners 
and situation they are in. 
To address the question of what is remembered fom a 
conversation, it is first necessary to consider what is potcmtialiy 
memorable fi-om a conversation. In other words, it is necessary to first 
dehmit some of the dimensions of language use. One important 
distinction is often made between the surface structure of a senterce (i.e. 
the exact wording) and the underlying meaning or prepositional content. 
When people talk, they are trying to do the things with their words (e.g., 
requesting, informing, promising etc) that is, they are perfonning what 
are commonly referred to as speech acts. Thus, speech acts can be 
regarded as an important dimension of language. 
An important point about speech acts is that, depending on the 
context, the same speech act (e.g., to request x) can be perform»id with 
different syntactic forms (e.g. declarative - "I would like x"; imperative -
"Give me x") and with utterances having different prepositional content 
(e.g. "I need x," "I would like x"etc). 
Hence, Grice's (1975) theory suggests that the ability of speakers 
to mean more than they say (i.e. convey non literal meaning) depends on 
shared knowledge regarding a set of maxims for how conversation should 
proceed. 
It has been suggested that there are a numbers of dimensions of 
language (Brown and Levinson, 1978; Clark and Shunk, 1980; Hrvin-
Tripp, 1976; Lakoff, 1973). Among these dimensions, assert veness, 
politeness, request, humorous, congruent and incongruent may be 
regarded as social dimension of language. 
Much of early work on memory for verbal material has suggested 
that memory for the surface structure of sentences is poor refitive to 
memory for the underlying content (Jarvella, 1971; Sachs, 1967 1974). 
In other words, there is a strong tendency for individuals to remember 
what was said (Prepositional Content) but not how it was said. Later 
research has suggested a number of exceptions to this general finding. For 
example, memory for wording of remarks can be quite good if subjects 
are forced to attend to this dimension (Graesser and Mandler, 1975) or if 
the remarks (e.g. jokes or insults) have interactional value (Bates, 
Kintsch, Fletcher and Giuliani, 1980; Bates, Masling and Kintsch, 1978; 
Keenan MacWhinney and Mayhew, 1977). 
There is substantial body of evidence suggesting the existence of 
systematic biases in memory for the wording of remarks (Beck and 
Bower, 1974; Brewer and Hay, 1984; Wertsch, 1975). For example, 
Brewer and Hay (1984) had subjects read a text that had been written in 
one of five different styles (e.g. academic, business etc) subjects were 
later asked to recall the text. One of the major findings was that subjects 
did not recall the material verbatim but did produce items thai were 
consistent with the style of the presented text. Brewer and Hay int(3rpreted 
this as evidence for reconstructive processes. This study along wita others 
(e.g. Wertsch 1975) demonstrated the importance of Contextual ftctors in 
memory for surface structure. Consistent with a suggestion made by 
Neisser (1967), this work suggests that memory for verbal material is a 
synthesis of the actual trace of the verbalization and more general 
information as well. 
As stated earlier there are a numbers of dimensions of language. 
More specifically verbal informafion may be expressed using different 
version of the language. These versions may be categorized as c sserti\e 
version, request version, humorous versions and congruent-incongruent 
version. There are considerable researches which have demonstrated the 
effect of assertive and request version of conversation on conversation 
memory. Holtgrave, Srull & Socall (1989) carried out three expe imems, 
to examine the effect of information about a speaker's status on memory 
for assertiveness of his or her remarks. The findings of their stud} clearly 
demonstrated that information does affect conversation memory Ibr the 
assertiveness of his or her remarks, i.e. under certain conditions the 
remark of the high status speaker were remembered as more asserti\e 
than the same remarks uttered by low status speaker. Subject in the high 
status speaker condition recalled both the assertive and non-asserti\ e 
remarks as more assertive than did subjects in equal status condition. 
These investigators also found that subjects recalled assertive ve-sion of 
remarks more than non-assertive version of remarks. Thougi these 
findings provided evidence for the existence of relation between one s 
speech form (assertiveness) and interpersonal variable (speaker's status), 
the result cannot be taken for granted as these investigators have ignored 
two important variables i.e. listener's (subjects) status and listeners 
emotional mood. Thus it is possible that if the listener himself has high 
status, he might have not remembered the remarks of high status speakers 
as more assertive. In other words conversation between high status 
speaker and a low status addressee is heard by a person wio also 
occupies high status, his conversation memoiy might have been affected 
in different way i.e. he might have not recalled, the assertive and non-
assertive remarks as more assertive since social cognitions ol' both 
speakers and listener play a crucial role in the memorization of 
conversational remarks. Hence, Ahmad (1997) studied convtnsation 
memory as a function of listener's emofional mood, status, version of 
conversation and speaker status. The main finding of our conctrn was 
that emotional state of the listener had differential effect on conv(;rsalion 
memory. He found that depressed subjects have better conversation 
memory than elated subjects. However, Schmidt (1994) found that 
humorous sentences are better remembered than nonhumorous sentences. 
These conflicting findings obtained by Ahmad (1997) and Schmidt 
(1994) infact motivated the present author to undertake this investigation. 
There is substantial body of evidence to the effect that humorous 
stimulus material influence memory to a great extent. Hence conversation 
memory is not likely to remain unaffected by humorous stimulus 
material. 
Thus, it has been found by numerous researchers that humorous 
material is retrieved in greater amount than nonhumorous material. For 
instance Kintsch and Bates (1977), Duncan, Nelson and Frontzak (1984), 
Gelb and Zinkhan (1989) and Schmidt (1994), have reported positive 
effect of humor on memory. However, there are some studies which ha\e 
found just opposite results. For instance, Kaplan and Pascoe (1977) and 
Zillmann et al. (1980) have found negative effect of humour on memory. 
The findings of these investigators, though conflicting, make it crystal 
clear that humorous material has an effect on memory. It is therefore, 
logically assumed that conversadon memory is also likely to be ilfected 
by humorous version of conversation. It is one of the objectives of the 
present investigation. More specifically, the present study is designed lo 
explore how humorous version of conversation affects conversation 
memory. 
Another consideration that motivated the present researcher to 
undertake this study is substantial body of evidence showing significant 
impact of incongruity not only on learning and memory but als(i on the 
formulafion of impressions about other persons which is turn affect the 
development of interpersonal relafionship. Since conversation and 
retenfion of conversation also affects interpersonal relationship, it 
becomes highly significant to investigate the effect of incongruity on 
conversation memory. 
Hastie and Kumar (1979) published their classic paper in which 
they demonstrated that expectancy-incongruent items of information are 
recalled with higher probability than expectancy-congruent items. Hastie 
(1980) introduced an associative network model to account for these 
findings. This model was further developed and enormous researches 
were carried out to test the model (Srull, 1981; and SruU & Wyer. 1980). 
This model provided an elegantly simple account of why inco igruent 
items are better recalled. The model has remarkably specified about 
underlying processes. In particular, the model specified effects that occur 
during information encoding, it detailed the consequences of those effects 
for how information is represented in memoty and it described the 
process by which stored items are retrieved from memory. The model 
also makes very specific statements about the cognitive processes that 
underlie social information processing. 
However, Crocker and Vitkus (1983) have observed that 
impressions of people are resistant to change. Information that contradicts 
an initial impression of a person has relatively little impact on impression 
(Schneider, Hastrof, and Ellsworth, 1979). At the same time, research on 
memory for social information indicates that information that coritiadicis 
an impression of another person is particularly likely to be recalled i.e. 
information that violates our impressions of another is more likel> to be 
recalled than information that confirms an impression. 
Prior theorists have suggested two basic types of distinctiveness 
effects: those due to primary distinctiveness and those due to secondary 
disfinctiveness (Schmidt, 1991). Primaiy disfinctiveness effects occur 
10 
when the properties of an item deviate from the properties of otht;r items 
in a given study list. Such distinctiveness effects have been demonstrated 
by isolating physical features, such as font size or color of an item, from 
other items in a list (e.g., Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Kishi>ama & 
Yonelinas, 2003) or by isolating an item from other items in a list via 
membership in a semantic category (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Geraci & 
Rajaram, 2004; Hunt & Lamb, 2001; Schmidt, 1985; von Restorfi, 1933). 
In these cases, the isolating feature was contrasted with other 
homogeneous features in the experimental context. Secondary 
distinctiveness, on the other hand, occurs when the properties of an item 
deviate from the properties of items in one's semantic memory, ^r long-
term store. Thus, this type of distinctiveness effect occurs when deviance 
can be defined in terms of dissimilarity of an inherent characterisiic of an 
item relative to the characteristics of a class of items or a particular study 
list. An example of this type of distinctiveness effect is the memory 
advantage of orthographically uncommon/exceptional words over regular 
words (Hirshman & Jackson, 1997; Hunt & Elliott, 1980; Rajaram, 
1998). Given this characterization of distinctiveness effects, i'ont fan 
effects may be thought of as an instance of primary distinctiveness. 
One central question in the literature on distinctiveness effects is 
the extent to which the memory advantage for distinctive items derives 
from encoding-based processes (e.g., salience or enhanced aitention; 
Fabiani & Donchin, 1995) or retrieval-based processes (e.g., item-specific 
processing used to access details of an encoding episode; Hunt & 
McDaniel, 1993). Whereas the literature on distinctiveness elfects m 
recall has generally suggested that retrieval processes must play at least 
some role (Schmidt, 1991), the literature on distinctiveness elfects m 
recognition memory has been less clear on the mechanisms involved. 
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Reder et al. (2002) attributed fan effects, and by association, font 
distinctiveness effects, to retrieval-based processes. Hunt and his 
colleagues (Dunlosky, Hunt, & Clark, 2000; Hunt, 2003; Hunt & Lamb, 
2001; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Hunt & Smith, 1996; Smith <^ : Hunt, 
2000) have consistently argued that distinctiveness functions to separate 
items in memory from one another at retrieval. Furthej-. Hunt (2003) has 
recently argued that distinctiveness can play a role both to enhance 
recollection of studied items as well as to reject familiar, unstudie-J items. 
Rajaram (1998) argued that distinctiveness is critical to the experience of 
recollection phenomenology, whereby items that contain perceptaally or 
conceptually distinctive features give rise to the experience of 
recollection. Thus, these three perspectives would all argue that bnt fan 
effects are a product of retrieval-based processes. On the other hand, 
Kishiyama and Yonelinas (2003) have suggested that distinc iveness 
influences recognition memory due to processes occurring U both 
encoding and retrieval. In particular, Kishiyama and Yonelinas argue that 
distinctiveness influences both recollection and familiarity-based 
recognition memory. Further, these authors argue that the e*^ "fect of 
distinctiveness on recollection is produced by encoding-based factors, 
whereas the effect of distinctiveness on familiarity is prodiced by 
retrieval-based factors. Finally, many standard views of distinc dveness 
effects largely attribute the memorial advantage of distinctiveness to 
encoding-based processes, such as enhanced attention (e.g., Jenkins & 
Postman, 1948) or salience (e.g., Green, 1956; Schmidt, 1991). 
Related to concept of incongruently is the construct known as 
distinctiveness. The constructs of incongruency and distinctivenc.-ss may 
be used interchangeably in the memory literature. Distinctiveness has 
been variously defined as the property that separate items or events that 
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share few rather than many features with other items in memory (^Jelson, 
1979). According to Hunt and McDaniel (1993) and Schmidt (1996) 
distinctiveness emerges due to differences rather than similarities among 
items. In the opinion of Hunt and Mitchell (1982) distinctiveness arises 
from presentation of isolated items in the context of background items. 
Moreover, Schmidt (1991) says that distinctiveness characterizes events 
that are incongruent with active conceptual frameworks or that contain 
salient features not present in active memory. These definitions of 
distinctiveness make it crystal clear that there is a common thread among 
these definitions: the differences among items that presumably uniquely 
specify some items or the salience of items that make them standcut from 
among the background items. 
It has been observed that distinctiveness has different ef "ects on 
memory performance, depending on how it is defined; suggesting that 
concept of distinctiveness has been over applied. Theoretical explanations 
of the effect of distinctiveness on memory fail to specify v. hat the 
different definitions of distinctiveness have in common and fail to 
compass adequately the broad range of phenomena to be explained. In 
view of this theoretical problem, incongruity hypothesis was deveoped as 
a refinement of the disdncdve hypothesis (Eysenck, 1979; Hunt and 
Elliott, 1980). Since the concept of distincfiveness has been difficult lo 
define and clear operafional definifion of distinctiveness has not offered, 
the incongruity hypothesis was proposed. Unlike, distinct i\eness, 
incongruity has been clearly defined. Incongruity results from a mismatch 
between features present in working memory and features activat(,'d by an 
item. The incongruous items lead to an orienfing response and, as a result, 
receive extra attention during encoding and increased sto-age of 
individual item information (Schmidt 1991). These processes are thought 
13 
to be automatic in the sense that they are not the result of an intt-ntional 
strategy and do not deprive other cognitive processes of attentional 
resources. 
The theoretical construct of distinctiveness/incongruity emphasize 
that the presentation of unique properties enhance memory (Hunt and 
Elliott, 1980; Hirshman and Jackson, 1997). The isolation or von 
Restorff, effect is perhaps the best known demonstration of the 
distinctiveness effect in memory and refers to the finding that people tend 
to have very good memory for unusual or incongruent items (Hunt, 1995; 
Geraci and Rajaram, 2004; Brandt, Gardinar and Macrae, 200(); Park, 
Amdt and Reder, 2006). 
As stated earlier, while dealing with the processing of congruent 
and incongruent information, Crocker and Vitkus (1983) obsen ed that 
impressions of people are resistant to change while information that 
contradicts an initial impression of a persona is recalled better than the 
information that confirms an impression (Hastie and Kumar 197 )^; 
Hastie; 1980; SruU, 1981). Hence there was an apparent pradox of person 
perception. The researchers suggested three ways to resolve this paradox. 
The first was that the information recalled about a persona and the 
impression one has of him or her may be independent. The second 
possible resolution was that the process of integrating incongruent 
information into an impression, people may link the incongruent 
information to the information they have that fit their initial impression. 
Thus, the additional thought given to incongruent items may ictually 
strengthen the exisfing links to congruent infomiation in memcry, and 
reinforce the inifial impression. The third possible solution, as suggested 
by Crocker and Vitkus (1983), stems from the findings that people 
generally attribute behavior that is inconsistent with their impression of a 
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person to situational causes (Bell, Wicklund, Macko and Laipir, 1976; 
Deaun and Emswiller, 1974; Feldman-Summers and Kiesler 1974; 
Hayden and Mischel, 1976; Kulik, 1983). Behavior that is attributed to 
situational causes is irrelevant to an impression of what the persor is like. 
Thus, when incongruent behavior can be attributed to situationa causes 
the behavior may be recalled but it should have less im})act on 
impression. Crocker and Vitkus (1983) provided an empirical supaort, for 
all three of the possible resolutions of paradox of person perception 
Though Crocker and Vitkus (1983) obtained empirical support for 
their all the three resolutions, their findings may be subjective to 
alternative explanation. First, it may be possible that incongruent 
information commanded greater amount of attention leading ;o more 
rehearsal as compared to congruent information. Thus, this attention-
rehearsal mechanism may be responsible for greater recall of incongruent 
information as compared to congment infoimation. Secondly, the mood 
of the subject may be a critical factor in determining wht-fner an 
information is perceived as congruent or incongruent, for example if a 
subject is in an elated mood than humorous information mi>ed with 
nonhumorous information may not be perceived as incongruent 
information whereas a subject with depressed mood may perceive the 
same information as incongruent. The present study is designed to test 
these assumptions in the area of conversation memory, for it is a 
conversation memory that play vital role in the formation of impression 
about the other persons. 
Still another important consideration that motivated us to undertake 
this proposed research is the existence of substantial body of i\ idence 
demonstrating mood biasing effect in memory. While studying the 
relation between different emotional states and memory, sub ects are 
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induced to feel happy or sad while learning list of words. They recall 
those lists better if they are induced to the same mood at the time of recall 
than if they are induced to a different mood, an effect usually called mood 
dependents retrieval (Bower et al., 1978; Bartlet et al., 1982; Schare et al., 
1984). The mood dependent retrieval effect is also demonstrated by the 
tendency of the subjects to show better recall performance when they 
experience same mood during encoding and retrieval as compared to 
when they experience different moods during encoding and njtrieval. 
(Teasdale & Fogarty 1979; Taylor 1981; Natale & Hantas, 1982; Snyder 
& White, 1982). Thus Schmidt (1994) studied memory for humorous and 
nonhumorous version of sentences. Subjects recall performance was 
affected by their emotional states. Those who were in elated mood 
remembered humorous sentences more than nonhumorous versions of 
sentences. But those who were in depressed mood recallc'l more 
nonhumorous version of sentences than humorous version of sentences. 
The above mentioned well established fmdings make it crystal 
clear that emotional mood of the subjects is a potent detent iner of 
memory and hence, conversation memory is not an exception. 
A topic of major theoretical interest within cognitive psychology 
pertains to the bidirectional relatioiis among cognitive and emotional 
processes. In the existing literature, most attention has been focused on 
memory phenomena of various kinds (Blaney, 1986; Bower; 19H; Ellis 
& Ashbrook, 1987, 1988; Johnson & Magaro, 1987). And almost without 
exception, the research has focused on "conscious" or explicit niemor}: 
the person's conscious, intentional recollection of some previous episode, 
most commonly reflected in standard tests of recall and recognit on. So, 
for example, congruence between the individual's mood states at 
encoding and retrieval appears to affect the accessibility of memories 
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(Rich & Metcalfe, 1989). The effects of mood on memory fall imo three 
general categories: (a) Mood-dependent memory effects, where retrieval 
is facilitated by a match between encoding and retrieval mood states; (b) 
Mood-congruent memory effects, where mood at time of encoding or 
retrieval facilitates retrieval of affectively congruent material; md (c) 
resource allocation effects, where extreme or negative mood s ates at 
encoding or retrieval impair processing. All these effects have been 
documented in studies of explicit memory, employing conventioral tests 
of recall or recognition. Moreover, it is important to recognize that mood 
is not just a state, like sleep or hypnosis that alter perception or induces a 
kind of amnesias. Mood is also a contextual cue, like other cues, ihat is 
processed when memories are encoded and guides the course of retrieval. 
In an effort to understand the apparent unreliability of context dependent 
memory, Eich (1980, 1989) has argued that state-dependent memory is a 
cue-dependent phenomenon that critically depends on the nature of the 
cues available at retrieval. From his point of view, a primary reason for 
inconsistency in the results of studies on context-dependent memory 
findings is the tendency for other stronger cues to overshadow the usually 
weak context cue. These potentially stronger cues may mclude 
experimenter presented or subject generated cues. So, for example, state 
dependent effects on memory are greatest under conditions of free recall, 
as opposed to cued-recall or recognition tests (Eich, 1980, 198' ) And 
environment-dependent memory effects are abolished when subjects are 
instructed to imagine the environment in which the items had been 
studied (Smith, Glenberg & Bjork, 1978). 
The foregoing analysis suggests two conditions under which 
chances of finding mood dependency would be increased: (a) if Vic link 
between the subjects' mood and the list items is strengthened; and (b) if 
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other potentially superseding cues are eliminated, thereby high ighting 
the mood cue. With respect to the mood-item link, there is no reason to 
think that this association is encoded automatically (Kihlstrom. 1989). 
Rather, it seems likely that the mood-item connection will most likely he 
made if subjects actively attend to their moods. 
In contemporary psychology, the cognitive processing of emotional 
information has been assigned a special status. An important ide;i is that 
emotion-relevant information has a high priority in demanding attention 
because of its high motivational relevance (Lang et al. 1997 : threat 
signals danger to be dealt with; happiness signals opportunities for 
elaboration, social bonding, mating behavior, etc. At the same tme, the 
ability to selectively attend and respond to relevant stimuli is of crucial 
importance to display adaptive behavior and depends on our ability to 
focus on relevant information and inhibit irrelevant or distiactiiig 
information. 
In the past decades, a wealth of studies has examined .^elective 
attention for emotional information. These studies have most fnxiuentiy 
used emotional modifications of cognitive-experimental tasks, with the 
emotional Stroop task (Stroop 1935) as the best-known examj)le. Tlie 
typical finding in the emotional Stroop task is that patients are often 
slower to name the colors of words associated with concerns relevant to 
their clinical condition (Williams et al. 1996). These results have been 
interpreted in terms of selective attention for and reduced inhibition of 
emotional information. A problem of the majority of the cognitive-
experimental tasks used to investigate selective attention is that tliey only 
provide a coarse measure of attentional processing: attention is conceived 
as a unitary concept, whereas several models suggest that selective 
attention involves multiple components (e.g., Posner et al. 1987). Hereby, 
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at least two different mechanisms can be distinguished: active selection of 
relevant information and active inhibition of irrelevant stimuli (Hasher 
and Zacks 1988). In most tasks, it is not possible to distinguish between 
those two aspects. For instance, in the emotional Stroop task tl e task-
relevant (color of the word) as well as the task-iiTelevant informations 
(semantic content) are presented within the same stimulus presentation, 
which causes difficulties in disentangling the contribution of acdvation 
and inhibition mechanisms. A paradigm that offers a mor: valid 
operationalization of the mechanisms underlying the inhibition of 
attention to emotional information is an affective modification of multi-
stimulus task named negative priming (Tipper 1985; Wentura 199'); 
Joormann 2004). This selective attention task allows mtasuring 
attentional inhibition of affective information. A complete trial in the 
negative affective priming paradigm (NAP) includes two separate trials: 
prime trial and a probe trial. Prime as well as probe trials con.^ ist of a 
stimulus pair consisting of a distracter and a target (e.g., pic ures of 
emotional faces). The participant is instructed to evaluate the tar^  et (e.g., 
picture in a black frame) as positive or negative, while ignoring 
(inhibiting) the distracter (e.g., picture in a grey frame). In the 
experimental condition the valence of the distracter in the priine trial 
corresponds with the valence of the target in the probe trial. In the control 
condition there is no such similarity between prime and probe. I ffective 
inhibition of the stimulus valence of the distracter in the prime trial leads 
to a slowdown in responding to the target in the probe trial when this 
target shares the same valence. T'his slowdown is called the Negative 
Affective Priming-(NAP) effect and can be considered as a valid mdex of 
inhibitory function towards affective material (Wentura 1999). 
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Positive affective states are generally related to a more intuitive, 
generative and "loosening" or broadening cognitive processing style 
associated with an increased cognitive elaboration and flexibility Fiedler 
1988; Isen 2001; Aspinwall 1998). An interesting framework wilhin this 
context is the broaden-and-build theory of Fredrickson (2001). This 
theory states that positive emotions are characterized by a broadt-ning of 
the thought-action repertoire, expanding the range of cognitions and 
behaviors that come to mind. One prediction of this model is that positive 
emotions widen the scope of attention. Several studies have shewn that 
individuals in a positive mood display a global, holistic ctlention 
processing (e.g., Gasper and Clore 2002; Fredrickson and Branigcin 
2005). Other research could prove that positive mood leads to an 
increased cognitive flexibility that is accompanied by an increased 
distractibility (Dreisbach and Goschke 2004). Reduced inhibitory 
functioning in a positive mood might explain the observed broadened 
"thought-action" repertoire as well as the observed increased 
distractibility during positive mood (Seibert and Ellis 199!). Yet, 
research on the role of attentional inhibition processes under positive 
affect is rather scarce. Kuhl and Kazen (1999) demonstrated that Stroop 
interference disappeared under induction of positive affect. Based on the 
above-mentioned argumentation, they hypothesized that irhibitory 
function during a positive mood will be significantly redjced as 
compared with a neutral mood condition. 
Recently, the NAP-task has been applied to investigate inhibition 
of positive and negative emotional stimuli in dysphoric siudents 
(Joormann 2004) and depressed patients (Goeleven et al. 2006a). In those 
studies, results revealed that participants with elevated depression scores 
failed to inhibit mood-congruent information (reduced NAl'-effect), 
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showing that depression is associated with a specific inhibitory delicit for 
negative information. At present an important question remains whether 
this observed inhibitory deficit is a vulnerability factor related to a stable 
trait or a variable component associated with emotional state. Eased on 
the existing literature, arguments can be found for both ideas. An 
indication for the trait hypothesis is that high levels of rumination, which 
are observed in depressed individuals and related to its maintenance 
(Nolen-Hoeksema 1991), have been linked to dysfunctional inhibition 
mechanisms (e.g., Linville 1996; Joormann 2006). Howe\er, the 
inhibition concept also fits with the general assumption that a iiegati\e 
mood impairs the amount of available cognitive capacity that can be 
allocated to a certain task as a consequence of intruding ir elevant 
information in attentional sources (Ellis and Ashbrook 1988). Indeed, it 
has been found that induced stress reduces inhibition function by using a 
non-emotional negative priming task (Braunstein-Bercovitz 2003; 
Skosnik et al. 2000). 
The most recent study was carried out by Goeleven, DeRaedt and 
Koster (2007) in which they demonstrated that the ability to inhibit 
affective infonnation plays a major role in efficient cognitive processing. 
In this study the effect of mood induction on inhibitory processing of 
emotional material was investigated. In Experiment 1, performance on a 
negative affective priming task (NAP) following negative and positive 
mood induction (MIP) was compared to a neutral mood condition 
Results revealed that, as compared with the neutral mood cordition. 
inhibitory function for affective material was unaffected by negative MIP 
However, after the positive MIP, inhibitory processes were significant!} 
impaired. In Experiment 2, they replicated and extended the findi igs on 
positive affect and inhibition. The data concerning positive mood fit with 
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the general findings that positive mood often leads to a "loose, flexible" 
processing mode. 
As far as effect of mood on memory is concerned, it has been 
widely investigated by numerous researchers. The main interest of these 
researchers was mood dependent memory and mood congruent memory: 
Some researchers demonstrated dependent memory in implicit memory 
but not in explicit memory (Mathews, Mogg, May, and Eysenck, 1989), 
whereas other researches found just opposite results i.e. they 
demonstrated mood dependent memory in explicit memory (Teasdale and 
Fogarty 1979; Taylor 1981; Natale and Hantas, 1982; Snyder and White, 
1982). However, mood congruent memory has been demonstrated 
consistently by large number of investigators (Gilligan & Bowei, 1984; 
Laird, Wagner, Halal, and Szegda, 1982; Madigan & Bollenbach, 1982; 
Snyder & White, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1980; Teasdale & Taylor, 
1981; Teasdale & Russell, 1983). 
The foregoing discussion highlights the facts that mooc is an 
important variable in memory studies. Like physiological state and 
environmental surround, mood is a feature of an event that :an be 
encoded along with other aspects of a memory and serve as a potential 
retrieval cue. Like the physiological states induced by psychoactive 
drugs, it can affect the deployment of attention towards some features of 
environment as oppose to others. Thus it is established beyond dotbt that 
emotion evoking qualities of stimulus have a profound impact on memory 
processes. It is evident from the publication of large numbers of journal 
articles .:iid books on memory processes and emotion. The "Handbook ot 
Emotion and Memoiy: Research and Theory" by Christianson (1992) is a 
recent addition in the existing literature on memory and emotion. 
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Further more, the mood and memory research induces a new, 
intriguing variable to the memory equation. Though, since the time of 
Aristotle cognition and affect have been assumed to be radically different 
so different that they might have little to do with each other. However, 
recent work in mood and memory has made it crystal clear that emotions 
affects memory processes in the same way as other cognitive activities 
are affected. Generally a question is raised: How can two such different 
things as emotions and cognitions have such similar affect? The answer 
of this question was scientifically given by Ellis and Ashbrook (1989) 
and Bower (1981) who believed that it is the feelings, not some other 
component of emotional episode which produces memory affects. 
According to them a normal emotional episode consists of atleast six 
easily distinguished components: the eliciting event, the appraisal of that 
event, patterns of autonomic response, expressive behavior, ins rument 
action, and the feeling. Ordinarily, all these components occur together. 
Consequently, any of these components could mediate the riemory 
affects. Thus, Laird, Wagener, Halal and Szegda (1984) have 
demonstrated that only the feelings affect cognitive processes. In short, 
the theories identify the emotional feeling as that which affect memory. 
A few studies have investigated the effects of emotional state on 
the retrieval of personal experiences, such as early childhood memories 
or more recent personal events (Goldstein & Ellis, 1983; Siegal et al., 
1979; Madigan & Bollenbach, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale 
et al., 1980). The evidence has been rather inconsistent with regard to 
mood effect on these memories. For instance, some investigators have 
obtained findings which are consistent with a mood congruency ef ect on 
the recall of personal memories (Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; 
Madigan & Bollenbach, 1982, Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale et al.. 
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1980). Other researchers have been unable to support a mood congruency 
effect on the recall of early childhood memories (Siegal et al., 1979). 
Whereas the network theory would suggest a facilitation of the 
mood with regard to the recall of personally-relevant events wnich are 
associated with one's prevailing mood (Bower, 1981), the resource 
allocation model predicts the recall of personal memories which are 
highly integrated in the memory system to be relatively impervious to the 
effects of emotional states (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). Clearlv, more 
research needs to be conducted focusing on the effects of mood s on the 
recall of personal memories to resolve these inconsistent findings 
evidenced in the literature. Hence the present study is designed to explore 
how listeners' mood affects conversation memory. In short in the Ught of 
existing findings regarding mood dependent memory anc mood 
congruent memory, it is highly logical to assume that if the listener is in a 
state of elated mood then he may recall humorous content of the 
conversation more than nonhumorous content of the convinsation. 
Further more it may also be assumed that if the listener is in a state of 
depressed/sad mood, he may recall humorous content of the con\ersation 
less than the subject with elated mood. It is further hypothesized that both 
subjects with elated mood and subjects with depressed/sad mood are 
likely to recall incongruent content of the conversation more as compared 
to congruent content of the conversation. The present study is designed to 
test these assumptions also. The findings of the present study v\ill not 
only open a new area of research in memory but will also provide 
significant infonnation about the development of inteipersonal jelations 
and will highlight the process of impression formation. Furthermore, the 
findings of the present study may also be applied in education settings 
like preparing syllabai and teaching methods. 
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CHAPTEE - II 
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In the preceding chapter, it has been pointed out that the study of 
conversation memory provides a means for examining the content and 
structure of social knowledge that play a role in interaction processes. 
Experimental studies of different types on conversation memory have 
amply justified this view .^ In this chapter, we shall review some of the 
important studies that bear direct or indirect relation with the present 
problem. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deal 
with the review of studies that demonstrates the influence of hunorous 
material on conversation memory. The second section is devotee to the 
review of congruent-incongruent version on conversation memory. The 
third and final section of this chapter reviews those studit-s that 
demonstrate the relationship between emotions and memory. More 
specifically the final section review such studies which throw light on the 
impact of different shades of listener's mood on conversation memory. 
SECTION- 1st 
Kaplan and Pascoe (1977) in a study entitled "humorous ecture 
and humorous examples: some effects upon comprehension and 
retenfion" explored the effect of two types of humor upon learning in a 
lecture situation. The two types of humor are humor related o the 
concepts presented in the lecture (or humorous examples) and humor 
unrelated to the lecture's content. The primary concern was to determine 
how vaiying correspondence of humor with the topics of a classroom 
lecture moderates the comprehension and retention of lecture material. 
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The subjects were 508 undergraduate students at a large public 
university. These participants were enrolled in the 16 sections of 
introductory psychology and the experiment was part of their regular 
instruction. Thus, subjects were run in large groups ranging from 13 to 45 
students. Close-circuit videotapes were customarily shown to all section 
as part of course instruction. Subject saw one of four version of a 20-min 
black and white videotape about Freudian personality theory, factual 
material in the lecture came from the chapter on Freud presentation in 
Hall and Lindzey (1970). Points covered in the lecture included a 
biographical sketch of Freud; the concepts of id, ego and superego; 
anxiety and defense; stages of psychosexual development, neo-Freudians; 
and projective techniques of personality assessment. One serious version 
and three humorous versions of the lecture were recorded on videotape. 
The humorous version included humor directly related to some c incepts 
in the lecture (concept humor), humor unrelated to any of the concepts 
(non-concept humor), and a combination of some non-concept and 
concept humor (mixed humor). Six main concepts were presented in the 
each version and they were spaced evenly throughout the lecture In the 
concept humor version, all of the concepts were illustrated by vvay of 
humorous example. An assistant professor of psychology delivered all 
four versions of the lecture. All humorous lines were practiced with a 
pilot audience and delivered on videotape with appropriate intleetion to 
maximize their impact. An example of concept humor centered on the 
difficulty in interpreting sentence completion assessments of personality 
After explaining the typical clinical procedure, the lecture oftered a 
variety of straight and humorous sentence completions. To the sentence 
root "Animals " the speaker responded with "scare me" ior the 
nonhumorous version and used often try to fool me" as the humorous 
punch line. Similarly, the stem "I would like...." met with "to be a 
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doctor" for the serious condition and "to drink blood" for the humorous 
condition. An example of non-concept humor regarding psychosexual 
stages of development was the lecture's comment that "Freudians would 
probably have a good time deciding what stage Linda Lovelace was 
fixated at". 
After the videotape, was played, a two-part questionnaire and an 
answer sheet were distributed to each student. The first section consisted 
of semantic differential scales describing separately the speaker and the 
lecture. Six word pairs taken from Smith (1959) were used to -ate the 
speaker and the lecture. These word pairs were as follows: valuable-
worthless, interesting-boring, serious-humorous, cold-hot, optimistic-
pessimistic, and light-heavy. A numbered, five-choice response; space 
separated each word pair. Subjects were instructed to mark en their 
answer sheet the number of the choice in each word pair that best 
described the lecture they had seen. The second part of the questionnaire 
was comprised of 11 multiple-choice questions on the content of the 
lecture. Of these items, 6 focused on the six critical examples used in the 
concept humor version. These items were dubbed humor items. The other 
5 items were based upon other information in the lecture and are defined 
here as non-humor items. Subjects were instructed to record oa their 
answer sheet which of four alternatives was the best response fcr each 
question. Two additional items on the questionnaire were included to 
code each subject's class section and grade on the previous unit exam. 
The same 11-item quiz was readministered to the subjects 6 weeks after 
initial tape viewing and testing. This retesting was conducted w the 
instructor of each section. 
Result suggested that all of humorous lectures were percei /ed as 
significantly more humorous and light than the serious presentation. 
Although there were some differences between humorous lecture groups 
(e.g., the concept humor lecture was slightly less effective than the other 
humorous presentation), differences between the humorous groups were 
trivial in comparison to the strong differences between each humor group 
and the group hearing the serious presentation. These distinctions were 
noticeable when audiotapes, which were recorded while subjects viewed 
the lecture, were compared for volume of laughter. Unlike students 
viewing the serious version, those viewing humorous version laughed 
during the lecture, especially in response to humorous punch lines. Thus 
there is compelling evidence that manipulation was effective. It was 
observed that any preexisting differences were statistically non-
significant. It was also suggested that the groups differed on performance 
for non-humor items, but did not differ for humor items. It should be 
noted that these students performed non-significantly better on the items 
based on the humorous example. Analysis revealed no significant 
difference between the two groups on either of these test questions. 
However, performance on the postjoke item for the non-concept humor 
group was slightly better and in the direction predicted by the arousal 
hypothesis (p < . 1). The analysis of variance results were as predicted-
groups viewing lectures with more concept-related humor did 
significantly better on items testing recall of the humorous examples than 
did the serious lecture group. Although total test scores were not 
significantly different. 
Keenan, MacWhinney, and Mayhew (1977) undertook a study 
entitled "Pragmatic in Memory: A Study of Natural Conversation". They 
examined (a) the generalizability of laboratory experiments on sentence 
memory to real-world settings and (b) the possible existence of 
differences in memory for sentences that are personally meaningful 
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versus memory for sentences that are not 19 members of the Psychology 
Department (Facuhy and graduate students) at the University ol Denver 
served as subjects. They were participating in research discussion and 
were unaware that they would later be given a memory test on the 
discussion. The procedure format for a research luncheon discussion at 
the University of Denver consisted of one participant presenting a set of 
ideas or experiments and others freely interrupting to ask question, 
expand ideas, give criticism, or make humorous remarks. This lesearch 
discussion under study was held in the usual manner with one exception: 
it was tape-recorded. Participants were aware of the tape records but were 
not aware of the purpose for taping, nor did anyone inquire as to the 
purpose. The speaker for the day was one of the authors. He did not 
attempt to inject statements particularly suited to the experiment; he 
simply spoke in his usual manner. After the discussion they played the 
tape, selecting statements for the recognition test. Two classes of 
statements were defined: high interactional content statements and low 
interactional content statements. High interactional content statements 
typically conveyed wit, sarcasm, humor, or personal criticism. Through 
mutual decision, 15 such statements were selected for the recognition test. 
To match these 15 statements, 15 statements which were ow in 
interactional content were selected from tape in a random fashion. Eight 
of the 15 high interactional content statements were uttered by the main 
speaker and the remaining 7 were uttered by other participants. The 15 
low interactional content statements were matched with the high 
interactional content statements in terms of speakers. 
The mean percentage of OLD (I'm sure the statement was said) 
responses to targets and paraphrases of targets, pooling over high a id low 
interactional content items, was 28% contrasted with a mean percentage 
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of 5% for statements expressing new content. There were 37% OLD 
responses to high interactional content targets and their paraphrases, and 
only 18.5% OLD responses to low interactional content targets and their 
paraphrases. When the interactional content was high, there were 56% 
OLD responses to targets compared to 18%o for paraphrases. On the other 
hand, when the interactional content was low, subjects responde d OLD 
equally often to targets (19%)) and paraphrases (18%). There uas no 
effect of speaker on the memorability of utterances, nor v/as the 
interaction significant. The only significant effect was the effect of 
interactional content. 
Control study 1 was conducted to answer the question: Are there 
differences in sentence memorability when the interactional component is 
removed? A typical sentence memory experiment was performed using 
the target statements of the first experiment. The sentences were 
presented in a list-learning fashion, and memory was tested by the same 
recognition memory test employed in the conversation experimimt. 34 
Introductory psychology students from the University of Den vet-
volunteered to serve as subjects for course credit. Subject listened to a 
tape consisting of 100 conversational-tape sentences. The list of seritences 
included the 15 high and 15 low interactional content statements from the 
conversation experiment and 70 filler sentences. Fillers were in included 
to prevent ceiling effects on the memory test. All of the sentences were 
recorded by the speaker who spoke in a conversational tone. The oider of 
sentences presentation was randomized with constraint that the first 10 
and last 10 sentences of the list were filler items to control for primacy 
and recency effects. Subjects were instructed to listen carefLilly to the 
sentences in order to do well on a subsequent memory test; the natui-e of 
the test was not specified. Immediately after listening to the 100 
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sentences, the subjects were given the same memory test used in the 
conversation experiment, except here the items were not identified by a 
speaker. As before, the subjects were told to rate each altemati^ e using 
the 3 point scale of OLD (I am sure the statement was said), GUESS (I 
cannot remember anything about this statement), and NEW (I im sure 
this statement was not said). Collapsing over high and low interactional 
content statements, the percentage of OLD responses to targets and their 
paraphrases was 32%, while the percentage of OLD responses to new 
content destructors was only 7.5%. The subjects did not show differences 
in memory between high and low interactional content statements. The 
percentage of OLD responses to the target was exactly the same, 47%, for 
both high and low interactional content statements. 
The findings of the previous experiments led Keenan et al. (1977) 
to assume that high recognition rates for high interactional content 
statements reflected subjects' memory for the surface forms ol" these 
statements. However, an alternative explanation may be ihat the 
paraphrase distractors for these statements were of poorer quality than 
paraphrases for low interactional content statements. Thus the third 
experiment was carried out to test this alternative explanation, [n this 
experiment subjects were given the 15 high and 15 low intei actional 
content statements, each paired with its paraphrase, and asked tc choose 
which of the two statements would be most likely to occar in a 
conversational setting such as the research luncheon discussion. 21 
students in an undergraduate learning course at the University ol Denver 
agreed to serve as subjects during class time. None of the subjects knew 
the speakers from the conversation experiment. The subjects were first 
given an extensive descripfion of the setting for the conversation 
experiment. This included a description of the people invoh ed, the 
purpose and procedural format for the discussion, the manner in which 
people interact in these discussions, and some information concer ling the 
topic under discussion. They were also told certain statements had been 
selected from the discussion and had been constructed for them; their task 
was to distinguish paraphrases from the real statements. Following this 
description subjects were given test booklets containing 30 pair of 
statements. Each pair consisted of one of the 30 target statements from 
the conversation experiment and its paraphrase. The subjects were told 
that one of the statements in each pair had actually occurred in the 
conversation, and that their task was to try to determine which one it was. 
The paraphrases were selected more often than the targets for botti higher 
interactional content statements, 59 versus 44%. This difference is highly 
significant and there was no interaction between target and paaphrase 
and high and low interactional content. These results clearly sho'ved that 
there was nothing peculiar about the paraphrase distractors for high 
interactional content statements that could have led subjects in the 
conversation experiment to reject them in favour of the targ<:ts. The 
paraphrases for both high and low interactional content statemejits were 
equally good candidates for conversational statement, and, interestingly, 
were even thought to be better candidates than the targets themselves. 
In the preceding experiment, subjects did not know the speakers. It 
was assumed that knowledge of the speaker's stylistic hal^t may 
determine which statement occurred in the conversation experiment. The 
final experiment was conducted to test this assumption. Thus final 
experiment invesfigated whether knowledge of the speaker allows one to 
select the target rather than the paraphrase for high interactional content 
statement but not for low interactional content statements. If so, then the 
surface form effect in the conversafion experiment could not be 
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interpreted as a result of memory; rather, it would reflect reconstruction 
on the basis of knowledge of the speaker's stylistic habits. 15 University 
of Denver faculty and graduate students who rated themselves as familiar 
with the speakers and the setting of the conversation experiment, out who 
did not attend that particular discussion, served as subjects. The 
procedure was similar to that of preceding experiment. Tlie only 
difference was that each pair of statements in this case was ideniitied by 
the speaker. In making their judgments which statement occurred, the 
subjects were asked to consider, phrase structure, lexical items, and 
overall "sound" of the statement in terms of the particular speaker. It 
should be noted that all subjects were highly motivated and none felt that 
their selections were at all random. Subjects who knew the speakers were 
totally unable to distinguish the targets from the paraphrases, bo h in the 
case of the high interactional content statements and in the case of low 
interactional content statements. The analysis of variance coniinned that 
there was no main effect of interactional content, or target-paraphrase, 
and there was no interaction. These results clearly supported the 
contention that the participants in the discussion actually remembered the 
surface forms of high interactional content statements, and did not simply 
base their responses on their knowledge of the stylistic habits ot a given 
speaker. The present experiment showed that knowledge of the speaker 
was not sufficient to distinguish the targets from the paraphrase. Thus, tor 
the sentences used in these experiments, knowledge of the spet ker was 
only sufficient to overcome a response bias for the paraphrase and allow 
responding in accordance with chance. 
Kintsch and Bates (1977) carriedout two experiments on memory 
for classroom lectures. They were interested in two important questions. 
First, will student remember only the meaning of a lecture or will they 
remember the meaning plus the actual words used? Second, is there a 
difference in the amount of memory for various types of statements'? In 
particular, are topic statement remembered better than mere illustrative 
material and is there prefential memory for extraneous statements (e.g., 
jokes, announcements) embedded in a lecture? Three types of statements 
were tested; topic statements, details, and such extraneous renarks as 
joke announcements. The findings revealed that two and five day after 
listening class lecture, students showed significance memory for laeanlng 
in that they were able to discriminate sentences actually spoken in the 
lecture or their paraphrases from control sentences that they had never 
heard before. Moreover extraneous sentences-jokes, comments to the 
audience, and announcements were recognized better than descriptive 
statements. Such a finding was explained by the researcher's interm of 
von Restorff effect in which unique elements are remembered better than 
non unique elements. Such an effect might be enhanced by the tact that 
jokes in particular provide relief from the heavy information load of the 
standard lecture. 
Zillmann, Willliams, Bryant, Boynton and Wolf (1980) 
investigated acquisition of information from educational television 
programs as a function of differently paced humorous insens. The 
investigation was designed to determine the particular effects of the 
involvement of humor and, more specifically, of the pacing of humor in 
educational programs for children on information acquisition and on 
hedonic aspects of the learning experience. Nonhumorous educational 
programs were produced, and, in the humor conditions, iaentical 
humorous inserts were interspersed at a comparatively slow or fast pace 
Since the humorous programs were thus necessarily of longer duration 
than the no-humor control program, giving the post-exposure 
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information-acquisition test, and since the particular schedule of humor 
interspersion can be seen as a unique disruption pattern that impairs 
information acquisition, two additional control conditions were 
employed. One control condition replicated the interspersion schedule of 
slow pacing, and the other control condition replicated that of fast pacing. 
Non-content (i.e. black screen) was inserted in these controls tc» assure 
minimal distraction from the educational message. 
The humor employed in this investigation was unrelatec to the 
specific contents of the educational message. As a consequence, any 
findings cannot readily be generalized to messages in which humor is a 
truly integral part of the educational information. 
76 Kindergartens and first-grade children (ages 5 years 6 months 
through 7 years 2 month), approximately half whom were males md half 
of whom were females, participated as subjects in the experimeni. All of 
the children were students at the Fort River Elementary School in 
Amherst, Massachusetts. The children's parents had been contacted by 
letter concerning the experiment. If they were willing to let their child or 
their children participate, the parents signed and returned an informed 
consent statement. Parental permission was received for 81 % of the 
children enrolled in these two grades level. For the investigation, children 
were randomly selected from this subject pool. Four edicational 
presentations were especially designed and produced for the experiment. 
Humorous episodes were taken from several televised carttton and 
Muppet programs. In the humor conditions, humorous episodes were 
interspersed in the educational segments in such a way hat the 
presentation of particular facts, circumstances, or views \vas not 
disrupted. In the humor conditions that controlled for the tim^ > of the 
interspersed humorous episodes, the screen was left blank (i.a. black 
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without sound) for exactly the periods of time taken up by the humorous 
episodes in the time-controlled condition. Each educational segment was 
composed of material that was considered to be novel to most children of 
the age level tested, yet the segments were written and produced so that 
the target audience could readily comprehend the bulk of the material 
presented. Each segment employed child actors and actresses; 
additionally, adult talent was employed in three of the four segments. All 
presentations used dialogue and were set in the home environment. 
Professional production facilities were employed in all instances, and the 
finished products were considered to be equivalent in quality to children's 
educational television stations. All segments were presented in color. The 
following four educational, presentations were employed. (1) The 
"Philatelisf, a segment about the hobby of stamp collecting, which 
presented two 8 years-old boys who were examining a stamp album while 
discussing stamp of other countries, the prices of rare stamps, and some 
of the procedures used by philatelists. This segment was 2 min 7 sec long. 
(2) "The Angkor of the Ennuif, which featured a little girl who was sick 
with a cold and whose mother consoled her while comparing the 
procedures of the typical American physician with the functions and 
method of the Ennuit medicine man. The segment was 4 min 2 e^c long 
(3) "Epiphytes", which showed a mother potting root-bound plants and 
discussing with her daughter plants that grow in environments other than 
soil. The segment was 2 min 53 sec long. (4) "Marriage in the Gisu 
Tribe", which presented a mother who was trying to wake her sleepy 
daughter so that they could attend a wedding. The mother described the 
customs and bonding ritual of the Gisu tribe of Uganda. This segment 
was 4 min 30 sec in length. The humorous bits were eight segme its from 
children's cartoon and Muppet programs. They were each approximately 
30 sec long and were composed primarily of slapstick routines and short 
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"one-liners" delivered by the Muppets. The episodes were self-Contained 
and were selected on intuitive grounds as at least moderately funny and 
moderately appealing to children at the age level tested. The contents of 
humorous episodes were totally unrelated to the educational messages in 
which they were embedded educational segments, episodes humorous 
and time controlling blanks were edited as to create the fine experimental 
communication. The no-humor control condition was composed of the 
four educational segments described previously (1-4, in that sequence). 
Its duration, accordingly, was 13 min 32 sec. All other conditions were 
about 4 min longer (8 times 30 sec, the average time of a hunorous 
episode). In the slow-paced humor condition, two consecutive hu norous 
episodes were placed after each of the four educational segments. The 
average time the educational message without humor was thus about 200 
sec. In the fast-paced humor condition, in contrast, one humorous episode 
was placed approximately in the middle, and one was placed at the 
conclusion of each of the four educational segments. The order of the 
humorous episodes (1-6) was not changed, however. In this condition, the 
average time of the educational message without humor was about 100 
sec. The two remaining conditions were controls for the two different 
distributions of humorous episodes. With both location and time of the 
episodes being controlled by blanks, these conditions provided a slow-
paced and a fast-paced no-humor control. 
Analyses of variance (ANOVAS) performed on the various 
dependent measures failed to reveal any appreciable differences between 
male and female respondents. The sex-of-respondent variabk was 
consequently collapsed, and all findings reported apply to both ma e and 
female Kindergarten and first-grade children. The findings strongly 
support the view that humor in educational programs for children, even if 
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the humorous stimuH are rather arbitrarily interspersed, fosters increased 
attentiveness and, ultimately, superior information acquisition, ' he data 
regarding visual attention leave no doubt about the fact that exposure to 
humorous stimuli created high levels of attentiveness and that these 
elevated levels of attentiveness extended into the exposure to educational 
materials. At the attention level then, the data unequivocally disconfirm 
and appose the view that the involvement of humor in education only 
distracts from the essential message and, hence, impairs information 
acquisition. The finding that the presentation of humorous materials in a 
fast pace produced the enhancement effect on information accuisition 
more rapidly than their presentation in a slow paced is entirely ir accord 
with the reasoning on vigilance and alertness. In practical terms, the 
educator who deals with an audience whose attentiveness is below the 
level necessary for effective communication should indeed bene'It from 
employing humor early and in frequent short burst. The findings of the 
present investigation fail to support the view that education suffers from 
humor involvement in that the serious segments conveying the 
educational message will be perceived as particularly loyless, 
uninteresting, and dull, incontrast to the humorous portions. Rather, the 
data lend limited support to the opposite claim: the positive afeclive 
reaction to humor appears to generalize to the educational message. In the 
present investigation, humor was entirely secondary to education (in 
terms of time). If this emphasis is reversed and humor becomes dominant, 
it must, ofcourse, be expected that sooner or later the disruption of the 
educational message will produce learning impairments. Needless to say, 
the facilitating effect of humor on information acquisition can also be 
neutralized and overpowered by interference from disruption. The 
excessive use of humor is certainly not advisable. However, it remains to 
be determined empirically at exactly what point and under exactlv what 
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circumstances the use of humor in educational produces undesirable 
effects and, hence, warrants the verdict of excessive. 
Finally, it should also be clear that the findings of the present 
investigation can't readily be generalized, in fact, they should not be 
generalized-to all conceivable motivational circumstances in the 
educational setting. The findings accord with the proposal that humor-
insfigated vigilance mediates greater attentiveness to nonhumorous 
portions of the surrounding program. The proposal presupposes that 
attentiveness to those nonhumorous portions is not at extreme levels. 
Stafford and Daly (1984) conducted an experimental study entitled 
"conversation memory: The effort of recall mode and nemory 
expectancies on remembrance of natural conversation". Th*;} have 
pointed out that conversations though, are part of our every day life and 
central to the social life of an individual ,unfortunately very little 
attention has been paid to the remembrance people have cf them. 
Conversations represent stimuli that are distinctly different from most 
other stimuli that people are required to remember. Conversations are 
jointly created, constantly update and necessarily are readily accessible 
by participants. Thus Stafford and Daly (1984) explored memory for the 
natural conversation in 128 undergraduates who participated in dyadic 
social exchange. Even only after 5 minutes, subjects were able to 
recollect only about 10 percent of what was said. The modes of the recall 
(written verses oral) and the presence and type of memory goal affected 
what and how much, interacfion was recalled. Subjects also remt:mbered 
more of their partner's comments in the interaction than their own. It was 
concluded that personality, recall mode, and expectancy concer ling the 
upcoming memory task all determine how much and what was 
remembered. 
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Gibbs (1987) examined the hypothesis that people best remember 
requests that do not specify the main projected reason for addresses not 
complying with the request. Result of a recognition memory using eighty 
four undergraduates supported this idea when subjects heard requests 
stated in conversational content. Without content, however, there vere on 
differences in subject memory for the different type of requests It was 
suggested that people memory for requests in conversation is dependent 
on the assessment made by speakers and listeners of the particular plans 
and goals that each has in various social situations. 
Benoit and Benoit (1987) carried out an experimental siudy to 
investigate conversational memory using cued and free recall. This study 
focused on a comparison of cued and free recall, testing two hypotheses: 
(a) verbal reports of Conversational interaction employing cued re:all are 
significantly more accurate than those employing free recall (b) 
conversational interactants remember more of their.interactional partner's 
utterances than their own. Results showed that subjects recalled 
significantly more conversation under the cued recall than undei- free 
recall condition .There was no difference between recall of own and othei-
comments overall under the free recall condition. However, subjects in 
the cued recall condition, subjects remembered more of their interactional 
partner's utterances. Finally, they concluded this study tested the 
accuracy of verbal reports elicited from memory by free and cued recall 
items. Cued recall produce significantly higher amounts of memory than 
free recall, demonstrating that humans are able to store and retrieve 
substantial amounts of conversational information, when properly 
elicited. Subjects did not recall more of their international patner's 
remarks than their own. In one condition (cued recall), subject 
remembered more (82% verses 76%) of their own than the others 
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utterances, but this is quite possibly an artifact of the accuracy criterion 
employed (gist). Further work needs to be conducted into the relative 
efficacy of various recall cues, and data here supported the notion that 
semantic cues are stronger than temporal one (89% versue 69%). 
Research employing a verbatim criterion could determine whe her the 
greater memory for own comment in the cued recall condition was an 
artifact of coding criterion, or whether subjects actually remember more 
of their own than other's utterances under cued recall. 
Hjelmquist (1989) in an experimental study tested Recognition 
memory for utterances in conversation. In his study forty four uni\ersity 
student listened to a dyadic conversation and were tested immt;diately 
afterwards or four days later. 
Neither two people in tape recorded conversation know each other 
nor did the audience know the two speaker-listeners on the tape. This 
design was used to further clarify the role of familiarity and personal 
participation for memory of conversational discourse. Gist memory was 
high in both conditions with lower performance after four days. Surface 
memoiy could be verified, and the level of variables used to index surface 
memory was about the same in both the immediate and delayed 
condition. 
Long (1994) explored two components of natural discourse (i.e. 
pragmatics and discourse style) in the context of conversation embedded 
in to naiTatives. Result from three experiments with a total cf 180 
undergraduates suggested that both components play a role in memory for 
the surface of the sentences. Recognition memory increased as a fuaction 
of information about the speaker's positive and negative attitudes 
Recognition memory was enhanced to the extent that such evaljative 
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information was conveyed by formulaic expressions (i.e. idioms, 
common expressions) that are characteristic of oral style discourse. 
Results were confirmed using a recall task. Subject exhibited substantial 
verbatim memory for evaluative and formulaic expressions. 
Schmidt (1994) in an experiment compared the memoiy for 
humorous and nonhumorous version of sentences. In order to investigate 
the memory of humorous and nonhumorous version of sentences, 
Schmidt (1994) carried out six experiments. 
The purpose of experiment 1 was to develop a set of materials 
which was used to study the effects of humor on memoiy. The cKample 
of humorous sentence was "The only way to keep your good health is to 
eat what you do not want, drink what you would rather not". The example 
of nonhumorous sentence was "The only way to keep your good health is 
to eat good food, drink healthy drinks, and do healthy activities'. Thus 
the researcher used 20 sentences for which the humoroiis and 
nonhumorous versions differed in their rated humor. Lists containing half 
humorous and half nonhumorous sentences were presented to 38 subjects 
in an intentional memory task. Then subjects were asked to recall the 
sentences. The findings revealed that subjects recalled greater proportion 
of humorous sentences than nonhumorous sentences. Similarly it was 
found that larger proportion of words was recalled from humorous 
sentences than from nonhumorous sentences. These results demonstrated 
that sentences humor is an effective mnemonic variable. 
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate the results of experiment 1 
and to determine whether the effects reported in the experiments I 
generalized to a between-subjects design. The impact of huinorous 
sentences and nonhumorous sentences on memory sentences in the same 
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list was determined in experiment 2. In the between-subjects design, 40 
subjects studied an all- humorous list and 40 subjects studied an all 
nonhumorous list. He used the same sentences as in experimert 1 and 
constructed these sentences into four lists. Two mixed lisis were 
constructed that contained half humorous and half nonhumorous 
sentences. The results from these findings were somewhat consistent with 
the hypothesis that humorous sentences received increased attention when 
presented in the context of nonhumorous sentences. However, if 
increased attention is an automatic process, why did the presence of 
humorous sentences have a negative effect on the recall of the 
nonhumorous sentences? This result is most consistent with the rehearsal 
hypothesis in which increased rehearsal of humorous sentences was at the 
expense of rehearsal on nonhumorous sentences. 
Experiment 3 had two main purposes: to determine whetier the 
effects of humor generalized to a cued-recall test and to test the 
hypothesis that the effects of humor on memory resulted from "surprise" 
at encountering humorous sentences in the context of a nonhumorous 
experiment. The comparison between cued and free recall piovides 
another test of retrieval explanations for enhanced memory of humorous 
sentences. 80 introductory psychology students participated in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. Ten subjects served in each ct 11 of a 
2 (labeled vs. not labeled) X 2 (free vs. cued recall) X 2 (list 1 vs. list 2) 
between-subject factorial. Type of sentence (humorous vs. nonhumorous) 
was manipulated within subjects. He used the same sentence sets ae those 
used in experiment 1 and 2. One or two words that were central to the 
meaning of each sentence were selected as retrieval cues and cue v\ords 
were underlined in all sentence sets. The measures of recall reported in 
experiments 1 and 2 were again used. He calculated separate ANOVAs 
on each measure with label, type of test, list, type of sentence, and 
sentence serving as variables. The effect of humor on sentence memory 
occurred independently of labeling and type of memory test. Telling 
subjects that the sentence they are about to read in humorous does not 
diminish the effect of humor on memory. Thus, the effects of hunor are 
not due to the surprise resulting from unexpectedly encountenng a 
humorous sentence. In addition, the effects of humor occurred i i both 
free and cued recall. In the cued recall test, recall order was controlled. 
As a result, the average recall position of humorous material was not less 
than the recall position of nonhumorous material. The positive effect of 
humor in cued recall thus eliminated output interference as an exphmation 
of those effects. To further investigate the relationship betweer rated 
humor and memory, experiment 4 was carried in which he asked subject 
to rate the sentences on humor before taking the memory test. He was 
also interested in investigating the effects of humor on incidental 
memory. There were 48 subjects in this experiment selected from the 
same pool as the subject in experiments 1-3. A within subjects 
manipulation of humor was used. There were two sentence lists, each half 
humorous and nonhumorous. 24 subjects were tested on each l;st. Me 
used the same 18 sentences as those in experiment 3. Unlike the pievious 
experiments, the sentences in this experiment were videotapeii. The 
sentences were projected in the middle of the screen, with one sentence 
displayed at a time. Each sentence was displayed for 10 sec. foUo^ ved b} 
a brief tone. The results of experiment 4 provided some additional 
support for the role of intentional rehearsal in producing the positive 
effect of humor on memory. That is, under incidental learning conditions 
the effects of experimentally defined humor v/ere attenuated. Hcuever, 
intentional rehearsal did not provide a complete explanation of the effect 
of humor. With the strict scoring criteria, more sentences, defined by the 
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experimenter as humorous, were recalled than nonhumorous sentences. 
To the extent that rated humor reflects attentive-getting properties of the 
sentences, these results supported the role attention and the incoiigruit} 
hypothesis. 
Experiment 5 had two main purposes: to further expk're the 
relation between rated humor and memory and to further explore the 
effects of humor on the conditional probability of word recall given 
sentence recall. Another purpose of this experiment was to provide a test 
of the hypotheses developed by Dixon, Willingham, Strano, and Chandler 
(1989). Subject were asked to rate their sense of humor. They were then 
subdivided to determine whether self-reported sense of humor was related 
to recall. 65 students were sampled from various psychology classes 
during the summer term in exchange for extra course credit. The sabjects 
were tested in groups ranging in size from 15 to 20. One subject was 
dropped for failure to complete the rating scale, and two subjects were 
dropped to balance the number of subjects receiving each list. Tlius. he 
used data from two groups of 31 subjects. Each subject read one c»f the 
two lists of sentences in a within-list manipulation of sentence Jnimor, 
The 18 sentences used in experiments 3 and 4 served as the to-be-
remembered items. The 2 sentences from the original list that WLTC not 
used as sample sentences in the instructions. For all conditions, sentence 
1 was presented in its nonhumorous form, and sentence 12 was prt sented 
in its humorous form. 
This experiment provided a replication and extension of the effect 
reported in experiment 4. The effect of experimentally defined humor 
were attenuated in an incidental tasks in which subjects were asked to rate 
the humor of sentences. This result was obtained when open-ended 
ratings of humor were used (experiment 4) and when subjects were asked 
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to confine their attention to the relative humor of sentences occuiTing in 
the experiment. Thus, even when humorous and nonhumorous seatences 
clearly received different ratings of humor, the experiment manipulation 
of humor had a relatively small effect on retention. However, subject"s 
definition of humor was strongly related to memory, with memory 
increasing as related humor increased. The analysis of recall as a f auction 
of rated humor provided evidence against the hypothesis that subject's 
rehearsal anchors used in the rating task, and that this rehearsal was 
responsible for increased retention of humorous material. Instead, the 
results supported the hypothesis that subject-defmed humor affects the 
amount of attention an individual devotes to a sentence. 
The main purpose of experiment 6 was to explore the effects of 
humor on incidental memory in a between-subject design. Experiment 2 
demonstrated that, in intentional learning, the effects of experirrentally 
defined humor were only obtained in a within-subjects design. On the 
basis of the attention hypothesis developed, one would expect that the 
same pattern of results would be found in incidental learning, /v more 
interesting prediction was that relative humor in a list should predict 
relative recall of sentences from the list. From the experimenter's 
perspective, both the humorous and nonhumorous lists in a between-
subjects design were homogeneous. However, from the subject's 
perspectives each list contained sentences that vary in humor. The 
amount of attention a sentence received may still vary with peiceived 
humor, and rated humor should still predict recall. To test these 
predictions, he used a rating task similar to that of experiment 4, and 
subjects were given an unexpected recall test. The open-ended rating 
scale was used so that differences between rating of humorous sentence 
from one group of subjects and ratings of nonhumorous sentences by the 
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other group of subjects could be detected. 52 subjects participated for 
extra course credit in a between-subject design with 26 subjects n each 
group. The same 18 sentences as those from experiments 3-5 were again 
used. Two lists were constructed and recorded on video tape. C>ne list 
contained the humorous versions of the sentences, whereas the otder list 
contained the nonhumorous versions. The results provided some 
additional support for the role of intentional rehearsal in memory for 
humorous materials. In intentional learning, increased recall of humorous 
material occurred at the expense of recall of nonhumorous material 
(experiment 2). This trade-off did not occur in incidental learning. Recall 
of nonhumorous material with incidental learning in within sibjects 
design (experiment 4 and 5) did not differ from recall of the same 
material in the between-subjects design (experiment 6). For example, 
compare the strict sentence recall in experiment 4 with the strict sentence 
recall in experiment 6. In addition, a significant effect of humor was 
observed in the experiment 4 with the strict measure of sentence recall 
Mean recall of humorous and nonhumorous sentences was .21 and . 14 in 
experiment 4, and .15 and .13 in experiment 6, respective!}. Ihe 
enhanced recall of humorous sentences in experiment 4 was not at the 
expense of nonhumorous sentences. 
Wyer and others (1995) tested the hypothesis that (1) reac.ion to 
the statements made during an informal conversation use is likely to be 
influenced by perceptions of their pragmatic implications as well as literal 
implications for the persons and object to which they refer; aid (2) 
recipients sensitivity to a statement pragmatic in meaning may depend on 
their information processing objectives when they encounter the 
statement and the extent to which the statement violates the rec pients 
normative contextual and stylistic expectations of the messages. The 
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hypotheses were supported by findings obtained by Wyre et al. (1995) 
and two studies in which 284 university students were aslced to form 
impression of persons on the basis of information exchanged during 
conversations in which they did and did not actively participate. 
Berk (2000) investigated "does humor in course tests educes 
anxiety and improves performance"? Given the paucity of evidence on 
the effects of humor in tests as well as the limited focus and condiions of 
previous studies (i.e., primarily multiple-choice items with content-
irrelevant humor in undergraduate psychology classes), he designed a 
different study of humor to target (a) constructed-response item f annats, 
but also included multiple-choice and matching formats,(b) content-
relevant humor that is an integral part of what an item is measuring,(c) 
undergraduates and graduates course in statistics, (d) day and e\ening 
graduate courses, (e) students perceptions of the extent to which humor in 
reducing their test anxiety and improving their performance, and (f) the 
reliability and validity of these perceptions with multiple cross-va idation 
samples of different students over six years. Seventeen convenience 
samples of students (N = 695) enrolled in six undergraduate and eleven 
graduate introductory (level one) statistics courses at the Johns Flopkins 
University's (JHU) School of Nursing were selected for this study. These 
two-and three-credit courses met for 15 weeks during each regular 
semester from fall 1994 through fall 1999. The accreditation board 
required all students to satisfy these course requirements in the bachelor 
and master's degree programs. He administered the Humor Effect \eness 
Evaluation, developed six years ago for a study of humor strategies (Berk 
1996; Berk and Nanda 1998), to students at the end of the last class 
(before the final exam). They completed it anonymoush. Ihe 
confidentiality was preserved until final grades were submitted to the 
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registrar's office. The same questionnaire and procedure were used for 
both undergraduates and graduates courses. Only one item on two of the 
three subscales focused on "humorous material on exams". The students 
were asked to rate the effectiveness of the strategy in producing two 
outcomes, "to reduce your anxiety on the exam" to perform your best on 
the exam". The student perceptions of effectiveness were graduated on a 
scale of ineffective, somewhat effective, moderately effective, very 
effective, and extremely effective. These were holistic ratings of 
effectiveness. Student were not requested to rate the effectiveness of the 
humor in the different item formats. Their rating reflected the overall 
impact of the humor on their anxiety and performance. The student 
ratings of effectiveness for each class were analyzed by computing 
median ratings for the anxiety and performance outcomes or criteria. 
First, the findings indicated that most students feel that tiumor 
makes a difference in their test performance; second, this effect was 
demonstrated with three item formats measuring "real-life" higher-order 
thinking skills, third, the effect was not idiosyncratic to just one class or 
level of students; fourth, the effect was consistent over time (six years) 
and accurate for different cross-validation samples; and fmally, tl e effect 
was general across undergraduates courses, day and evening graduates 
courses, and a range of class sizes, students, and exams. 
SECTION- Ilnd 
As stated earlier, this section exclusively reviews those studies that 
highlight the impact of congruent-incongruent version of convers.ition on 
conversation memory. 
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Hunt and Elliott (1980) investigated the role of non semantic 
information in memory: orthographic distinctiveness effects on retention. 
Two general issues around which this series of studies was designed 
involved the theoretical mechanisms mediating non semantic factors in 
memory and the empirical issue of the source of distinctiveness in the 
physical stimuli. 
The initial experiments were devoted to delineating the 
circumstances under which the OD effect may be obtained. The rationale 
for these studies was to introduce manipulations that would reduce or 
eliminate the effect. The natures of these manipulations then provide a 
reasonable basis for inferring the source of distinctiveness in the physical 
stimulus as well as the functional locus of distinctiveness effect in 
memory. The first experiment, therefore, involved presentation of OD 
(orthographic distinctiveness) and OC (orthographic common) vords in 
mixed verses unmixed lists. All previous studies reporting OD effects 
have manipulated OD in mixed lists. It is possible that the immeciate list 
content of OD encodings of the OD words. If such is the case, no OD 
effect would be expected following unmixed presentation of OD and OC 
words. An interaction of this form, an OD effect in mixed lists but no 
effect in unmixed lists, would suggest a very simple differential attention 
interpretation of OD effect. That is, OD words in mixed lists may be so 
different as to "surprise" the subject and attract additional prt'cessing 
time, perhaps in the form of additional rehearsal, at the expense o( OC 
words. In unmixed lists, the competition for processing time would not 
exist, and no OD effect would be obtained. The subjects v.ere 60 
undergraduate volunteers randomly assigned to one of four corditions, 
each containing an equal number of subjects. The four conditio is were 
based on an orthogonal combination of two variables, list type and word 
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type. The two levels of word type were OD and OC words. List t} pe was 
represented by mixed and unmixed presentation of OD and OC words. In 
order to directly compare performance as a function of list type, Grice's 
(1966) design for direct comparison of between and within-subject 
variables was used. According to this design, the unmixed-list cor ditions 
involved lists containing only OD or OC words. The mixed-list groups 
were given lists containing an equal number of OD and OC words; 
however, for one group, performance was analyzed only on OD items and 
for the other group, performance was analyzed only for OC items Thus, 
the design was a 2(list type) X (word type) factorial with four group; 
unmixed OD (UOD), unmixed OC (UOC), mixed OD (MOD), and mixed 
OC (MOC). The stimuli were obtained by selecting 50 words that 
appeared to be orthographically distinctive. These words ther were 
matched with OC words on the basis of Thomdike-Lorge frequency. 
associative meaningfulness, number of letters, and first lette. The 
meaningfulness data on these words were obtained by asking 50 subjects 
to write as many associations as possible to each word in a 30-sec period. 
The words also were scaled for distinctiveness by a second group of 50 
subjects who rated the words for visual "weirdness" on a 5-poin scale 
where 5 = very weird. As the result of these scalings, 20 OD-OC words 
pairs were selected for which the mean meaningfulness values were 5.11 
and 5.12 for OC and OD words, respectively. The average distinctiveness 
ratings were 2.43 for OC and 4.o6 for OD words. The following OC-OD 
examples were included in the lists: leaky-lymph, kennel-khaki, airway-
afghan. The 20 OD words made up the study list for the UOD condition, 
and the 20 OC words were presented in the UOC condition. For the MOD 
and MOC conditions, the 20 OD-OC pairs were arranged randomly into 
two lists of 20 OD and OC words. Each of these two lists was presented 
to half of the MOD and MOC subjects. In each condition, two different 
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presentation orders of the lists were used. With each order, the words 
were arranged randomly, with the restrictions on the mixed lists that no 
more than two OD and OC words would occur contiguously and that an 
equal number of OD and OC words would occupy the last si< serial 
positions. 
The effect of list type on recall was not reliable. The total recall 
from mixed as compared to unmixed lists was numerically equal. Word 
type had a significant effect on performance. However, inspection of the 
means suggests that the beneficial effect of OD words was limited to the 
mixed-lists comparison. A Duncan's Range Test revealed a significant 
difference between MOD and MOC recall but no reliable difference 
between UOD and UOC. Thus, the data clearly demonstrated tiiat OD 
words facilitate performance only when presented in a list contain ng 0 ( ' 
words. They also found the superior recall of OD words in mixed list 
without a reliable difference between OD and OC words in unmixed lists. 
This interaction implicated the immediate test context as an imooitant 
condition for OD effects on memory. 
Experiment 2 was designed to test directly the time-sharing 
explanation of OD effects. In order to test this hypothesis, subjects were 
allowed to view each word in a mixed OD-OC list for as long as the} 
thought necessary to remember the word. The amount of time spent on 
each word was then considered in relation to recall performarce. In 
addition, the manipulation designed to provide initial information 
concerning the aspect of a word that make it distinctive for memor> 
purposes and second purpose of experiment 2 was to provide information 
on the source of physical distinctiveness by comparing recall of 
capitalized and un-capitalized words. 30 undergraduate volunteers were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups containing 15 subjects eac i. The 
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two conditions differed only in that all of the words were capitalized in 
one (UC condition), and were in lowercase for the other (LC condition). 
In each condition, the same lists of words, half OD and half OC, were 
presented. Thus, the design was 2 (type font) X 2 (word type) mixed 
factorial. The words were the 20 OC-OD pairs used in the mi>.ed-list 
conditions of experiment 1. Two lists of 10 matched pairs eaci were 
used with half of the subjects in each of the type font conditions receiving 
one of the lists. Each of the two 20-word lists was presented in two 
different random orders. 
Neither the list variable nor the order of presentation variable had 
any effect on recall, and both were ignored in subsequent analyses. The 
amount of time spent viewing a word was not reliably affected by either 
type font or orthographic distinctiveness. Both variables, however, had a 
significant effect on recall perfonnance. The pattern of these conditional 
probabilities is the same as in experiment 1, but in the present 
experiment, the differences were not reliable. The results showed an OD 
effect in the LC condition in the absence of a reliable differenc(? in the 
amount of time devoted to OD and OC words. The pattern of resuJts from 
contingent recall scores and study time suggests that enhanced recall of 
OD words is not satisfactorily explained by a time-sharing hypothesis. 
In the third experiment, the major variables of the first two 
experiments were combined in a single design. Subjects received OD and 
OC words in either mixed or unmixed lists; the words were e tlier all 
capitalized or all in lowercase. Based on the results of the f rst two 
experiments, one would expect the OD effect to occur only in the case of 
mixed-list presentation of lowercase words. The absence of contrast with 
OC words in the unmixed lists should preclude enhanced recal of OD 
words. The lack of visual irregularity in the mixed lists with u})percase 
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words also should eliminate the OD effect. There is little reason to 
believe that these latter rnanipulations would differentially affect 
performance. The subjects were 88 introductory psychology students who 
were randomly assigned to one of eight different conditiors. The 
conditions were formed by an orthogonal combination of list type (mixed 
vs unmixed presentation of OD), type font (upper vs lower case), and 
word type (OD vs OC). The list type and word type variabks were 
combined in Grice's (1966) design in the same fashion as described for 
experiment 1. Type font was manipulated entirely between subjec ts. The 
eight groups so formed were mixed-list-lowercase-OD, mi>ed-list-
lowercase-OC, unmixed-list-lowercase-OD, unmixed-list-lover-OC, 
unmixed-list-uppercase-OD, and unmixed-list-uppercase-OC. Eacti of the 
four unmixed-list conditions contained 15 subjects, and 7 subjects were 
assigned to each of the four mixed-list condition. Procedural details, 
including stimulus materials, were the same as in experiment 1 with the 
exception of the capitalization of all words in two of the mixed and 
unmixed lists. 
Results suggested that neither word type, list type, nor type font 
had a main effect on performance and word type did interact v ith list 
type. The effect of word type also interacted marginally with type font. 
Most important, however, was the reliable interaction between list type, 
type font, and word type. This triple interaction was the })rimary 
prediction of the experiment. The findings suggested that the effect is due 
to enhanced recall of lowercase OC words in mixed lists. 
Subsequent analyses confirmed this interpretation of tht triple 
interaction. In separate analyses of the mixed and unmixed list data, the 
mixed list yielded no effect of type font or, most importantly, word type, 
nor did the two variables interact. The mixed-list analyse.'^  were 
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considerably different, revealing a main effect ropv^ovd.»-^e and a 
reliable word Type X Type Font interaction. 
The purpose of the fourth experiment was to examine the relative 
contributions of phonemic and orthographic attributions to the OO effect 
by comparing the OD effect following aural and visual presentatic^n of the 
same lists. The comparison was based on the assumption that luditory 
presentation encourages phonemic encoding and visual presentation 
encourages orthographic encoding. The subjects were 30 undergraduate 
volunteers who were randomly assigned to one of two groups of i5 
subjects each. The two groups differed only in that list presentation was 
visual for one and aural for the other. In each condition, the word lists 
were the same as those of experiment 2 and 3. Although it was not 
feasible to equate the auditory and visual exposure rate for each v/ord, the 
total presentation time in the two conditions remained constant 10 
word/min. In addition, the amount of time allotted to each word was 6 
sec. In the visual condition, each word exposed on slides for 3 sec 
followed by 3 sec of a blank slide prior to presentation of the next word. 
In the auditory condition, the words were presented via a tape recorder at 
the rate of 1 word every 6 sec. All subjects were given the same standard 
free-recall test with a maximum time limit of 3 min was administt3red. 
Recall of OD words exceeded that of OC words but the C»E) effect 
was not consistent across presentation mode as evidenced by a reliable 
presentation Mode X Word Type interaction. The source of interaction is 
clear from inspection of the means. The OD effect was pr-esent with 
visual but not with auditory presentation. The main effect of presentation 
mode was not reliable. These results are quite straightforwai-d in 
implicating visual presentation in the OD effect. Although it s highly 
likely that visual presentation is accompanied by covert pronunciation, it 
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does not seem reasonable to argue that visual presentation sensitizes the 
subject to phonemic attributes to a greater extent that does auditory 
presentation, consistent with the finding in the second study tiat OD 
effects are eliminated by capitalizing the words, distinctive orthography 
appears to arise from the visual pattern presented by the letter 
combinations. 
The experiment fifth addressed the questions concerning the 
mechanisms mediafing OD effects through an examination of the 
interaction of semantic processing and non-semantic structure. The 
subjects were 80 undergraduate volunteers who were randomly assigned 
to one of five equally sized groups. Each group performed different 
orienting tasks as follows: In seen group the subjects simply viev\ed the 
words, in the write group subjects wrote each word as it appeared, in the 
association group subjects wrote the first word that came to mind when 
each list word appeared, in the pleasantness group subjects raled each 
word for pleasantness on a 5-point scale, and in the sentence group 
subjects wrote a sentence containing each list word. The word lists were 
those used in experiment 2 and 3, and each word was exposed for 5 sec. 
The words were printed in lowercase and all subjects were given 
intentional memory instructions. All other details of procedure ^vere the 
same as experiment 1. Orienting Task X Word Type interaction was not 
reliable indicating that the OD effect was consistent across the orienting 
tasks. The OD effect itself was reliable. Thus, within the range of these 
orienting tasks, OD words had a consistent positive effect regardless of 
the particular orienfing tasks. Overall performance was highest in the 
sentence condition, and the same Newman-Keuls analysis revt.-aled no 
reliable differences among the other orienfing tasks. Inspite of the 
differential effect of orienting instructions, the relative effect of OD 
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remained essentially constant over conditions. The size of the Ol) effect 
is virtually the same in the four orienting task conditions. It is equally 
interesting to note that the reduction in the magnitude of the OD effect 
relative to the seen condition is due in all cases to an increase in the 
percentage of OC words recalled and a corresponding decreas<.' in the 
percentage of OD words recalled. Thus, this analysis indicates that, 
although qualitatively different orienting tasks produce differenticd recall, 
the size of the OD effect is independent of the type of orienting task. 
The rationale of the last experiment was to see if distinctive 
orthography has the same relative effect on recognition and recall as does 
meaningftilness. The subjects were 58 undergraduate volunteers, m equal 
number of whom were assigned to recognition and recall test conditions. 
For both test conditions, meaningfulness (m) and OD were maripulated 
within subjects. Each list contained an equal number of OD and OC 
words, and within levels of OD, half of the words were high m and half 
were low m. The lists were constructed by first selecting the 20 OD and 
20 OC words from the previous studies as the high m wc-rds. /\n 
additional group of 20 OD and 20 OC words matched for length and 
Thomdike-Lorge frequency were selected from Zechmeister's (]969) 
norms. These additional words were selected on the basis of their low m 
value. Since the study was concerned with interactions between OD and 
m, it was necessary to provide additional scaling information or the two 
variables. First, the words selected from Zechmeister's norms were rated 
for m by 30 students who wrote as many associations as possible to each 
word in a 30-sec period. The second scaling procedure invoKed 
examining distinctiveness within levels of meaning and was necessitated 
by the fact that low m words were selected from Zechmeister and high m 
words from our own scaling. Thus, all 8 words were rated by an 
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additional 30 subjects on a 5-point distinctiveness scale where 5 - highly 
distinctive. The 80 words then were divided into separate lists. In recall, 
four lists of 20 words each were constructed. Each list contained an equal 
number of high m-OD, high m-OC, low m-OD, and low m-OC w)ids. In 
recognition, two 40-word lists were constructed, containing an equal 
number of each word type. For the recognition test, all 80 words were 
presented, and consequently, an equal number of each type of word was 
present on the test. 
The recognition and recall results were analyzed separately because 
of traditional concerns about unequal scale values. The relative efrects of 
the primary variables, however, were sufficiently different to encourage 
confident conclusion based on relative comparisons. It was found that 
meaningfulness was directly related to recall and the main effect of ()D 
was not reliable. The m X OD interaction was significant. This 
interaction was due to superior recall of OD words at high m levels and 
no reliable differences in recall of OD and OC words at low levels of m. 
Newman-Keuls analysis led to this interpretation of the interaction The 
only reliable influence on recognition performance was exerted by OD. 
Recognition was higher for OD than OC words. The OD efject in 
recognition was consistent across levels of m, as evidenced b> the 
unreliable OD X m interaction. Finally recognition was not affected by 
m. Thus, the recognition and recall data differed in two aspects, th(3 most 
important of which was the reliable OD effect at both m levels in 
recognition, but only with high m words in recall. In addition, level of 
meaning had a direct effect on recall but no reliable influence on 
recognition performance. 
Kemper and Thissen (1981) conducted a study on memory t^r the 
dimensions of requests. The present research was undertaken to scale 
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requests dimensions of politeness and directness and to dttermine 
whether requests that violate conversational conventions governing the 
form of requests are more memorable than requests that conform to the 
rules. Different forms of requests were placed on interval scales of 
politeness and directness by applying nonmetric multidimensiona scaling 
(MDS) to similarity judgments of the effectiveness of the requests. In this 
study, the stimuli were 19 different forms of requests and the subjects 
were asked to judge the relative effectiveness of those fomis. This 
procedure did not require the subjects articulate the bases lor their 
judgments nor did it restrict them to predefined dimensions of si nilarity. 
80 naive native speakers of English were recruited from introductory 
psychology courses. Ten directive request forms were select'-xl from 
among those listed by Ervin-Tripp (1976a, 1976b). Initially, a pair of 
sentences consisting of an action imperative and a related need-assertion 
was prepared. Form the imperative, five new forms were constructed by 
(1) combining the imperative with please, (2) embedding it under the two 
hedges I think you should and why don't you and (3) forming an 
affirmative or negative interrogative by embedding the imperative under 
Do you think should or Don't you think you should. Three new forms 
were created from the need-assertion by (1) embedding it unde- I think 
and (2) embedding it under either Do you think or Don't you thinic These 
transformations of the imperative and need-assertion resulted in a set of 
request that included both affirmative and negative questions, hedges, and 
direct and indirect requests. Two general themes and four examples of 
each theme were used to create eight sets of requests. The two themes and 
the specific topics were: (1) requests for simple actions that art, raking 
the leaves, watering the plants, making coffee, and turning off the 
television, and (2) requests were requiring the exchange of modi.^ st sums 
of money, that is, lending five dollars, buying shampoo or milk or a new 
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typewriter ribbon. For each set of requests, 45 pairs of sentences were 
constructed so that each of the 10 directive forms was paired with each of 
the others. Eight sets of response booklets were constructed by randomly 
ordering the lists of 45 pair of requests was accompanied by a 19-point 
rating scale of relative effectiveness marked from " 9 " to "+S". The 
subjects were instructed to rate the relative effectiveness of tie two 
sentences labeled A and B. Negative values were to be assigned to these 
pairs in which sentence B was judged to be more effective than sentence 
A in securing the intended result; positive values were to be assigned 
when sentence A was judged to be more effective than sentence B. In 
addition, each subject was asked to rate a second set of 10 requests on six 
bipolar adjective scales. They were to rate these requests on 9-poini scale 
of politeness, assertiveness, intimacy, naturalness, clarit/, and 
importance. These ratings were obtained in order to provide convergent 
evidence for the interpretation of the MDS results. The obtainixl two-
dimensional solution for the request forms was essentially identical to the 
nonmetric MDS solution, confirming that this configuration is not 
specific to a single method of data analysis. The correlation betv een the 
dissimilarity data and the obtained distances in this solution is .56; 
approximately 20% of the total variance was accounted for by dimension 
1 and 11% by dimension 2. Dimension 2 was not related to any of six 
bipolar scales; it was interpreted as a dimension of directness. Need-
assertive and questions are located at the negative end of this dimension 
while the imperative forms are located at the positive. Examination of the 
subject weight space revealed that individual subjects differed in their 
reliance on these two dimensions in a manner related to the their e of the 
requests placed less weight of politeness (dimension I) than did subjects 
who judged money oriented requests. The opposite was U'ue for 
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directness (dimension 2): the significantly greater than that for money-
oriented requests. 
The second experiment was undertaken to investigate the recall 
performance under different forms of request. To achieve this, the scale 
values of the 10 directive forms were used to predict recall of the 
different forms requests. It was hypothesized that requests that violate 
conversational conventions would be more salient and more memorable 
than requests that conform to the rules. Eighty naive native speakers of 
English were recruited from introductory psychology classes, ' h e 10 
directive forms from Experiment I were again used. These forms were 
combined with 20 different topics to create 200 different reques s. The 
topics involved either simple actions or the exchange of modest amounts 
of money. These requests were then used as the captions of cartoois. Foi-
each set of 10 requests about a particular topic, two cartoons were 
selected. These cartoons portrayed two (or more) individuals in a social 
context that clearly specified the relative status of speaker and addressee. 
The two cartoons differed in whether the speaker was of higher oi lower 
social status relative to the addressee. Some of these speaker-addressee 
pairs were: waiter-diner, attorney-judge, clerk-customer, commoner-king, 
secretaiy-employer, monk-abbot, sinner-devil. Twenty adcilional 
cartoons and captions were selected as filler items. Each subject received 
a booklet of 30 cartoons and captions. They were asked to rate, on a 7-
point scale, the funniness of each caption. The general theme of the target 
requests and the status of the speaker varied between groups of subjects. 
There were four groups of subjects: those who rated (1) action-oriented 
requests by high-status speakers, (2) action-oriented requests by low-
status speakers, (3) money-oriented requests by high-status speakei- and 
(4) money-oriented requests by low-status speakers. Each subjec rated 
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the humor of one request of each directive type (e.g., one imperati ^ e^, one 
need-assertion) and each of the 200 different requests was rated by two 
subjects. After a 20-minute interval during which the subjects canied out 
an unrelated task, they were asked to recall the captions for the 10 targets 
cartoons, which were provided as recall prompts. Verbatim recall of the 
original captions was stressed. The flinniness ratings weie not 
significantly related to any design feature. There were no substantial 
differences between action-based and memory-based requests and this 
distinction was ignored for the remaining analyses of the requests forms. 
Nor were there differences between requests by low and higl"-status 
speakers for overall recall. However, fiirther analysis revealed that 
verbatim recall was a function of speaker status politeness, and 
directness. When the data were pooled and an attempt was made to use 
the same quadratic function for the easiness-of-recall for both sets of 
subjects (those with high and low-status speakers), the resulting 
likelihood ratio test for equality of the quadratic functions for the two 
groups was extremely large, indicating a highly significant inte-action 
between speaker status and the effects of politeness and directness. Part 
of that interaction was specifiable in terms of the complexity of the model 
required for each group. The single-degree-of-freedom likelihood ratio X" 
tests indicated that the contribution of the quadratic politeness term was 
significant for the low-status speakers but not for the high-status speakers 
and the quadratic directness term was significant for the high-status 
speakers but not for low-status speakers. Subjects who studied cartoons 
with high-status speaker, 66 and 63% of the substitutions of old ard new 
forms, respectively, involved such deletions; for the other subjects, 69 
and 68% of the old and new forms resulted from such operations. The 
new directive forms were no more polite than the originals (high-status 
and low-status speakers) but they were more direct than the or ginals 
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(high and low-status speakers). Substitutions of old or new di ective 
forms did not alter the politeness of the original requests but shified the 
request to a more direct form. The investigators concluded that a speaker 
must select form of a request that is appropriate to the situation. As Ervin-
Tripp and Lakoff have observed, this selection depends on conversational 
conventions governing politeness and directness. Although the }-)recise 
rules have not been formulated, speakers must consider such factors as: 
setting (at home vs. at work), magnitude of the requested service (a loan 
of five dollars vs. one of five thousand dollars), asymmetries in age or 
rank, familiarity, and expected role responsibilities. A speaker's request 
may fail if a superior is offended by a direct or an impolite request, if the 
addressee does not interpret an indirect request as such, or if the 
addressee chooses not to comply with an indirect request. The benefits 
and risks of being polite must be balanced with those of being direct; 
different forms of requests enable speakers to offset directness with 
politeness. Scale values of politeness and directness obtained from 
judgments of the probable effectiveness of requests are highly related to 
the memorability of those requests. Thus a speaker who violates the 
conversational conventions governing the form of requests, who does not 
appropriately balance politeness and directness^ will pay two penalties: 
not only may the request fail but the inappropriate request v ill be 
accurately remembered. 
Crocker and Vitkus (1983) conducted a study entitled 
"Attribufions, Attention, and Person Memory: Processing Congruent and 
Incongruent Information". They tried to resolve an apparent paradox of 
person percepfion. The paradox is this: Impression of people (and social 
beliefs in general) is resistant to change. Information that contrad cts an 
inifial impression of a person has relatively little impact en the 
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impression (Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth, 1979). At the same time, 
research on memory for social information indicates that information that 
contradicts an impression of another person is particularly likely to 
recalled (Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Hastie, 1980; SruU, 19SI). If 
information that violates our impression of another is more likely to be 
recalled than information that confirms an impression. 
They conducted an experiment to examine more directly the 
amount of attention congruent and incongruent information recei^ es as a 
function of the causal attribution given to the item. The experiment 
replicated the procedure of Crocker et al. with a few modifications. 
Subjects received information about the behavior of a target persoii which 
was congruent with their initial impression of him with the exception of 
one item. The target item was either congruent or incongruent Avith the 
initial impression and was attributed to a dispositional or a sitaational 
cause. In a departure from the procedure of Crocker et al., the beliavioral 
information was presented on a CRT screen controlled by a 
microcomputer, and subjects controlled the length of time each item 
appeared on the screen. The viewing time, which uas the 
operationalization of amount of attention, was recorded by the computer. 
In addition to viewing time, we measured recall for the information, and 
subjects' impression of the target person. 
They found that when the target item was incongruent, subjects 
remembered more non-target congruent items than when it was 
congruent, regardless of how the target item was explaintxl. The 
relationship between attention and impression, which showed an 
unexpected pattern for the in-congruent, dispositionally attributed item. 
This pattern of results suggested that the relationship between attention 
and weight in impression is not as straight forward as Fiske (1980) 
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previously suggested. The result of analysis of variance showed very 
similar patterns for looking time, recall, and impressions, but co-
relational analyses indicated that within conditions longer looking items 
are not always related to an item having more impact on impressions. 
These result suggested that the information that one attends to \v'ill not 
always be over represented in judgments (C.F, McArthur, 1981; Taylor 
and Fiske, 1978). Under some circumstances, greater attention to 
information can lead to less impact on impressions. 
The correlations between recall and impressions also failed to show 
the expected pattern. For congruent items, the relationship between recall 
and impression was stronger for the situational attributed item tiian for 
the dispositionally attributed item. For incongruent items, both these 
attributed to the situation and those attributed to dispositional causes, 
recalling the item was related to less impression change (i.e. impression 
more like the initial impression). The impressions are not simply derived 
from subject recall of the target item. 
Rajaram (1998) investigated the effects of conceptual salience and 
perceptual distinctive on conscious recollection. This study exami led the 
hypothesis that processing the salient or distinctive attributes of stimuli 
leads to the experience of remembering. The constructs of salience and 
distinctiveness have often been used interchangeably in the memory 
literature (Schmidt, 1996) and the extant studies do not explicitly 
differentiate between them. Distinctiveness has been variously delined as 
the property that (1) separates items or events that share few rather than 
many features with other items in memory (Nelson, 1979), (2) emerges 
due to differences rather than similarities among items (Hunt & 
McDaniel, 1993; Schmidt, 1996), (3) arises from presentation of isolated 
items in the content of background items (Hunt & Mitchell, 1982), or (4) 
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characterizes "events that are incongruent with active conteptual 
framework, or that contain salient features not present in active memory'" 
(Schmidt, 1991). Thus, a common thread among these definitions is the 
differences among items those presumably uniquely specify somii item. 
or the salience of items that make them stand out from among the 
background items. 
In this study, the role of salience or distinctiveness in producing the 
experience of remembering was tested with variables that can a priori be 
designated as generating conceptual salience (experiment 1) or perceptual 
distinctiveness (experiment 2). The main objective of experiment I was 
to examine the effects of semantic or conceptual salierce on 
remembering. As noted, facilitatory effects of conceptual manipulations 
on remembering have been documented in a number of studies (e.g. 
Gardiner, 1998; Rajaram, 1993). Note that in most of the previous 
experiments, semantic or conceptual encoding was contrasted with non 
semantic encoding. For example, encoding of meaning was compared 
with encoding of phonemic features (Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 1993). To 
understand the nature of conceptual attributes that would specifically 
influence remembering, the present experiment contrasted two types of 
conceptual encoding. This manipulation was achieved by using 
homograph (e.g. chest); subjects focused on the salient corceptual 
attribute of the stimulus in one condition (the dominant meaning, e.g., 
body part-CHEST) and on the non-salient conceptual attribute in another 
condition (the non-dominant meaning, e.g. cabinet-CHEST i. 36 
undergraduates from the state University of New at Stony Brook 
participated for credit in partial fulfillment of course requireirent. At 
study, subject encoded the dominant or the non-dominant meanings of 
homographs in a within-subjects design. Accuracy data for explicit 
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memory and retrieval experience of remembering were measured using a 
recognition memory paradigm. Altogether, 60 homographs ser/ed as 
critical items in the experiment. This set of 60 homographs was S(ilected 
from the Nelson, McEvoy, Walling and Wheeler (1980) lorms. 
According to the Nelson et al. norms, in this item set the average 
frequency with which the dominant meaning was produced by subjects 
(35) differed reliably from frequency for the non-dominant meaning. The 
dominant and non-dominant meanings of the homographs were biased 
with phrases constructed and reported by Rajaram et al. (1998). In 
addition to the 60 homographs, one additional set of 40 words was used 
as fillers in the study lists and a second additional set of 40 words was 
used as fillers in the construction of the recognition test. Three stud) lists 
were constructed for purposes of counterbalancing in such a way that, 
across lists, each homograph served as a studied dominant target, a 
studied non-dominant target, or a non-studied item. Within each study 
list, 20 homographs were preceded by phrases that biased their dominant 
meaning (e.g. yellow-name of color), 20 homograph were preceded b\ 
phrases that biased their non-dominant meaning (e.g., yellow-cowa -dly or 
chicken). In addition, 40 phrase-word fillers (e.g. sadness: an emotion) 
were included to conceal the experimental manipulation from subjects. 
The 80 phrase-word pairs were arranged randomly with respect to the 
study conditions in the study booklets. In addition, a scale displaying 
numbers from 1 to 5 was placed in front of each phrase-word pair to 
enable subjects to rate the pair. The test list consisted of 40 studied 
homographs (20 studied for their dominant meaning and 20 fo- non-
dominant meaning), 20 non-studied homographs,.and 20 filler words to 
maintain 1:1 study-test ratio from the subject's point of view. Tvo test 
lists were constructed to create two random orders of stimuli with respect 
to the conditions. In the test booklet, each word was followed by two 
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blank lines in that raw. The first line was provided to indicate whether or 
not the word had been studied earlier. The second line was provided to 
indicate whether the subject remembered or knew the item from the stud> 
list. In addition to the study and test lists, a cover sheet was consiructed 
with a window that exposed one row at a time. Study exposu'e was 
controlled through a tape on which a female voice prompted with "next" 
every 5 sec. 
For the overall recognition memory measured, there was a 
significant advantage for homographs encoded for their dominant 
meaning compared with homograph encoded for their non-dominant 
meaning. The critical question posed in this experiment was whether this 
advantage for the dominant meaning would also appear in the remember 
judgments. The results showed that subjects gave a significant!}' higher 
proportion of remember judgments to homographs encoded for then-
dominant meaning than to homographs encoded for their non-dominant 
meaning. For know responses, the reversed difference was not 
statistically significant. These findings clearly revealed that processing of 
salient conceptual attributes leads to a higher proportion of re nember 
responses than processing of non-salient conceptual attributes. 
The aim of experiment 2 was to examine the hypothesis that 
remember judgments increase as a function of processing the distinctive 
attributes of the stimuli even if the processed dimension is perceptual in 
nature (Rajaram, 1996). A new group of 32 undergraduates from ihe State 
University of New York at Stony Brook participated for credit in partial 
fulfillment of course requirements. Orthography of words was 
manipulated at two levels, distinctive and common, in a within- subjects 
design. Accuracy of recognition memory and remember-know esponse 
frequencies were measured in a recognition memory test. A toial of 64 
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blank lines in that raw. The first line was provided to indicate whether or 
not the word had been studied earlier. The second line was pro\ ided to 
indicate whether the subject remembered or knew the item from the study 
list. In addition to the study and test lists, a cover sheet was constructed 
with a window that exposed one row at a time. Study exposure was 
controlled through a tape on which a female voice prompted with "next" 
every 5 sec. 
For the overall recognition memory measured, there was a 
significant advantage for homographs encoded for their dominant 
meaning compared with homograph encoded for their non-dominant 
meaning. The critical question posed in this experiment was whether this 
advantage for the dominant meaning would also appear in the remember 
judgments. The results showed that subjects gave a significantly higher 
proportion of remember judgments to homographs encoded for their 
dominant meaning than to homographs encoded for their non-dominant 
meaning. For know responses, the reversed difference was not 
statistically significant. These findings clearly revealed that processing o)' 
salient conceptual attributes leads to a higher proportion of rerrembei 
responses than processing of non-salient conceptual attributes. 
The aim of experiment 2 was to examine the hypothes s that 
remember judgments increase as a function of processing the distmctive 
attributes of the stimuli even if the processed dimension is percep:ual in 
nature (Rajaram, 1996). A new group of 32 undergraduates from the; State 
University of New York at Stony Brook participated for credit in oaitial 
fulfillment of course requirements. Orthography of words was 
manipulated at two levels, distinctive and common, in a within-siibjects 
design. Accuracy of recognition memory and remember-know response 
frequencies were measured in a recognition memory test. A total of 64 
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critical words were used in this experiment. 32 words in this set were 
orthographically distinctive (e.g. subpoena, calypso, graw, lymph), and 
the remaining 32 words were orthographically common (e.g. sailboat, 
cookie, grit, loser). 16 orthographically distinctive and 16 orthography 
common words were taken from the materials published by Huit and 
Toth (1990). In order to increase the list length, a norming stuciy was 
conducted to collect an additional set of 16 orthographically common 
words. In this norming study, 110 words were printed in a booklet. The 
orthographically distinctive and common words reported in the Hunt and 
Toth (1990) article were included in this pool in order to validate the 
ratings given for the remaining words. A new group of 75 subjects who 
did not participate in the two experiments reported in this article to<:»k part 
in this norming study. Following Hunt and Toth's procedure, subject in 
this norming study were instructed to rate on a scale from 1 to 5 the 
visual "weirdness" of each word (1 = not weird, 5 = very weird). The set 
of critical words was selected in this norming study in a way that the 
mean weirdness rating given by subjects for the new set of words differed 
significantly for orthographically common words (1.67) and 
orthographically distinctive words [3.37; t (30) = 11.84, SE = .14]. 
Furthermore, the orthographically distinctive and common words in the 
new set of materials (as in Hunt and Toth) were matched for frequency. 
In order to ensure that each of the 64 words served as studied and non-
studied items across subjects, two study lists were prepared. Each study 
list, presented in booklet form, consisted of 16 orthographically 
distinctive and 16 orthographically common words. Care was taken to 
ensure that half of the words in each orthography type were drawn from 
the Hunt and Toth (1990) material and the other half from the new set of 
materials created for this experiment. Study words within each booklet 
were arranged randomly with respect to orthography. Furthermort, two 
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random orders of each study booklet were prepared and presented equally 
often across subjects. The test booklet consisted of all 64 words, 16 
studied orthographically distinctive words, 16 non-studied 
orthographically common words, and 16 non-studied orthographically 
common words. Two random orders of the test booklet (with resoect to 
orthography as well as study status of materials) were prepan;d and 
presented equally often across subjects. In the test booklets, two blank 
lines were provided in front of each word. The first line was provided for 
recognition (Y/N) responses and the second line was provided for 
remember-know responses. Finally, a cover sheet with a window and a 
tape with 5 sec prompts in a female voice were also used n this 
experiment. 
The proportions of false alarms for orthographically distinctive and 
orthographically common words were quite low and within the range 
reported in the literature. In overall recognition, performance was 
significantly better for orthographically distinctive thar for 
orthographically common. More critically, the effect of this perceptual 
manipulation was evident only in remember responses: significant!} more 
remember responses were made for orthographically distinctive than for 
orthographically common words. The orthography manipulation had no 
effect on know judgments. The results from this experiment conrlrmed 
that remember responses are influenced by perceptual variable ae- well. 
Furthermore, these results demonstrated that remember responses 
increase as a ftinction of processing the distinctive attributes of the 
encoded stimuli. 
Hunt (2003) conducted a study to investigate the two contribution 
of distinctive processing to accurate memory. This research was provoked 
by levels of processing and led to the evolution of distinctive proct^ssing 
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as the progeny of depth of processing (e.g. Eysenck, 1979; Humj)hreys, 
1976; Hunt and Einstein, 1981; Jacoby and Craik, 1979). Why \^ould a 
manipulation that has such a dramatic effect on correct rejection have no 
effect on correct acceptance? The specific goal of the present study is to 
address this question by manipulating both forms of distinctive 
processing. 
The target list items shared an obvious dimension of sirriilarity, 
distinctive processing at the item level should facilitate recognition of the 
targets themselves. Although the items in the second list of Dobbins et al. 
(1998) shared the obvious spatial/temporal similarity of the list, tht^ re was 
no manipulation designed to encourage processing of differences iligned 
with that similarity and thus no item-based distinctive processing of the 
second list. To implement item-based distinctive processing, categorized 
lists were used in this experiment. This first experiment was a replication 
of Dobbins et al. (1998) in that participants saw a pre-exposure ist and 
study list on which either the same or a different orientating task was 
performed. A recognition test for the second list items followed and 
included target items, pre-exposed distracters, and new distracters. The 
participants were 96 volunteers from introductory psychology, fhe 
design called for an equal number of participants in each of four 
conditions defined by the combination of orienting tasks on tie pre-
exposure and study lists. With category judgment (c) and pleasantness 
rating (p) as the two orienting tasks, the four condition were CC, CP, PC 
and PP. Due to an error in assignment, 25 participants were in the CC 
condition and 23 were in the CP condifion. Conditions PC and PP 
consisted of 24 participants each. Three types of items appeared on the 
recognition test, targets from the study list, pre-exposed lures, and new 
lures. Target items and pre-exposed lure occun-ed either one cr three 
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times prior to test. Item repetition was a within participant manipulation. 
A pool of 90 words, 9 instances from each of 10 categories, comprised 
the materials for the experiment. All words were of intemiediate 
frequency in the Battig and Montague (1969) categoiy production aorms 
The 9 instances from each category were arbitrarily assigned to groups o1' 
three and each of these word-triads, served as the targets, the pre-exposed 
lures, or the new lures. Each word-triad appeared equally often in t-ach of 
those roles across participants. Pre-exposed lures and targets occurred 
either one or three time prior to test. Half of the pre-exposed lures were 
shown three times in the pre-exposure list. Half of the target items were 
shown twice in the pre-exposed list and half of the targets were absent 
from the pre-exposed list. Regarding of pre-exposure, targets appeared 
once in the study list. Thus, the repetition factor describes the number ol" 
times an item was experienced prior to the memory test. This repetition 
factor was between category such that all of the items from a given 
category occurred one or three times. The items were counter-balanced 
such that across participants the word-triads from each category appeared 
equally in the two repetition conditions. Both the pre-exposure anc study 
list were presented blocked by category, and the order of categories with 
lists was randomized for each participant. The recognition test list 
contained 90 words, 9 instances from each of the 10 categories, /unong 
these 90 words were 30 targets from the study list, 30 pre-exposure lures. 
and 30 new lures. The test lists were randomly ordered wi h the 
restriction that no more than two items from a category occur 
contiguously. 
The first measure indexes discrimination of study items from pre-
exposed distracters in that hits are corrected by false alarms to distiacters 
shown once were subtracted from hits on study items shown one and false 
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alarms to distracters shown three times were subtracted from hits to stud) 
items that had been shown three times. The second measure of ace uracy, 
hits corrected by false alarms to novel distracters, was computed by 
subtracting false alarm rates to novel distracters from hit rates tc novel 
distracters from hit rate collapsed over frequency of presentation. This 
measure of accuracy was affected reliably by orienting cordition. 
Subsequent analysis showed that the PP condition was more accurate than 
CC, PC and CP. The CP condition was marginally more accurate than CC 
in both cases. No other differences were reliable. Thus, the accu-acy of 
discriminating targets from novel distracters showed a very d fferent 
pattern than accuracy of discriminating targets from pre-CKposed 
distracters. More detailed examination of the overall hit and falst- alarm 
rates to pre-exposed distracters was provided by an analysis of lit and 
false alarm rates as a function of experimental condition and frequency of 
presentation. Analysis of the hit rate and false alarm rate to pre-exposed 
distracters revealed that the main effects of orienting condition and item 
type were qualified by an interaction between the two variables. Simple 
effects analysis showed a main effect of orienting condition on both hit 
rate and false alarm rate. In addition to the effects of orienting condition 
and item type, the overall analysis revealed an effect of frequency of 
presentation, which interacted with orienting condition. Simple effects 
analyses via independent group t-tests showed the source of the 
interaction to be an increase in "old" responses from 1 to 3 presentations 
only in the CC group. Frequency of presentation did not interact reliably 
with item type nor was the triple interaction significant. 
The design of second experiment was identical to that exptniment 
1. A new sample of 98 participants was drawn from the pool of 
volunteers in introductory psychology. Condition CC and PP coaiained 
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24 participants each while condition CP and PC contained 25 
participants. The materials were the same as those used in the first 
experiment. The procedure also was the same as the first experiment 
except that the final test was free recall. Participants were instructed to 
write all of the words they could remember from the second list thty saw 
The instructions included the warning that some of the words on the 
second list had appeared on the first list, but they were only to lecali a 
word if it had appeared in the second list. Five minutes were allotted to 
the recall test. The analysis of recall parallels that of the recognition 
analysis from experiment 1. Accuracy will be presented first in the form 
of correct recall of list items minus intrusions of pre-exposed distracters. 
Unlike the recognition data, accuracy cannot be corrected for recall of 
novel distracters because we do not know the population of such 
distracters in recall. The accuracy analysis was followed by analysis of 
correct recall from the study list (hits) and incorrectly intruded recall 
from pre-exposed items (false alarms). Accuracy increased with 
frequency of presentation, orienting condition also exerted a significant 
effect on accuracy and an effect that was consistent across freqi ency of 
presentation as indicated by the lack of frequency X orienting ondition 
interaction. Individual comparisons of the orienting condition effect were 
conducted with independent t-tests. These comparisons showed reliably 
higher accuracy in the CP condifion than in either the C( or 1*P 
conditions which themselves did not differ. 
Geraci and Rajaram (2004) investigated the distinctiveness effect 
in the absence of conscious recollection: Evidence from ccnceptLial 
priming. The goal of their experiments was to test the hypothesis to 
determine whether conscious awareness was necessary for obta ning the 
effects of distinctiveness on memory. 
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Experiment 1 was designed to separate the contribut on of 
conceptual processing at study and test by using an implicit ttst that 
recapitulates the evaluative process presumed to mediate this 
distinctiveness effect. In this study, distinctiveness was created using 
study lists that contained categorically isolated items. At test, participants 
were given an implicit test of categoiy verification. They used this lest to 
try to mimic the hypothesized evaluative processes that participants cairy 
out at study when they encounter an incongruent item. They used both an 
explicit and implicit version of the category verification test, [n the 
explicit version, participants saw a category label and a word anc judged 
whether or not they had studied the word. In the implicit version, 
participants also saw the category label and word. However, sn this 
version, participants were simply told to indicate whether or not the word 
was a member of that category. In the present paradigm, tie study 
conditions are designed to lead the participants to note that the isolated 
items does not fit within the context without requiring an integration of 
the incongruous item within the context. Thus, if the process of 
evaluating mismatch at study is recapitulated at test, paiticipanls should 
be faster to engage in this same evaluation for the isolated items at test 
compared to the non-studied and non-isolated items. 166 SUNY Stony 
Brook students participated for research credit. 52 participants received 
an explicit category verification test and the remaining 84 paiticipants 
received the implicit category verification test. Of these 84 participants. 
60 were categorized as "unaware" of the connection between study and 
test based on the data from the post-test questionnaire. Data from these 
"unaware" participants were included in the implicit anahsis. Ihe 
experiment was a 2X2X2 mixed factorial design. Test type (oplicit vs. 
implicit) was the between subjects variable and study status (studied and 
non-studied) and item type (common and distinct) served as tie within 
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subjects variables. 24 categorized lists of 8 words each were deriv(;d from 
the Battig and Montague (1969) and Shapiro and Palermo (1970) 
category norms. All items were chosen from among the top 10 most 
common examplars for each category. For each list, one of the eigit items 
served as the critical items. The critical item was either studied as 
common or as distinct, depending on the structure of its stidy list. 
Participants studied 12 lists. Across participants, the order in wiich the 
12 study lists were presented was semi-randomized, with the exception 
that no more than two common or distinct lists appeared in a row. For 
each list, the critical item appeared in either the 3'^ '', 4'*^ , 5'"^ , study position 
to avoid primacy and recency list positions. Six of the 12 study lists were 
structured such that the critical item was distinct because it was 
semantically isolated. In these lists, all the words in the list were from the 
same category except the one critical word that was from a different 
category. For example, the word, "table" might be presented in a list of 
types offish (e.g., trout, herring, shark, catfish, perch, salmon, aid tuna). 
The other 6 study lists were structured such that the critical iten "table" 
was not distinct. In these lists, all the words, including the cntical item 
"table", were from different semantic categories (e.g., opium, cookies, 
sponge, salmon, Iroquois, spokes, and four). Across participants, the 
same or a common item by virtue of the study list construction or as a 
non-studied item studied as common or distinct and whether it was 
studied or non-studied produced 4 study lists sets. In the test ist, there 
were 24 critical test items, half of which were studied and half of which 
were non-studied, and 24 filler items. The purpose of the filler items was 
to disguise the nature of this task as memory test, and to include "Yes" 
responses as described later. Of the 12 studied critical items, half had 
been studied as distinct and other half had been studied as conmon. At 
test, the distinct items were paired with category labels that con esponded 
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to the categoiy membership of the background"rfen»«'l!fe'stud:/ list. If 
the word, "table" had been studied as distinct in a list offish, thea at test 
participants would see table paired with the category label, "Type of 
fish". The common items were paired with other unique category labels 
that corresponded to one of the background items in the study list. For 
example, if "table" were studied as a common item in a mixed list of 
unrelated items including only one type of fish, then the question would 
again be whether "table" is a type offish. However, in this case, the word 
wouJd have been encoded as common instead of distinct. Thus, the 
category names and examplars were held constant and only the encoding 
of the examplars as a distinct or common item was varied. For all studied 
items, common and distinct, the correct answer to the category 
verification question was "no". This was done for two reasons. First, they 
wanted to mimic the evaluation process that they assumed to have 
occurred when people saw the different item in either a list of other 
similar items (the distinctive processing condition) or in ; list of 
intermixed items (the common processing condition). Second, they 
wanted to be able to directly compare category verification limes for 
common and distinct items. Previous research using the category 
verification test has consistently shown that people are faster to confirm ii 
(Vaidya and Gabrieli, 2000; Vaidya et al., 1997). Therefore, we kept the 
"no" responses constant across distinct and common items. The 12 
category verification questions for non-studied items also requinid a "no" 
response for purpose of comparison across studied and non-studied 
conditions. To reduce the bias to respond "no" to the verification 
questions, they included 24 filler questions to which the correct answer 
was "yes". The order of category verification quesfions in tht list was 
randomized with respect to common/disfinct encoding, studied/non-
studied status, and yes/no response. 
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Data from the explicit and the impHcit version of category 
verification test were analyzed separately because of procedu'-al and 
baseline differences. The level was set at .05 for all analyses. For both 
tests, they analyzed participants mean accuracy and median reaction time. 
For the explicit version of the test, they compared recognition accuracy. 
As predicted, result from the explicit version of the test showed that 
participants had better recognition for isolated than non-isolated category 
exemplars, consistent with previous literature using the explicit riemory 
test of category verification (Srivinas et al. 2000), there Avas no 
differences in reaction time to correctly recognize isolated versus non-
isolated examplars. For the implicit version of the test, the} again 
analyzed accuracy and reaction time. They obtained overall priming in 
the accuracy data and found that participants were better at correctly 
disconfiiTning category membership for studied versus non-studied 
category examplars. However, they were no more accurate to disi onfimi 
category membership for isolated examplars than to the non-isolated 
examplars. The authors compared reaction times to disconfirm c itegory 
membership for studied versus non-studied exemplars and found hat the 
pattern of reaction times was in the expected direction, althoigh the 
differences was not statistically significant. Importantly, this lack of 
overall priming appeared to be due to the comparable reaction times 
between the non-studied and common or non-isolated items. Hcvvevei, 
reaction times for the isolated items were significantly faster than reaction 
times for the non-studied items. Importantly, priming was significantly 
greater for the isolated items than the non-isolated items. Thus, they 
found greater priming, as measured by speeded reaction times to 
disconfirm category membership, for category members that had been 
isolated at study than those that had not been isolated. Results suggested 
that the distinctiveness effect can be obtained using an implicit test if the 
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test engages the evaluative processing that took place at stud} (i.e. 
evaluating the way in which an item is different from surrounding items). 
This result is generally consistent with the transfer appropriates 
processing framework, which states that performance on explicit and 
implicit tests is based on the match of processing. However, their results 
demonstrated that it is important to cue the specific conceptual pr(>cessing 
that occurred at study. As such, the results supported the mon- recent 
elaborations of multiple conceptual processes that mediate memory 
(Cabeza, 1994; Hamilton andRajaram, 2001; Vaidya et al. 1997; Weldon 
and Coyote, 1996). Ultimately, these findings demonstrated that although 
awareness effect is sufficient to mediate the distinctiveness ef'ect and 
often plays an important role, it is not always necessary. 
The results were interpreted to suggest that the distinctiveness 
effect can be obtained on an implicit memory test if it recapitulates the 
exact evaluative processing engaged at the time of study. However, it is 
not clear whether the distinctiveness effect was obtained on this test 
because the test accessed categoiy infonnation alone, or because it 
required the same evaluative processing across study and test. In other 
words, it could be that simply cueing the general category information 
was sufficient to produce an advantage of the isolated items i^ and not 
necessarily the accompanying evaluative process per sec). To distinguish 
between these two possibilities, experiment 2a and 2b used a different 
conceptual implicit test, this test again accessed general category 
information, but it did not require an active evaluation of category 
membership that would recapitulate the evaluative processing that 
occurred at encoding. They used explicit and implicit category production 
tests. In the explicit version, participants saw a category label md were 
told to write down an example of that category that they had seen earlier. 
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Priming would be observed if people were more likely to write down a 
category examplar when it had been studied than when it was not ;;tudied. 
106 students from SUNY Stony Brook and 88 students from Washington 
University in St. Louis (for a total 194 students) participated for lesearch 
credit. 72 participants (40 from Stony Brook and 32 from Washington 
University in St. Louis) received the explicit category cued recall test. 
The remaining 122 participants (66 from Stony Brook and '6 from 
Washington University in St. Louis) received the implicit category 
exemplar production test. 122 participants were tested in the implicit 
version to obtain a completely counterbalanced group of 72 participants 
(43 from Stony Brook and 29 from Washington University in S . Louis) 
that were categorized as "unaware" of the connection between s udy and 
test based on the post-test questionnaire data. Their data were int luded in 
the initial analyses. The experiment was 2X2X2 mixed factorial design. 
Test type (explicit vs implicit) was the between subjects variable and 
study status (studied and non-studied) and item type (common and 
distinct) were manipulated as within subject variables. The study 
materials were identical to those used in experiment 1. The test materials 
differed in that participants were now presented with only the category 
label in experiment 2a (e.g., A type offish), whereas in experimt^nt 1 they 
were presented with category labels and targets (e.g., A typi; of fish: 
table). The labels in experiment 2a corresponded to the critical items-
thus, unlike experiment 1, all of the to-be-recalled targets were consistent 
with the labels presented. For example, people would be given the label, 
"piece of furniture"? and write down examplars of this category, 
regardless of whether they had studied "table" in a list of all type of llsh, 
or in a non-isolated, random list. Once again data from the explicit 
category cued recall test and the implicit category examplar production 
test were analyzed separately because of procedural and baseline 
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differences. For both tests, they analyzed participant's accuracy. Result 
from the explicit category cued recall test replicated earlier work (Smith 
and Hunt, 2000) and showed that participants had better catego-> cued 
recall for isolated than non-isolated category examplars. In the implicit 
category examplar production test, participants were first sorted nto test 
"aware" and "unaware" groups based on the post-test quest onnaire 
responses. Overall priming for participants classified as unaware showed 
that these participants produced more studied exemplars than non-studied 
examplars, but this effect did not reach significance using a tv o-tailed 
test. This result was attributable to a lack of significant priming for non-
isolated items. Priming for distinct items was significant. This pattern was 
similar to the pattern of results from the categoiy verification test in 
experiment 1. Priming was observed only for isolated but not for non-
isolated items. Results from the test unaware participants supported that 
people were no more likely to produce examplars that had been studied as 
distinct than those that were studied as common. Given the theoretical 
significance of this result, they conducted additional analyses tc confirm 
the lack of a distinctiveness effect in the implicit category production test. 
First, they conducted a power analysis; the results showed that he effect 
size for the implicit category production test in experiment 2a v as small. 
such that they would need over 1000 participants to have an 80"/o chance 
of detecting this effect. Second, they also examined the data from the test 
aware participants; interestingly, the data from the test aware pi riicipants 
followed the same pattern and showed no difference in category 
producfion for isolated and non-isolated items. This finding suggested 
that the extent of awareness was not strong enough to motivate 
participants to engage in intentional strategies. Two possible reasons were 
pointed out to support this intei-pretation. One was that the procedure for 
this test required speeded responses in that it required rapid production of 
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responses (within 30s), thereby reducing the opportunity for de iberate 
retrieval. Two, the responses on the post-test questionnaire indicated that, 
although many people guessed the purpose of the experiment, they did 
not report deliberately recalling items to write down in the short tiiae they 
were given (Richardson-Klavehn and Gardiner, 1995 and Richirdson-
Klavehn and Gardiner, 1996; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, ani Java, 
1996). It is also likely that participants became aware of the purx)se of 
the test only upon answering the questionnaire. Because these two groups 
did not appear to perform differently, they examined all the implicit 
participants (both aware and unaware) together to increase powe •. Even 
when they increased power by combining these two groups for a otal of 
122 participants, they found no evidence for a distinctiveness effect: there 
was no difference in priming for isolated and non-isolated items. Result 
from experiment 2a suggested that the distinctiveness effect carmot be 
obtained on the implicit test of category production, and that this o itcome 
is not attributable to a lack of reasonable power. Although they failed to 
find a distinctiveness effect on this test of category production, this result 
is weakened by the fact that they did not obtain significant priming for 
the non-isolated items. Experiment 2b was conducted to determine 
whether the isolation effect would be obtained on a test of categor) 
production when significant priming was obtained for both isolated and 
non-isolated items. They attempted to increase priming in this expt riment 
by using crifical items of a lower frequency. In experiment 2b, they used 
less frequency category exemplars for the critical items (e.g., bookcase 
for the critical furniture item). They also used a more elaborate cover 
story to attempt to further reduce the possibility of explicit contami lation 
With these changes, they examined whether the distinctiveness effect 
would be obtained on an implicit test of category production when 
priming was significant for both the isolated and non-isolated ite ns. 97 
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students from Washington University in St. Louis were tested in the 
implicit version to obtain a completely counterbalanced group of 72 
participants that were categorized as "unaware" of the conaection 
between study and test based on the post-test questionnaire daia. The 
experiment was 2X2 mixed factorial design: study status (studied and 
non-studied) and item types (common and distinct) wen; both 
manipulated within subjects. The material were identical to those used in 
experiment 1 and 2a, with the exception that the critical items were now 
of lower frequency (average POSITION = 13.58, as compared to 3.96 in 
experiment 2 a). 
Again, participants were first sorted into test "aware'" and 
"unaware" groups based on the post-test questionnaire resoonses. 
Examining overall priming for only the participants classified as unaware, 
a t-test showed that these participants produced significantly more studied 
examplars than non-studied examplars. The overall level of perfo'mance 
was lower in this experiment; this reduction was to be expected gn en that 
lower frequency category examplars were used in this experiment. 
Priming was also significant for both the isolated and non-isolatec items. 
They found no difference in priming for words that were isolated or non-
isolated at study. Thus, again, they found no evidence for an ad\ antage 
for isolated words on the implicit test of category production, lesults 
from experiments 2a and 2b suggested that the distinctiveness effect 
cannot be obtained in conceptual priming when the task does not 
recapitulate the distinctive processing from study. 
Brandt, Gardiner, and Macrae (2006) conducted a study to 
invesfigate the distinctiveness effect in forenames: the role of subjective 
experiences and recognition memory. The main aim of the juesent 
research was to further investigate the qualitative nature *)f the 
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distinctiveness effect using socially relevant stimuli that, unlike the faces 
in the Brandt et al. (2003) study, are familiar to participants. 
Participant in the experiment 1 were 34 undergraduate from the 
University of Bristol (20 women and 14 men). The experimen. had a 
single-factor (forename: typical verses distinctive) repeated measures 
design. The forenames used in the present experiment were taker from a 
study by Macrae, Mitchell and Pendry (2002) in which participar ts rated 
the familiarity of 160 male and female forename. Two sets of forenames 
(familiar and unfamiliar) were constructed then sequentially presented to 
20 participants on an Apple Macintosh microcomputer (Power Mac). The 
presentation of forenames was randomized and for each ft rename, 
participants were required to make a typicality rating by means of a key 
press. A 9-point scale was used whereby 1 represented a very distinctive 
forename and 9 represented a very typical forename. 
Participants' overall corrected recognition scores (i.e. lits-false 
alarnis for distinctive verses typical forenames) were submitted to a 
paired t-test. This revealed that distinctive forenames were recognized 
significantly more memorable than typical forenames has replic ated and 
extended the distinctiveness effect to a class of socially relevant stimuli 
other than faces (Brandt et al, 2003). In addition, ih: results 
demonstrated that distinctive forenames were more likely to elicit 
'remember' responses in comparison to typical forenames therebv 
supporting predictions made by the distinctiveness fluency model 
(Rajaram, 1996). The present results additionally demonstratt; that the 
distinctiveness effect in forenames is present using a direct rt cognition 
test, and hence it is not necessary to manipulate both the immediate 
context as well as participants previous experience with the stimulus 
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items in order to obtain a distinctiveness effect (Stanhope and ('ohen, 
1993). 
The aim of experiment 2 was to investigate the effect of retention 
interval on the distinctiveness effects found in experiment 1. Participants 
in this experiment were 34 undergraduates from the University oi Sussex 
(21 women and 13 men). The experiment had a 2 (forenames: typical vs. 
distinctive) X 2(retention internal: day vs. week) mixed factorial design. 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, and a female 
experimenter explained that the study was an investigation of people s 
memory for forenames. Participants were told that they would be 
presented with a series of forenames on an Apple Macintosh computer 
and that they were to try to remember these items as their memory for 
them would be tested at a later stage. Participants were randomly divided 
into either the day or the week conditions. Each forename was presented 
for 2,000 ms with a 2,000 ms inter-stimulus interval. In total, 80 
forename were presented (40 distinctive and 40 typical). In addition, half 
of the presented forenames were female and the other half weie male. 
The presentation of the forenames was counterbalanced such that 
forenames presented as targets for half of the participants were used as 
foils for the other participants. After the study phase participar ts were 
reminded of their test date (either 1 day or 1 week later). During the test 
phase, participants were presented with the 80 targets and additional 80 
foils, and were required to make old/new decisions for each itiin and, 
following an 'old' response, were ftirther required to make a 
remember/know/guess decision. 
Participants' overall coiTected recognition scores (i.e. hits-false 
alarms for distinctive verses typical forenames) were submittec to a 2 
(forename: distinctive vs typical) X 2 (retention interval: day vs week) 
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mixed model ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of forename, vhereby 
distinctive forenames were recognized more accurately than typical 
forenames. The analysis also revealed a main effect of retention interval, 
such that recognition accuracy was greater following the 1-day compared 
with the 1-week retention interval. The forename X retention interval 
interaction was not significant. 
Park, Amdt, and Reder (2006) investigated a contextual 
interference account of distinctiveness effect in recognition. In this 
article, they seek to add to the extant literature in two ways, fn st, they 
seek to further test the extent to which font fan effects are dri\en hy 
encoding-or retrieval-based processes with two experiments that liold the 
perceptual distinctiveness of study items constants, while var>ing the 
distinctiveness of perceptual features reinstated at retrieval in a 
recognition memory task. Second, they seek to examine the extent to 
which the memorial advantage of presenting test words in di.^tinctixe 
fonts is associated with recollection-or familiarity-based recognition. 
To examine whether the number of contextual associations to a 
font has a greater effect on retrieval competition at test than a differential 
influence at encoding. They attempted to equate item processing and 
overall distinctiveness of study items. This was accomplished by 
presenting each list item with two features, one distinctive (low fan) and 
one less distinctive (high fan). At test only one of the two featu es was 
reinstated, either the low-fan or high-fan feature. By equating the 
distinctiveness of the stimulus during encoding, it was possible to 
measure the effectiveness of two types of cues at retrieval and hereby 
examined the SAC retrieval-based account. 
; « ' 
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In experiment 1, two perceptual features (color and foni) were 
associated with each word. The goal was to keep to overall 
distinctiveness of each word constant during encoding by presenting 
studied word in one high-fan feature (i.e. used to present man;/ other 
words) and one low-fan feature (i.e. used to present few other woids). At 
test, only one of the two features was reinstated with the word, white the 
other feature was kept neutral at test, the word would be presented in a 
common font such as Time Roman; if color was to be neutral at test, the 
color of the font would be black instead of the colors utilized to oresent 
items at study. 26 Carnegie Mellon University students participated in 
experiment la and 24 participated in experiment lb for n^search 
experiment credit. They conducted two versions of the experiment, in 
which they varied the nature of the perceptual features associated vith the 
study words. During study, each word was presented in an unusual font as 
one contextual feature, experiment la varied the color of the background 
on the computer screen, and experiment lb varied the color of the font. 
Given that colors have for greater pre-experimental exposure t lan do 
these a typical fonts, the degree to which varying experimental far of the 
color cue would affect performance was unclear. Because ol" this 
uncertainly, they instantiated color as a contextual feature in two different 
ways. For expositional purposes, they treated these two different 
implementations of the color feature as the same manipulation, because 
the two variants of this manipulation had the same effects on the esults. 
Each color and font was randomly assigned to be either a high fan or 
low-fan feature for a given participant. High-fan features (colors oi fonts) 
were shown with 24 different words, whereas low-fan features were 
shown with 3 different words. Which feature (color or font) was h gh fan 
or low fan for any particular word was randomly determined fcr each 
participant, with the constraint that each word had one high and ore low-
87 
fan feature and that each feature type (color and font) was used equally 
often as a high-and as a low-fan feature. Words were also raidomly 
assigned to study and test conditions for each participant. Given these 
constraints, nine different colors and nine different fonts were req aired to 
present 48 words at study. 
During the recognition memory test, 48 studied words 48 new 
words were presented. For studied items, only one feature from the study 
phase was reinstated and the other feature was neutral. For example, if a 
color feature was reinstated with an item, the item was presented in a 
neutral font (Time Roman); if the studied font was reinstated as the test 
cue, then the words was presented on a white screen using a black font so 
the color feature at test was neutral. An equal number of words were 
tested with their low-fan and high-fan features. Additionally, ai equal 
number of words were tested with the font of study prest^ntation 
reinstated as with the color of study presentation reinstated. 48 ne\^ words 
were also tested with one of the two contextual features, using the same 
distribution of the features tested for targets. These were two study test 
cycles, that there were 96 old words ands and 96 new words used in the 
entire experiment. 
Experiment 2 employed 9 different voices and 9 differert fonts, 
just as experiment la used 9 different colors and fonts. In experiment 1, 
color or font was made neutral at test, whereas in this experimeit, only 
one of two encoding features was reinstated at test. 21 Carnegie Mellon 
University Students participated in this experiment, either to satisfy a 
research experience requirement or in exchange for $7 payment. 9 
different voices (5 male and 4 female) and 9 unusual fonts were used lo 
present the words aurally and visually during study. Assignment of voices 
and fonts to fan condition was randomly determined for each participant 
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as was assignment of fonts and voices to words. In all, 48 words were 
presented at study, each word presented with two features, one ow fan 
(shared with 3 words) and one high fan (shared with 24 words). Only one 
of the two encoding feature was presented at test, either the voice or font. 
Likewise, the 48 new words used as foils were either only heard or only 
read at test, always with one of the voices or fonts used with the studied 
items. Half of these foils were presented aurally and half visua ly, just 
like the target probes, using the same distribution of high-and low-fan 
features that was used for studied items on the recognition test. 
They assessed whether the recognition advantage for items tested 
in a low-fan feature was associated with recollection-based prociisses or 
familiarity-based processes and found evidence that the advantage was 
reflected in changes in recollection-based processes. The present result 
may not provide unique support for SAC, in the sense that clternate 
explanations such as the recollection-fluency perspective of Rajaram 
(1996, 1998) can also account for these results; there were two orimary 
reasons why they found the SAC account of these data to be infoimative. 
First, the SAC model provides a formal specification of the meciianisms 
producing the perceptual distinctive effects in these expeiments: 
contextual competition. It is important to note that this mechansm is a 
fundamental property of the theory, and has been applied not only to 
explain fan effects, but also to other recognition memory phenomena, 
such as the word frequency effect (Reder et al. 2000), the list-length 
effect (Cai7 and Reder, 2003), and list-strength effect (Diana and Reder, 
2005). Second, the SAC model advances the strong prediction that 
perceptual fan effects should be evident in recollection-based processing, 
because of the view that details of study presentation are associaied with 
episodic representations. Thus, the SAC model can explain not only why 
89 
perceptual fan effects occur, but also why these effects are reflected in 
recollection-based processing, and when the perceptual feature piesent at 
study was reinstated at test (Reder et al. 2002). 
SECTION- Ilind 
As stated earlier, this section exclusively reviews those studies 
which are directly or indirectly relevant to the problem under 
investigation. More specifically under this section of the chapter an 
attempt is made to highlight the relationship between emotion and 
memory in general and between emotion and conversation memory in 
particular. Research on the relation between emotional staes and 
cognitive processes has burgeoned in the past ten year. Although this area 
of research has a much earlier history of activity. It lay dormant f )r many 
years. Beginning in the mid 1970's, this research area bogan to 
accelerate to the point where it has now become a major area of ictivity. 
A number of article, books and edited volumes now atleast to the \'itality 
of this research area (e.g. Clark and Fisco 1982, Clark and Isen 1982; 
Fielder and Forges, 1988; Isen 1984) and new journal "cognition and 
emotion" appeared in 1987 which is devoted entirely to relatione among 
emotional states and full range of cognitive processes typically studied by 
psychologist. This section describes the important aspects of research on 
emotional states and impact of different shades of listener's n ood on 
conversation memory. 
Kleinsmith and Kaplan (1964) investigated interaction of arousal 
and recall interval in nonsense syllable paired-associate leamijig. fhe 
present study was designed to test the independence of the phenomenon 
from the association values or other qualities unique to the individual 
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stimuli. Nonsense syllables of zero association value (Hilganl, 1951) 
were selected as stimuli in order to obtain random arousal effects. In this 
way both high and low arousal curves would contain essentially the same 
items and thus any differential behavior in learning could not be 
explained in terms of qualities unique to the stimuli. The subjects were 36 
University of Michigan undergraduates obtained from intrcductoiy 
courses in psychology. They were run in three subgroups of 12 subjects 
each. The subjects were given a single learning trial with a Vnt of six 
nonsense syllable-number pairs. The following six 0% association value 
nonsense syllables were used: CEF, QAP, TOV, JEX, LAJ, D/vX. The 
response items were single digits from 2 to 7. A slide projector with an 
exposure time of 4 sec. was used to present the stimuli. Duiing the 
training trial, subject first saw the nonsense syllable repeated with a 
single digit response. To separate the arousal effects from onv- set of 
pairing to the next, two slide containing four colors each were inserted 
between the paired associates and subject was instructed to mime the 
colors. (Red, green, orange, blue, black, and yellow were used randomly 
on these slides). The subject was instructed to "concentrate care uliy on 
both colors and nonsense syllable-number pairs" as he called them out 
loud, to avoid rehearsal subject was not specifically told that he would be 
tested for recall. In order to determine the specific arousal effects of each 
nonsense syllable, skin resistance was recorded during learning. The 
electrodes were of the zinc variety described by Lykken (19S9). To 
ensure constancy of conditions, electrodes and recording apparatus were 
also used during the recall sessions. During the recall session subject was 
instructed to indicate the correct number for each nonsense syllable as it 
appeared, and to guess if he was uncertain. The correct numbers v>ere not 
repeated. Colors were used as an interpolated task as before. The three 
groups were tested on at each of three recall intervals: immediate (ibout 2 
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min.), 20 min., and 1 wk. To correct for serial order effects six different 
training lists were used, each list given to two subjects in each grcup. The 
lists were designed so that each of the six nonsense syllables appeared 
once in each position in the list (Fisher and Yates, 1938). The order of the 
recall lists was varied in the same manner. Any drop in subject's skin 
resistance which occurred within 4 sec. of presentation of a nonsense 
syllable was considered an arousal deflection; these were converted to 
percent deflections. Each subject's six GSR deflections were then ranked. 
(In case of ties, a deflection occurring at a low level of absohite skin 
resistance was considered higher arousal than a similar deflection 
occurring at a higher absolute level). The three highest deflect ons for 
each subject were designated "higher arousal learning", and the three 
lowest were designated "low arousal learning". 
The findings revealed that at immediate recall, numbers associated 
with low arousal nonsense syllables were recalled four times as i)i"ten as 
numbers associated with high arousal nonsense syllables. The capacity to 
recall numbers associated with low arousal nonsense syllables decreased 
as a function of time in a characteristic forgetting curve pattern. On the 
other hand, the capacity to recall numbers associated with high arousal 
nonsense syllables showed a considerable reminiscence effect. /Tter 20 
min., the increase was found 100%, by a week it has increased 200%. 
Significant interaction was primarily attributable to the effect of the 
immediate condition and 1-wk condition. Thus at immediate reciU, low 
arousal learning was significantly greater than higher arousal karning; 
after 1 wk. the situation reversed and high arousal recall wa.^  found 
significantly better than low arousal recall. Since there was some 
tendency for adaptation of GSRs during presentation of a 1 st, the 
possibility aroused that serial order interacts with the arousal 
92 
classification. Thus it would be expected that the first two items would 
tend to fall in the high arousal category, while the last two items v/ould be 
in the low arousal category. This was not borne out by the data. /Vnalysis 
of recall as a function of interpolated interval and arousal classification, 
plotted separately for pairs of consecutive items, was essentially identical 
to the results. 
In brief, high arousal learning showed poor immediate recall due to 
the relative unavaibility of the rapidly reverberating neutral trace, and 
strong permanent memory due to the great amount of perseverati\e 
consolidation. Low arousal learning, on the other hand, showt.'d good 
immediate recall due to lack of rapid reverberation, and yet poor long-
term memory for the same reason. 
Natale (1977) investigated effects of induced elation-depression on 
speech in the initial interview. The effects of depression and el ition on 
speech were sought in an experimental analogue (mood inductior) that is 
both generalizable and valid in term of the authenticity of the affective 
states. Subjects were 45 female college students, ages 17 to 23, enrolled 
in an introductory psychology course. Subjects dialogue was obtained m 
an audiotape automated standardized interview developed by Webb. All 
recording equipment was located in a chamber adjacent to the interview 
room. Three separate tape decks (sony-104) were used-one for the 
delivery of the interviewer's emergency statements, and the thirc for the 
continuous playing of appropriate background noise. The later d^ck was 
used to audibly mask the stopping and starting of the other t vo tape 
decks. Velten's technique was used to induce either elated or depressed 
mood. The subject read preparatory statements silently and then aloud for 
the mood induction task. The actual mood induction consistec of the 
reading of 60 self-referent statement; each statement was typed on a 
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separate card and presented to the subject for 20 sec. A sample elation 
statement is "If your attitude is good, then things are good, and my 
attitude is good". A sample depressive statement is "I have many bad 
things in my life". There is also a set of 60 neutral cards used by a control 
group. The difference scores of the pre-induction and post-induction 
writing speed score and the mean semantic differential ratings were used 
as independent criteria to verify the experimental MIP. Post-interview 
questioning ascertained that none of the subjects discerned the automated 
nature of the standardized interview and none of the subjects were 
cognizant of the true nature of the experiment. Newman-Keuls analysis 
demonstrated that the "personal feelings" associated with the thrt-e levels 
of the state variable were all significantly different from one other. Fhe 
subjects' performance on the semantic differential scale indicated that 
Velten's MIP did evince feelings congruent with the moods of deoression 
or elation. It was stated that depressed subjects manifested motoric 
retardation, with elated subjects exhibiting motoric accelemtion as 
compared to a neutral group. The verbal behavior, as measured b} all five 
variables, of subjects in the depressed and elated treatment groa]3S was 
found not to differ from individual in the neutral mood condition. The 
post-induction results revealed that subjects made to feel elaied, had 
significantly shorter response latencies, faster speech and articulation 
rates, and less total speech time occupied by pauses longer than 2 sec 
(silence quotient), as compared to individual in a neutral mood state. The 
induction of depression in subjects was shown to produce a larger 
interviewee silent quotient as contrasted with the neutral subjects. The 
results also revealed that the second half of the interviev> (post-
induction), regardless of the experimentally induced mood state, elicited 
fewer words per response, longer reaction time, slower rates, and an 
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increase of lengthy hesitation (silence quotient) in the speech of the 
interviewees. 
Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1978) conducted a siudy on 
emotional mood as a context for learning and recall. In this experiment, 
emotional moods were produced by hypnotic suggestions. They chose 
happiness (euphoria) and sadness (grief) as the moods because they are 
apparently incompatible opposites. Highly suggestible subjects were 
induced to feel very happy or very sad during learning of a word list, and 
later induced again to feel happy or sad during free recall of that list. The 
issue was whether performance is superior if the same mood prevails 
during learning and recall. Experiment 1 used a single learning 1 st and a 
short retention interval. One group learned a word-list under hypnosis 
while in a happy mood; a second group learned while in a sad mood. 
After a brief interpolated task, they were placed in the opposite mood and 
asked to recall the word list. Then their original mood was reinstated and 
they were asked to recall again. The contrast of interest was the first 
recall in the opposite mood vs. the second recall in the same mood as in 
original learning. Further, half the words in the learning list were pleasant 
or happy words, and half were unpleasant or sad words. The question was 
whether happy subjects recall more pleasant words, and sad subjects 
recall more sad words. The word list consisted of 16 abstract because 
Weingartner et al. (1976) found greater SDR (state-dependent retention) 
effects with abstract rather than concrete nouns. Eight of the words 
connoted happy things (e.g., humor, pleasure), and eight connoted sad 
things (e.g., atrocity, misery). The subjects were 10 Stanford 
undergraduates selected for high susceptibility to hypnosis. Tiey had 
scored from 10 to 12 (maximum) on an earlier test using the Sanford 
Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C (Weitzenhoffer and Hil^ard, 
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1962). They were experienced hypnotic subjects, able to enter trance 
easily, and to verbally assess the "depth of trance" they reponed vivid 
emotional experiences when these were suggested. The subjects v\ere run 
individually in a 1-hour session. 
Happy subjects frequently laughed as they found hjmor in 
everything; sad subjects were long-faced, morose, slow to respond, and 
often on the verge of tears. Initial learning was equivalent for the happy 
and sad subjects. The groups showed no forgetting nor did the}' differ 
reliably from one another. Thus, a switch in mood caused no loss in 
memory whatsoever. Mean for second recall do not differ reliably from 
the first-recall means nor from the end-of-leaming means. The results 
thus showed no mood-dependent retention effects at all. This wa^  not due 
to a ceiling on recall, since recall averaged around 65% but the fact that 
items available in immediate recall were still available on ihe later 
retention test regardless of the mood state. Happy subjects were not more 
likely to recall happy words, and sad subjects were not more ikely to 
recall sad words. The sole difference that occurred in this respect 
concerned the order of recall; the first word recalled by subjects natched 
the mood during recall. Of 40 recall protocols (10 subjects times four 
recall each), in 37 the first word recalled matched the mood of the recaller 
(a highly significant bias). 
There is always the possibility that more sensitive expeiimental 
conditions could be arranged to show the SDR effect. This was attempted 
in experiment 2. This experiment had a 2X2 factorial design with four 
groups of four subjects: happy or sad mood during learning and happy or 
sad mood during retention testing the next day. The 20-word learning list 
consisted of eight happy words, eight sad words, and four neutral words. 
Thus, word-type was a within-subject variable. The 16 subjects were 
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Stanford undergraduates who had scored very high (10 to 12l on a 
screening with the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale. Thay were 
experienced in hypnosis, quickly entered trance, could estimate "depth of 
trance" and could vividly experience the emotions suggested by the 
experimenter. The subjects were assigned in random rotation to the four 
groups defined by the "learning-mood by testing-mood" factois They 
found that the original learning was about the same for the Happy and 
Sad learners and learning mood had a slight effect on late • recall. 
However, the difference between happy and sad learners was not 
significant in the factorial analysis of variance. Subjects in the same 
mood as learning recalled an average of 6.8 words, and those in different 
mood recalled an average of 7.0 words. 
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate whether hypnot c mood 
could be used to enhance or diminish the retroactive interfere ice that 
normally arises when a person learns two lists of words. The two I ()-word 
lists were abstract words (rated between 2.0 and 3.0 on conrettmces in 
Paivio et al. (1968). In each list there were eight happy v/onis (e.g., 
affection, victory, gaiety) and eight sad words (e.g., atrocity, tragedy, 
misery). The subjects were 14 female and 10 males assigned as evenly as 
possible to the three main experimental conditions. Ten subjects were 
Stanford undergraduates selected for having scored very high (10 to 12 
points) on the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C. Tlie other 
14 subjects were non-students selected from a pool of former students in 
hypnosis workshops conducted by the third author. They were cKcellent 
hypnotic subjects; nine were tested on the Stanford Scale, Form C and all 
scored in the 10 to 12 range. There were six experimental corditions. 
Using first and second letters to denote mood states during leaming of 
List 1 and List 2, and the third letter to denote mood during recall of both 
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lists, the six conditions were: SHH and HSS (maximum interference tor 
List 1); HHH and SSS (controls); and SHS and SHS and HSH (maKimum 
interference for list 1). These conditions are referred as the max, min, and 
control groups. Four subjects were assigned in random alternation to the 
six groups with the restriction that the male-female composition should 
be nearly the same in each group. The two sub-groups with a given 
condition hardly differ in original learning or recall. Thus, for example, 
subgroups SHS and HSH in the max conditions are quite comparable at 
all points. This means that mood state per se was not an influential factor 
during either learning or recall; only the relation of learning o recall 
moods was influential. The overall analysis of variance for list-1 letention 
percentages showed a significant effect due to groups. With he max 
interference group showing poorest list-1 retention (46%) the control 
group a moderate amount (54%), and minimum interference group 
showing the best list-1 retention (66%). A similar overall anc lysis of 
variance on percentage recall scores (arc sine transforms) for list-2 
declared highly significant group differences (with percentages at 90°'o, 
57%) and 48%) for groups max, control, and min, respectively). Recall was 
best when the mood-state during recall was the same as the mcod-state 
during learning of the list being recalled and when the learning mood-
state of the interfering list was different (e.g., SHS or HSH). 
Lewinsohn and Amenson (1978) investigated some relation 
between pleasant and unpleasant mood-related events and depression. 
The present research was conducted within a framework that postulated 
that a low rate of response-contingent positive reinforcement is a critical 
antecent of clinical depression (Lewinsohn, Weinstein, & Shaw 1969). 
That is, it was, assumed that the behavior of depressed individuals does 
not elicit reinforcement to a sufficient degree to maintain beha\ ior and 
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that a low rate of response-contingent reinforcement leads to a feeling of 
dysphoria, which is central to the phenomenology of depression. Ihus, 
the concept of the reinforcement is crucial to this approach to depression. 
Data from three separate samples were obtained. Sample 1 (Lewinsohn & 
MacPhillamy, 1974) consisted of 251 participants, about equally divided 
between depressed (D), non-depressed psychiatric (PC) and normal 
control (N). Sample 2 (Lewinsohn & MacPhillamy, 1974) consisted of 
459 normal participants. Sample 3 consisted of 199 participanis about 
equally divided between D, PC, and N participants. The participants m 
sample 1 and 2, and the non-depressed controls in sample .^ were 
recruited through a variety of public armouncements to townspeople of 
the Eugene-Springfield area of Oregon inviting paid participation in 
psychological research. The participants were thus very heterogeneous in 
regard to age and educational and occupational levels. The diignostic 
groups did not differ from one another in regard to socioeconom c status 
(HoUinghead, 1957). The depressed subjects for sample 3 were recruited 
by announcing, through both public media and community agencies, the 
availability of a depression treatment program. For samples 1 ind 3 a 
two-stage screening process was used to assign participants to the 
diagnostic groups. This classification procedure employed the M nnesota 
Multiphase Personality Inventory (MMPI) in complete (sample 3 or 
abbreviated (sample 1) fonn (Byrne, 1964) and the structured clinical 
interview rating form constructed and validated by Grinker, Miller, 
Sabshin, Nunn, and Nunnally (1961). The normal controls in sample 2 
were selected using only the MMIP with the Byrne (1964) scale criteria. 
Depressed participants were mildly to severely depressed with depression 
as the major problem. Psychiatric controls had mild to severe 
maladjustment other than depression. All participants signed informed 
consent forms and except for the depressed subject in sample 3. fhe 
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relation between the mean aversiveness rating of each UES iten- (based 
on sample 3, N = 199) and the percent of the population for whom the 
item significantly correlated with mood was less strong. Examination of 
the scattergram suggested that the relation was attenuated by the act that 
some of the most aversive items occurred with low frequency and, 
therefore, were significantly correlated with mood for only a few 
participants. There was a highly significant main effect due to diagnostic 
class for all measures. Depressed participants have lower PES (Pleasant 
Events Schedule) frequency, enjoyability, and cross-product sctres and 
higher UES (Unpleasant Events Schedule) frequency, aversiveness, and 
cross-product scores than the non-depressed participants. There was also 
a highly significant main effect due to item type. Mood-related items 
were rated higher than non-mood-related items on all measures It was 
demonstrated that mood-related items discriminate more po^verfully 
between depressed and non-depressed participants than do noii-mood-
related items. Strong positive correlations were found among pleasant 
events and among unpleasant events. It was concluded, therefore, that no 
significant correlations were observed between the participants impact 
rating of pleasant and unpleasant events. Results also showed that low but 
statistically significant positive correlations were observed between Pf-S 
MR (mood related) frequency and UES MR frequency and between PES 
MR enjoyability and UES MR aversiveness. All other correlation did not 
differ significantly from zero. 
Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) investigated differential effects of 
induced mood on retrieval of pleasant and unpleasant events from 
episodic memory. The aim of the present study was" to obtain 
unambiguous evidence of the relationship between depressed mood and 
speed of retrieval of pleasant and unpleasant past experiences. Each 
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subject was seen on two occasions, receiving a depressed mood induction 
on one occasion and a happy mood induction on the other. C)n each 
occasion subjects were presented with a series of words. For eac h word 
they were asked to recall a real-life experience, specified to either 
pleasant or unpleasant, that they associated with the word latency of 
retrieval was measured for each experience. 30 student subjects were 
recruited from Oxford Polytechnic and Dorset House School of 
Occupational Therapy, Oxford. Of the 16 subjects who net the 
acceptance criteria for the study, 12 were women and 4 were mer, with a 
mean age of 19.8 yr. A latin square with repeated measures design was 
used. Each subject received both happy and depressed mood inductions, 
counterbalanced for order across subjects. Subjects rated their mood 
using cards bearing O-lOO line scales, 10 c m long, on whicli 0 was 
labeled 'T do not feel at all X" and 100 was labeled "1 feel extremely X'\ 
For different cards, X was anxious, despondent, and happy. /Vt this 
Moment" was typed at the top of each card to indicate thai it was 
instantaneous mood that was to be rated. The ratio of latency for etrieval 
of unpleasant experiences to latency for retrieval of pleasant experiences 
was significandy less following depressed mood induction than toll owing 
happy mood induction. This result was largely due to an effect of mood 
on retrieval of pleasant experiences. The judges' ratings of the 
pleasantness of the experiences recalled were similar or the 
corresponding experiences in the two conditions. Following depressed 
mood induction, the subjects were also significantly more anxious, less 
happy, showed longer speech pause-time in counting from 1 to 10, and 
took longer, overall, to retrieve memories associated with the stimulus 
words. Following the depressed mood induction, latency of retrieval of 
pleasant experiences was significantly longer and the U/P ratio 
significantly smaller than after the happy mood induction. Latency of 
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retrieval of unpleasant experiences was very similar following two mood 
inductions. A significant effect of word list was obtained for he U/P 
ratio, the mean for list A being significantly smaller than that for list B. 
The researcher found that the subjects were reasonably balanced for the 
order in which they received mood inductions (14 had the order happy-
depressed, 16 the order depressed-happy), but were not balanced for order 
of mood induction and word list. For the total sample of subjects, 
significant correlations were obtained between the difference in mean 
latency of retrieval of pleasant memories in two conditions and 
differences in mean happiness, as well as the differences in an overall 
measure of "bad mood" calculated by adding the mean scores for 
despondency and anxiety, and subtracting the mean score for haoj^iness. 
Non-significant trends in the same direction were obtained for dif brences 
in mean anxiety and despondency. The "worse" the mood was in the 
depressed condition relative to the happy conditions, the greater u as the 
slowing of recall of pleasant experiences relative to the happy condition. 
Maslach (1979) investigated "Negative Emotional Biasing of 
Unexplained Arousal". The current research was designed to llirther 
investigate the process of a cognitive search for the causal antecedents of 
unexplained arousal. It involved a modified replication in which 
procedural elements were altered to correct some of the original 
methodological problems. These improvements included the use of 
hypnosis to produce an arousal state, rather than a drug injection. Second, 
the behaviors of the two emotion conditions were made directly 
comparable the nature, level, and timing of the activity were equi\ alent in 
both conditions, and only the confederate's obvious emotional state 
(happy or angry) was varied. The reasons given for the confederate "s 
emotion were ones that the subject could readily share, and tiie 
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confederate's behavior appeared believable and appropriate m the 
laboratory setting. Finally, several measures were added to th>i study, 
both to assess the validity of the experimental manipulations and to 
reflect more precisely any differences in emotional behavior. 48 
undergraduate subjects (25 males and 23 females) were drawn Irom the 
introductory psychology course of Stanford University. All of the 
subjects had received scores of high hypnotic susceptibility on the 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor and Ome, 1962). 
36 of these subjects were randomly assigned to training in hypnosis prior 
to the experiment, while 12 subjects were randomly assigned to control 
groups that did not receive such training. The hypnotic training, which 
averaged about 10 hours per subject, was conducted in small groups and 
utilized a relaxed and permissive approach (Zimbardo, Maslach and 
Marshall, 1972). The training program sampled a wide vaiiety of 
hypnotic experiences and included as criterion tests (a) the successful 
completion of posthypnotic suggestions with accompanying amnesia (b) 
increased tolerance of ischemic pain (a measure developed by Lenox, 
1970). Throughout the experimental session, trained and uitrained 
subjects were treated identically except for a brief hypnotic induction for 
the trained subjects. There were six such intervals followirg each 
stimulus, and their individual scores were combined into a total mean 
score for each stimulus. A repeated measures analysis of variance for the 
highest heart rate scores showed that there was a significant main effect 
of visual stimuli, such that the highest heart rate following the arousal cue 
was significantly higher than the highest heart rate following the neutral 
stimuli (which did not differ from each other). However, there was a 
significant interaction between stimuli and hypnosis condition. The F 
tests for the two hypnosis conditions revealed that this main effect was 
due entirely to the hypnotized subjects. The unhypnotized subjects did 
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not show a significant increase in highest heart rate in response to the 
arousal cue. An analysis of mean heart rate revealed exactly tie same 
pattern of results. A similar pattern of arousal was reflected in he total 
number of GSRs (Galvanic skin response) following each stimulus. There 
was a significantly greater number of GSRs following the arousal cue 
than following the neutral stimuli. However, there was also a significant 
interaction between stimuli and hypnosis condition and the F tests for the 
two hypnosis conditions showed that the main effect was due entirely to 
the hypnotized subjects and not to the unhypnotized grouo. This 
difference in arousal response is even more striking given the lact that 
both hypnotized and unhypnotized subjects showed a more rapid 
recognition of the cue word (as evidenced by a shorter latency and higher 
amplitude of the first GSR following the cue). The changes scores for the 
hypnotized subjects indicate the marked shift in emotional state that 
resulted from their arousal. Their mood became significantly more 
negative, less positive, and less passive. In contrast, the unhypnotized 
subjects showed no changes on the negative, active, or passive mood 
indexes, although there was a tendency for them to report less positive 
feelings. Overall, the hypnotized subjects showed a more extreme shift on 
a composite of these four indexes mood than did the unhypaotized 
subjects. There was no between-group difference in overall recall 
accuracy on either list, subjects in the arousal groups made signijicantly 
fewer errors of commission than did the unaroused and unhypnotized 
groups on the second learning list. From 92% to 1()0% of the subjects in 
the aroused conditions reported experiencing each of the four suggested 
symptoms, whereas only 26% to 52% of the unaroused and unhypnotized 
subjects reported having even a single one of the symptoms. Subjects in 
the happy condition evaluated the confederate's mood as signif cantK 
more positive than the neutral midpoint of zero. In contrast, the treatment 
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mean for subjects in the angry condition was significantly more negative 
than zero. The difference between the two confederate conditions is 
highly significant. The overt behavior of the subjects varied as a function 
of the confederate's mood, but seemed unaffected by experience arousal. 
Subjects in the presence of a happy confederate exhibited a significantly 
higher amount of sociable behaviors than did subjects who were with the 
angry confederate. This was true for both verbal behaviors and nonverbal 
behaviors. Although the confederates' mood had a demonstrable effect on 
the subjects' overt behavior, it did not exert the expected influence on 
their reported emotional state. A comparison of means revealed that this 
was due to the more negative scores of the aroused condition. Analysis of 
each of the happy and the angry ratings separately revealed the same 
significant difference in emotional reactions between the aroused subjects 
and the other subjects without arousal. There was a significant main 
effect of arousal condition and comparison of means revealed that the 
aroused groups reported a significantly more negative emotional state 
than both the unaroused and unhypnotized groups (which did not differ 
from each other). This same pattern of results was found for each 
individual scale. On the overall index, the aroused conditions reported 
negative emotions that were significantly different from the neutral 
midpoint of zero, while the unhypnotized groups were neutral m their 
emotions (their mean score did not differ significantly from zeio), the 
unaroused subjects rated themselves as feeling a positive emotional state. 
Apparently, the unaroused subjects were responding appropriately to the 
posthypnotic suggestion that they would feel relaxed and good when they 
came out of hypnosis. The positive feelings of the unaroused group offer 
a dramatic comparison level for the negative reaction reported by the 
arousal subjects (despite the same posthypnotic suggestion to feel good 
and identical prior to hypnotic training). The number of aroused s ibjects 
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(67%) who thought they knew the cause of their current feehngs was as 
high as that of the unaroused and unhypnotized groups. They showed the 
same increase in heart rate, similar changes on the Mood-Adjective 
Checklist, the same pattern of recall errors, but not a similar change in 
GSR. The simplified arousal subjects reported increased breathing and 
heart rate. Suiprisingly, however, all of them also reported sweaty palms, 
and two thirds reported a sinking feeling in the stomach. The perception 
of the confederate by the two control groups was the same as th.it of the 
happy aroused group, and they showed the same pattern of sociable 
behaviors (both verbal and non-verbal) in their interaction with the 
confederate. Overall, the two arousal control groups were similar to the 
happy aroused group interms of physiological arousal, ^ eridical 
perception of the confederate, and overt behavior. However, they differed 
in experienced emotional state. The informed arousal subjects renorted a 
neutral set of feelings (which did not differ from the zero midpi)int), as 
opposed to the negative feelings expressed by the happy aroused group. 
They all stated that the reason for their experienced arousal vas the 
hypnotic suggestion. In contrast, the simplified arousal subjects leported 
the same negative emotion as the happy aroused group (on eacJi of the 
self-report measures) and gave the same type of causal explaaations. 
Their mean rating on the emotion index was significantly more r<egative 
than the neutral midpoint of zero. 
Riskind, Rholes, and Eggers (1982) conducted a study entitled 
"The Velten Mood Induction Procedure Effect on Mood and Memory". 
This study was conducted to deteraiine whether the memoiy bias 
observed by Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) is produced by the somatic 
statements in the VMIP, as the study of Frost et al. (1979) suggestxi. It is 
possible that the self-devaluative aspects of the VPIM have an el feet on 
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memory, even if they do not affect mood. 52 undergraduates (13 per 
experimental condition) took part in the study. Slightly less than half of 
the subjects were male and the rest were female. (There wen- no sex 
effects for any analysis). Prior to the VMIP mood manipulation, subjects 
filled out a 7-item mood scale and took part in a task in which they 
recalled four pleasant and four unpleasant life experiences (in a random 
order). The time between memory trial onset and beginning of a subject's 
recitation of experience (response latency) was recorded. AilQv the 
premeasures, the VMIP was administered to manipulate mood. Following 
the procedures of Frost et al. (1979), this study included three depressed 
mood conditions. In the combined-depression condition, subjects read 
VMIP statements that concerned both self-devaluation (e.g, I am 
worthless) and "depressed" somatic states (e.g., I feel listless). In the self-
devaluative and somatic conditions, subjects read only self-devaluative or 
somatic item, respectively. Subjects in the fourth condition read Velten's 
set of positive mood items. This "elation" condition served as reference 
point for assessing the effects of the three depressed conditions. 
Following the mood-induction procedure, the original recall and mood 
measures were readministered. 
An analysis of covariance was conducted on the posttest mood 
scores, with the pretest scores as the covariate. The elation group 
(contrast weight: 3) was found to be significantly more positive n mood 
than the other three groups. Further comparison showed that the elation 
group was significantly higher in mood than the self-devaluation group, 
the somatic-suggestion group and combined-depression group. PosUest 
recall latencies for posifive experiences were significantly faster han for 
negative experiences among subjects in the elafion condhion. In contrast, 
among the self-devaluative, somatic-suggestion, and coinbined-
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depression conditions, positive experiences were not recalled 
significantly faster than negative ones. Further comparisons contrasted 
the elation condition with each depression condition. The di Terence 
between the speeds of positive virsus negative recall in the elation 
condition was significantly different only from the speeds in the self-
devaluation condition. The correlation for posifive recall v/as not 
significant. The correlation for negative recall was not o ily not 
significant but opposite to the expected direction. The results do not 
support the hypothesis, suggested by Frost et al. (1979), that somatic 
VMIP statements have a greater effect on memory and mood than self-
devaluative ones. All three depression conditions produced lower mood 
than the elation condition. Only the self-devaluative statements produced 
a significant difference with the elation condition in positive versus 
negative recall. The self-devaluative group, however, \\as not 
significantly different from the other two depression conditions. 
Regarding memory, the present results extended the findings of the 
memory-distortion literature by showing that self-devaluative statements 
alone can produce a difference in positive versus negative recall that is 
significantly different than the one for elation statements. The 01 her t\\o 
depression conditions were not significantly different from either the 
elation or self-devaluative condidon. Results suggested that changing 
self-devaluative cognitions may be beneficial therapeutically by (a) 
improving mood and (b) ameliorating a negative memory bias taat may 
otherwise maintain a depressed person's mood overtime. 
Whinney (1982) investigated the role of arousal in memory for 
conversafion. This study examined the extent to which high interactional 
content can lead to superior memory for the surface form of whole 
sentences, even when the interacfion is viewed on videotape. If the effect 
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of interactional content holds up, even for the nonparticipants, it may be 
possible to begin to study memory for natural conversation b '^ using 
videotape as a stimulus. In order to test for the effect of participation on 
memory for natural conversation, three groups of subjects were studied: 
(1) participants, subjects who knew each other and who directly engaged 
in natural conversation; (2) familiar nonparticipants, subjects who knew 
the participants but who did not themselves participate in the 
conversation and who listened to and watched a videotape of the 
conversation generated by the participants; and (3) nonfamiliar 
nonparticipants, subjects who neither knew the participants nor engaged 
in the conversation and who listened to and watched the discussion on 
videotape. These three groups were viewed as vaiying along a general 
dimension of involvement: the participants were the most invoh ed and 
the nonfamiliar nonparticipants were the least involved. Unfortun itely, it 
was not possible to deconfound participation and familiarity in this 
design, because a conversation between nonfamiliar participants could 
hardly qualify as an instance of natural conversation. Thus the main 
comparison of interest was between the participants and nonfamiliar 
nonparticipants. Although familiarity is partially confounded with 
participation, by comparing the performance of the familiar 
nonparticipants with the nonfamiliar nonparticipants, it was possible to 
get some idea of the relative importance of familiarity as opposed to 
participation in memory for natural conversation. The participant and 
familiar nonparticipants groups were composed of graduate students from 
the clinical area of the department of psychology at University of Denver. 
Four conversations, each involving three students plus the exper menter 
(P.R), who was also a psychology graduate student, were recorded on 
videotape. Simultaneously, electrodermal responses were recorded on 
polygraph tracings. Each conversational group was made up of students 
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from the entering year. Thus, there was a 4*'^ -year conversational group, 
3'^'^ -year group, a 2"'^ -year group, and a T^-year group. Because there were 
3 subjects in each group, there were a total of 12 subjects in the famiUar 
participants group. The familiar nonparticipants group also contained 12 
subjects. Each familiar nonparticipant was shown a videotape of the 
conversation in which the participants were from his own class, (n other 
words, 4*-year familiar nonparticipants watched 4*-year participants, 3 ' ' 
year familiar participant's watched 3 -year participants, and so forth. The 
familiar nonparticipants had extensive social contact with the participants 
within the context of the numerous close interactions in the clinical 
program. This was true because all the students within a given class spent 
a great deal of time with each other in supervision meetings, area 
meetings, and courses. The nonfamiliar nonparticipants were 12 graduate 
students in the professional psychology program at the University of 
Denver. All were complete strangers to those they watched on videotape. 
However, in terms of clinical interests, academic ability, age, social class 
and so forth, the nonfamiliar nonparticipants were quite compaiable to 
the other two groups of clinical graduate students. Results suggested that 
none of the correlations between EDR (Electrodermal response) and 
memory was significant, whereas all the coiTelation between interactional 
content and memory for surface form were significant. Furthermore, a 
scatter plot of memory performance as a function of EDR shov* ed that 
these low correlations were not the result of masking of an uncerlying 
quadratic function. Thus, these results provided little support for the 
arousal hypothesis. However, these results are consistent with a irodel in 
which there are two paths from interactional content, one to memory and 
one to EDR, but no path from EDR to memory. Such a model clearly fits 
these data better than the alternative, in which EDR and intenctional 
content make separate contributions to memory. There was a highly 
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significant effect of involvement. Participants showed high ERC's on an 
average of 39% of the sentences, whereas famihar nonparticipants 
showed high EDRs on only 20% of the sentences and nonfamihar 
nonparticipants showed high EDRs on only 9% of the sentences. It is 
interesting to note that, while both familiarity and participation ilfected 
arousal, the increase due to familiarity (19%) was almost twice that due 
to participation (11%). There was also a significant effect of interactional 
content on EDR. An average of 30% of the high interactional content 
statements produced high EDRs, compared with only 17% for :he low 
interactional content statements. Finally, there was a significant 
Involvement by Interactional Content interaction. The large dilference 
between high and low interactional content statements observec in the 
familiar participants (27%) and decreased for the familiar nonpart cipanis 
(9%) and was virtually eliminated in the non familiar nonpart cipants 
group (3%). 
So for as overall memory performance is concerned, it was found 
that memory for the meanings of high interactional content statements 
exceeded that of low interactional content statements. The surface* forms 
of high-interaction items were recognized significantly better than the 
surface forms of low-interaction items. The main effect of involvement 
also just reached significance. Planned comparisons showed that 
nonfamiliar nonparticipants remembered less about surface form than did 
either participants or familiar nonparticipants. The main effect cf class 
was significant, the 4'-year class remembered more than the 3"-year 
class, the 2"'-year class, and the l^'-year class. An important and 
potentially useful finding of the study was the absence of an inte action 
between interactional content and involvement. Whereas in the EDR data 
the difference between high and low interactional content statemerts was 
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quite large for the participants and increasingly smaller for the familiar 
nonparticipants and nonfamiliar nonparticipants, in the memory data the 
difference between high and low interactional content statements was 
virtually the same for all three experimental groups. The main effect of 
interactional content was again highly significant. The main effect of 
involvement was also significant. Planned comparisons showed that the 
nonfamiliar nonparticipants remembered less than both the familiar 
participants and the familiar nonparticipants. Finally, the effect j f class 
was significant, indicating once again that the 4*-year class remembered 
more than any of the other class. 
In order to test the possibility that factors other than interactional 
content may have been responsible for the difference in memory t etween 
high-and low interaction statements, a control study was performed to 
determine whether the high-interaction statements used in this exptiriment 
were simply more inherently memorable than the low-interactional 
statements. 36 students from the University of Denver were recruited by 
an advertisement in the school newspaper. Subjects listened to a tape 
consisting of 150 conversational-tape sentences. The list of sentences 
included the 56 high and 56 low interactional content sentences from the 
four conversations, along with 38 filler sentences. Filler were included to 
prevent ceiling effects on the memory test. All of the sentences were 
recorded by a single speaker who spoke in a conversational tone The 
order of the sentence presentation was randomized, with the constraint 
that the first 10 and last 10 sentences of the list be filler items to iX)ntrol 
for primacy and recency effects. Subjects were instructed to listen 
carefiilly to the sentences in order to do well on a subsequent memor> 
test; the nature of the test was not specified. As part of the informed 
consent procedure, it was necessary to warn the subjects that a few of the 
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sentences contained profanity, highly suggestive sexual references, or 
both and that, if they did want to listen such language, they did lot have 
to participate in the experiment. All subjects, however, a '^,reed to 
participate. Immediately after listening to the 150 sentences, the subjects 
were given a composite of the four memory tests used in the con^ ersation 
experiment. The items were the same four-alternative forced-choice 
questions; however, in the test given to control group, the speaker was not 
identified by name. The test consisted only of the 112 high-aad low-
interaction statements from the original conversations. 
An analysis of variance was perfomied in which the 36 
experimental subjects were compared with the 36 control subjects. 
Overall, the control group had better memory for surface form than did 
the experimental group. However, this superiority held only "or low 
interactional content statements. In terms of memory for the surface form 
of high interactional statements, the two groups did not differ. It was 
found that the size of this difference in memorability is much smaller 
(9%) than that observed for any of the experimental group (21%). 1 his is 
reflected in the highly significant interaction between groip and 
interactional content. The control group remembered more of the content 
of the high-interaction sentences (82%) than of low-interaction sentences 
(76%)). Again this difference (6%o) is much smaller than the average 
difference observed in the experimental group (31%)), as reflected in the 
significant interaction between group and interactional content. 
Clark, Milberg, and Ross (1983) conducted a study on arousal cues 
arousal-related material in memory: implications for understanding 
effects of mood on memory. Their first two studies examined the idea 
that information about arousal can be stored in memory and that 
subsequent arousal can sei-ve as a retrieval cue for material presu nably 
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linked to that information. Under the guise of a study on learning under 
distracting conditions, subjects learned a list of phrases while 
experiencing normal arousal. Later, they were given a recall test for 
phrases on both lists when they were experiencing either enhanced 
arousal or normal arousal. Subjects were 37 college students enrolled in 
their first psychology class. Two lists of phrases consisting of an 
adjective and a noun were generated (e.g., failed exam, wide road). Then 
8 judges rated how abstract and how emotionally toned each phrase was. 
Finally, 20 phrases were selected for each of 2 lists, hereafter reieired to 
as List A and List B, such that the average abstractness and emoiionality 
ratings of the phrases on each list did not differ. Results supported the 
effectiveness of the arousal manipulation. Exercise produced significantly 
greater increases in pulse from pre-test-to post-task than did rel ixatiou. 
For subjects who were highly arousal at recall this proportion was greater 
for phrases originally heard when experiencing high arousal (85''o) than 
for phrases originally heard when experiencing normal arousal (70%). 
For subjects who were experiencing nonnal arousal at recall this 
proportion was greater for phrases originally heard when experiencing 
normal arousal (91%) than for phrases originally heard when they were 
experiencing enhanced arousal (69%)). Results revealed no effect of 
arousal at learning, no effect of arousal at recall and a significant 
interaction between arousal at learning and arousal at recall. A planned 
comparison indicated that when subjects were highly aroused at lime of 
recall, recall of material heard when highly aroused was significanth 
greater than recall of material heard when normally aroused. A second 
planned comparison indicated that when subjects were experiencing 
normal arousal at recall, recall of material heard when normally a oused 
was significantly greater than recall of material heard when highly 
aroused. A 2X2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with emotiona ily of 
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phrases as one variable, arousal at recall as the second indt^pendent 
variable, and percentage of phrases recalled as the dependent variable. 
There were no significant effects. 
In second study sixteen college students participated. The word 
lists and procedure were the same as in the first study with the exception 
of the manipulation of arousal at recall. For subjects who were highly 
aroused at recall this proportion was greater for phrases originally heard 
when experiencing high arousal (80%) than phrases originally heard 
when experiencing normal arousal (60%). In addition, for subjects 
experiencing normal arousal at recall this proportion was greater for 
phrases originally heard when experiencing normal arousal (71%) than 
phrases originally heard when experiencing high arousal (65%). Analysis 
revealed a marginally significant effect of arousal at learning, such that 
subjects tended to recall more phrases learned when aroused than phrases 
learned when not aroused, no effect of arousal at recall and a sigrificant 
interaction between arousal at learning and arousal at recall. When 
subjects were highly aroused at recall, recall of material heard when 
aroused was significantly greater than recall of material heard whi^ n not 
aroused. A second planned comparison indicated that when subjects were 
not highly aroused at recall, recall of material previously heard when not 
aroused was significantly greater than recall of material heard when 
aroused. As in the first study, a second 2X2 mixed analysis of vai iance 
was conducted with emotionally of phrases and arousal at recall us the 
independent variables, and number of phrases of each type retailed 
relative to the number learned as the dependent variable. This analysis 
revealed no significant effects. 
Third study was designed to demonstrate that additional arousal at 
the time a person is experiencing a positive mood will enhance priming of 
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positive material from memory. Under the guise of a study on distraction 
and memory, subjects listened to a story while either stepping up and 
down on a block (High Arousal) or stringing cardboard disks together 
(Normal Arousal). Afterwards, all subjects took a memory test. Half the 
subjects from each arousal condition were then told they had done well 
(Positive Feedback Conditions); half were told that test had not vol been 
scored (No Feedback Conditions). Finally, all subjects filled out i survey 
about their university. 44 college students participated. Each was 
randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: (1) High Arousal-
Positive Feedback, (2) High Arousal-No Feedback, (3) Normal Arousal-
Positive Feedback, or (4) Normal Arousal-No Feedback. The cl ange in 
subjects' blood pressure and pulse from just before the distraction task lo 
2 V2 minutes after the task was the manipulation check of arousa . In the 
High Arousal condition subjects' systolic and diastolic blood pressure 
increased +3.5 and +1.8, respectively. In contrast, in the Normal Arousal 
conditions, subjects' systolic blood pressure dropped as did their pulses. 
The difference between changes in systolic blood pressure between the 
two groups was significant as was the difference between chaiges in 
pulse. The difference between changes in diastolic pressure vas not 
significant. Scores in the Positive Feedback condition were higher than 
score in the No Feedback condition. In the Positive Feedback Condition, 
arousal seems to have heightened the effects of the positive feedback. 
Subjects who received positive feedback gave their University higher 
ratings than did others. The interaction between Arousal and Feedback 
approached significance and there was no main effect for Arousal. The 
High Arousal Positive Feedback subjects rated the university as being 
significantly more positive than the Nornial Arousal Positive Feedback 
subjects. A second planned comparison between the Normal Arousal-No 
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Feedback and High Arousal-No Feedback Condition reveiiled no 
significant difference. 
Finally, the blood pressure and pulse increase for each subjixt were 
correlated with the positivity of their judgments regarding their university 
separately for each of the four conditions. None of these cotTelations was 
significant. The result of third study supported both predictions. At least 
in the presence of arousal, a positive feeling state, induced by success, 
enhanced the favorability of subjects' rating of their universit}. Fhe 
results also supported new prediction that if something positive happens 
to a person, arousal, in addition to that which was assumed that the 
person feels as a result of the mood state induction, will enhance the 
impact of that mood on judgments. 
Warr, Barter & Brownbridge (1983) conducted a study on the 
independence of positive and negative affect. The objective of this article 
was to explore three different possible explanations ot the pardox relating 
to association between positive and negative effect. 
In summary, the research described in this article exploreti three 
possible explanations of the statistical independence of Braclburn's 
measures of positive and negative affect. The explanations are of 
different kinds and are not mutually incompatible, so that each may be 
viewed as an alternative account of one part of reality. 
520 volunteer undergraduate students from Sheffield University 
served as subjects in four separate samples. Sample 1 comprised 24 men 
and 26 women, sample 2 comprised 100 men and 90 women, and samples 
3 and 4 each comprised 70 men and 70 women. Subjects' median age was 
20 years. Respondents were contacted in university halls of residence or 
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in teaching departments (other than the psychology departmtnt) and 
asked to complete anonymously the questionnaire provided. Respondents 
returned this questionnaire through boxes placed at several locations m 
the university. Items were drawn from the literature and from discussion 
with undergraduate students. Following a pilot study with 89 iterr s, a 6^-
item inventory was administered to sample I subjects in order to identify 
for subsequent inquiry events in university students' lives that were rated 
consistently as either desirable or undesirable. The events covered those 
broad areas examined by previous investigators: health, work, fnancial, 
home and family, and personal and social. Respondents from sample 1 
were asked to assess the desirability or undesirability of the occurrence of 
each event in their lives on a 7-point scale from _3 to +3 (extemeh, 
moderately, and slightly undesirable; neither desirable nor undesirable; 
slightly, moderately, and extremely desirable). Some examples ol events 
were personal illness or injury that required a period in the hospital, an 
important piece of work favorably assessed, major financial diftlcvilties, 
planned pregnancy (if female) etc. On the basis of the sample 1 -esults, 
50 events were chosen for the principal investigation. These had been 
consistently assessed as desirable or undesirable (25 items each), and 
mean desirability rating were available for use in weighting reports of the 
occurrence of each item in the main questionnaire. This was administered 
to sample 2(n = 190), and respondents were asked to place a tick beside 
"any event which has happened to you in the last six months". Tht mean 
numbers of desirable and undesirable reported were 9.15 and 3.24 (SD =--
3.41 and 2.3, respectively). In addition to these unweighted totak, each 
person's responses were weighted by the mean item desirability rating 
obtained from sample 1. Two separate desirability rating were examined: 
those from sample 1 respondents of the same sex as a sample 2 
respondent, and those from all members of sample 1 irrespective cf sex. 
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For reported life events from sample 2, three scores were thus ccmputed 
for both desirable and undesirable events: unweighted totals, total 
weighted by same-sex desirability ratings, and totals weighted by 
combined-sex desirability ratings. Lei and Skinner (1980), Ross and 
Mirowsky (1979), and others reported that several forms of difierential 
weighting of life events yield scores whose pattern is almost identical to 
that of unweighted totals and that associations with other variables are 
virtually unchanged by weighting. This was also the case in the present 
study, with correlations between weighted and unweighted scores <:lose to 
unity and external correlations almost identical for each tvpe of 
weighting. 
Scale from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck 
& Eysenck, 1975) was used to measure extraversion and neuroticism in 
sample 3 and 4 (n = 140 in each case). For extraversion, mean for sample 
3 and 4 were 13.16 and 14.47, respectively .(SDs = 4.29 & 4.12); For 
neuroticism, mean were 9.96 and 8.94, respectively (SDs = 4.65 & 5.18). 
These values are slightly above the age norms for extraversion and 
slightly below that for neuroticism. The two scales from Ef'Q are 
typically significantly negatively intercorrelated (e.g., Eyserck & 
Eysenck, 1975; Rocklin & Revelle, 1981), and in this case the value were 
_.33 and .28 for the two samples, respectively. Bradbum's (1969) 10 
items served as the basis for construction of the new measures of positive 
and negative affect. However, two of the original items were omitted 
because responses to them are a function of specific intei-personal events 
(cf Cherlin and Reeder, 1975). These items are "proud because someone 
complimented you on something you had done" and "upset because 
something criticized you". Five additional items were devised fo- both 
positive and negative affect, which were drawn from the literature on 
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minor psychiatric symptomatology and from studies of mood. Data from 
the two samples were combined to yield an overall sample size c-f 330 in 
order to carry out several forms of item analysis. Despite aa initial 
expectation that it would be appropriate to omit a small number of items, 
the two 9-item scales proved to be most acceptable. The cosTclation 
between them was .ol, and alpha coefficients were .66 and .64 for 
positive and negative affect, respectively. Successive omission of the four 
items in each scale that had lowest item-whole coiTelations hardly 
affected the interscale correlation (values all less than _.06), and decided 
to retain the 9-item scales because these scale covered the widest i ange of 
experiences. Mean values were 7.42 (SD = 2.00) and 5.98 (SD = 2.13) for 
positive and negative affect, replicating a typical finding with the 
Bradburn items that positive affect scores tend to be higher than negative 
affect scores. 
The results showed that number of desirable and undt^sirable 
episodes were found in general uncorrelated and that both affect and life-
event measures were members of the general category of episodtis. The 
significant coiTelation between evaluatively matched affect and lif i-event 
scores provided direct support for this possibility. An independence 
between counts of desirable and undesirable life events seems reasonable 
on logical grounds in the case of psychologically healthy samples, but a 
negative association might be expected for sample of, for example, 
depressed patients; depth of depression is likely to covary botli with 
reports of many undesirable events and few desirable ones. Positive 
associations between numbers of the two kinds of events would be less 
easily explained, although a correlation of .19 (N = 337 mothers) had 
been reported by Gersten, Langner, Eisenberg and Orzeck (1974) and 
value of. 16 and .47 (N = 720 adults in a community survey) havf been 
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reported by Ross and Mirowsky (1979). In both of these studies, 
however, the number of undesirable items in the inventory considerably 
outweighed the number of desirable one, and judgments about desirability 
were made by the investigators rather than by a sample of respondents. 
One or both of these features may have been responsible for the positive 
correlations. When responses were given in terms of proportion of time, a 
strong negative relationship was observed between positive and negative 
experiences. 
Another issue that was examined was the relationship between 
positive and negative affect and personality measures of extraver^ion and 
neuroticism. The findings demonstrated that positive aTect is 
significantly associated with extra-version whereas negative af ect was 
found to be associated with neuroticism. 
Rholes, Riskind and Lane (1987) investigated emotional state and 
memory biases; effects of cognitive priming and mood. They foiniulated 
three hypotheses as given under 
1. In the self-evaluative conditions, positive experiences vvould be 
recalled faster than negative ones when subjects were exposed to 
posifive statements, and negafive memories would be recalled 
faster than positive ones when subjects were exposed to legative 
statements. 
2. The impact of the self-evaluative cognitions would be largely 
unaffected by mood; thus, they expected to find that self-e\aluative 
cognifions would influence memory retrieval even among those 
subjects whose mood states were little affected by tie self-
evaluative statements. 
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3. Finally, the somatic conditions would have little impact on 
memory retrieval relative to the self-evaluative conditions. 
96 students from the introductory psychology course at Texas A & M 
University took part in the study. 46% of the subjects were men. The 
percentage of men in each condition was 50, 39, 44, 44, and 50 for the 
positive somatic, positive self-evaluative, negative somatic, negaiixe self-
evaluative, and neutral conditions respectively. The questionnaire 
consisted of four positive mood adjectives were: elated, cheerful, happy, 
and good (mood), and four negative mood adjectives were: sad, 
discouraged, depressed, and bad (mood). Subjects indicated ho\N elated, 
cheerful, sad and so forth they were on 11-point scales. An overall mood 
score was obtained by subtracting the sum of a subject's responses to the 
positive adjectives. After the first eight recall trials, each subject r^ad one 
of the five types of VMIP statements. They read either positive >omatic 
(PSS) statements (e.g., I feel energetic), positive self-evaluativt (PST) 
statements (I am a very capable person), negative somatic (NSS) 
statements (I feel tired and listless), negative self-evaluative (NSE) 
statements (I am worthless), or neutral, nonaffective (NU) stateinents 
(Oklahoma City is the capital of Oklahoma). There were 43 statements in 
each list. Subjects were asked to read each list twice. As many as possible 
of the statements from Velten's (1968) original lists of statements were 
used. The data were analyzed with t-test that revealed that the mood 
scores of subjects in both of the negative statement conditions (NSE" and 
NSS) were significantly more negative than the scores of subjects in the 
neutral group and that the mood scores of subjects in both of the positive 
statement conditions (PSE and PSS) were significantly more positive than 
those of subjects in the neutral group. Other comparison show_^ d no 
significant differences between either the positive self-evaluative and 
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negative somatic conditions or the negative self-evaluative and negative 
somatic conditions. These results indicated that overall the self-e^ aluative 
and somatic conditions had equally strong effects in mood. However, it is 
important to note that the analysis of variance (ANOVA) also revealed a 
significant Sex X Treatment Condition interaction, t-test showed that the 
mood scores of women in the negative self-evaluative condition were 
significantly more negative than those of men in this condition. 1 hus, 
women were more responsive to the negative self-evaluative statements 
than were men. There were no significant differences between the scores 
of men and women in any of the other conditions. 
A preliminary analysis showed that the sex-of-subjects var able did 
not influence the recall latencies either as a main effect or in interaction 
with other independent variables. Thus, the interaction of condit ons and 
sex that appeared in the mood data had no parallel in the recill data. 
Furthermore, they tested for male versus female recall differenct-s in the 
one condition, NSE, that showed a sex effect on mood and fomd that 
recall latencies were not different in this condition. The results further 
showed a main effect for type of memory, with positive memories 
recalled faster than negative ones, in the two somatic conditions (^SS and 
NSS), and an interaction, with positive memories recalled faster than 
negative ones among subjects who read positive statement and negative 
memories recalled faster than positive one among subjects wio read 
negative statements, in the self-evaluative conditions (PSE and NSE). \ 
contrast that tested the significance of this predicted pattern o ' means 
proved to be highly significant. Further analyses showed that positi\e 
memories were recalled significantly faster than negative ones in the 
PSE condition and negative memories were recalled significantly faster 
than positive ones. The overall ANOVA revealed a main ef ect for 
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positive versus negative memories which indicates that, on the whole, 
positive memories were recalled faster than negative memcTies (cf. 
Natale & Hantas, 1982). It also revealed a significant interaction between 
positive and negative statements and recall of positive versus negative 
memories which indicates that positive memories recalled faster in the 
positive statement condition (PSE and PSS), whereas negative statements 
tended to be recalled faster in the negative statement condition (NSE and 
NSS). Subjects in the upper half of this distribution showed large changes 
in mood in the expected direction in response to the Velten procedures, 
and subjects in the lower half of this distribution showed small changes. 
This overall analysis revealed the same effects as the overall ANOVA 
reported previously, a main effect for positive versus negative m Emories 
which indicates that positive memories were recalled faster than r egative 
ones, and an interaction between positive versus negative statements and 
the recall of positive versus negative memories. Compared the negative 
memory latencies in the control group with those in the four expiiriment 
groups revealed that only the NSE group led to significantly faster recall 
in one-tailed. All of the other groups produced a non-significant 
comparison with the control. Compared the latencies for' positive 
memories revealed that the PSE group had shorter latencies than the 
control and that the PSS group also had shorter latencies in one tailed. 
The other comparisons of positive memories yielded non-significant 
effects. The main effect for positive versus negative memory trials which 
simply indicates that the memories recalled on the positive memor} trials 
were judged by the raters to be more positive than the one recalled on 
negative trials. This analysis also revealed a Condition X Memory 
Valence interaction. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the unpleasant 
memories of the negative self-evaluative groups were more negat ve in 
valence than memories of all other VMIP (Velten Mood Induction 
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Procedure) groups. Surprisingly, comparison also indicated that pleasant 
memories were less positive in the negative somatic group thin in all 
other groups. 
The results, however, do not invalidate the state-dependent model. 
There are, in fact, results that are in keeping with it, naraely the 
covariation between mood change and memory effects that occurred in 
the somatic conditions. Thus, the results of this study as a whole suggest 
that (a) self-evaluative and somatic mood induction do not seem to 
influence memory retrieval in the same way, and (b) some of these results 
are consistent with the state-dependent model but others quite clearly are 
not consistent with it and seem best explained by the priming m(»del. The 
results, in other words, seem to suggest that, for the present, il may be 
best to regard the effects of mood on memory as determined by multiple 
processes. 
A number of recent studies have argued that negative versus 
positive affect states have effects on a wide range of behaviors in addition 
to memory retrieval. Positive mood states, relative to negative ones, have 
been found to alleviate learned helplessness (Kilpatrick-Taback & Roth, 
1978), increase prosocial behavior (Rosenhan, Karylowski, Salovey, & 
Harris, 1982), and increase perceptions of control over events (Alloy, 
Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981). Some of these studies of affect ha\e used 
cognitive or autosuggestive techniques to induce mood (e.g., the VMIP), 
whereas others have manipulated situational factors (e.g., success or 
failure on a task, or adventitious positive or negative events) to induce 
mood states. Regardless of their procedures, the results have been 
interpreted as demonstrating the influence of affect on behav or. The 
present study under review suggests, however, that it may be the 
cognitive (self-evaluative) as well as the affective experiences that 
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accompany mood-induction procedures that influence behavior. For 
example, Alloy et al. (1981) found that the illusion of control was 
increased by having subjects read positive mood statements fom the 
VMIP. Was it the affective component of mood that inlluenced 
perceptions, or was it the positive self-evaluative cognitions (e.g., I am 
very able) that may have been produced by the Velten procedure? The 
results of this study suggested that it may partly have been the cognitive 
set induced by the positive evaluative statements in the Velten procedure. 
To summarize, this study seems to provide support for both the 
priming and the state-dependent models as they relate to nemoiy 
accessibility. 
Forgas, Bumham, and Trimboli (1988) investigated mood, 
memory, and social judgments in children. This study sought to extend 
this work by looking at the role temporary moods play in children's 
encoding and retrieval of social information, as well as in their 
impression-formation judgments. Do affective states influence children's 
memory performance in school? Does affect facilitate the lea ning of 
affect-consistent information? Are judgments of a friend or a peer 
dependent on how a child feels at the time and, if so, are these mood 
influences similar to the pattern found with adults (Forgas and Bower, 
1987a)? These were some of the questions the investigators looked at in a 
large and heterogeneous child population. Groups of 8 to 10 year-old 
children were presented with counterbalance pictures and descrijitions of 
two stimulus characters, identified as Lisa or Jenny. Each presentation 
was preceded by a short video tape segment designed to elicit a 
manipulation happy or sad mood state. One day later, children fr^e recall 
and recognition memory for detailed of the two stimulus characters were 
assessed while they again experienced either a happy or a sad slate, and 
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their impression-formation judgments of the target characters were also 
obtained. Subjects were 161 schoolchildren (85 boys and Ih girls), 
between 8 and 10 years of age. The experiment was based on 2X2X2 
design: children's mood state while learning about the first ;;timulus 
character (happy/sad), their mood state while learning about the second 
stimulus character (happy/sad), and their mood state one day later, while 
remembering information about either of the two characters (happy/sad). 
In addition, the effect of the affective loading of the stimulus naterial 
(positive vs. negative) was also assessed as a within-subject varia ile. The 
dependent variables included two memory measures (cued recall and 
recognition) and impression-formation judgments. The use of short video 
sequences with strong and predictable emotional impact appeart d to be 
the most suitable mood-manipulation technique in the present 
circumstances. They needed six short video-film sequences (three sad and 
three happy) for the study. A small preliminary investigation was run in 
order to select and establish the reliability and validity of these ilms as 
suitable mood manipulators for children. As a first step, they ecoded 
fourteen 6 to 10 min story sequences (6 happy and 8 sad) from popular 
children's programs such as "Lassie", "Little House on the Prairie"', 
Happy days", "Swiss Family Robinson", "Disneyland", "Eifferent 
strokes", and "Gilligan's Island". These episodes were selected on the 
basis of the consistently happy and cheerful, or sad and depressed, 
emotional tone of events they depicted. Care was taken to exclude 
episodes with potential direct priming effects on the stimuli. In all. 14 
episodes were presented to a sample of twenty-seven 8 to 10 } ear-old 
children, who were told "you will be watching some stories. At tht end of 
each story write down how happy or sad that story made you feef . 
Judgment were made by children by checking one of seven facjs with 
stylized expressions ranging from the every sad to the very happy. Of the 
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14 episodes, those 6 (3 happy and 3 sad) that produced the most 
consistent and clear-cut mood effects on the _3 to +3 sad-happy scale 
were selected. The mood effects of these selected sequences were then 
further validated by showing each sequence to a second group of 18 
children and asking them to indicate how the films made them feel. 
Average mood ratings were significantly different followiig sad 
sequences as against happy sequences, indicating the validity c>f these 
films as effective mood manipulators. The effects of the films were also 
reliable across the first and second group of children who rated them. 
Happy learning moods resulted in slightly better recall memory 
than did sad learning moods for both characters. Similarly, children who 
felt happy at the time of recall also remembered significantly mort details 
about the target characters than did children who felt sad. They found no 
significant main effects in recognition memory due either to the learning 
mood or the recognition mood of the subjects. A significant interaction of 
learning and retrieval moods showed that total recall for both stimulus 
characters was better when mood at the time of learning was identical to 
rather than different from mood at the time of recall. Happy siibjecis 
remembered more about a character they encountered in a happ;/ rather 
than in a sad learning mood and sad subjects remembered more about 
target seen in sad rather than in happy learning moods. This finding 
clearly supports the mood-state dependent retrieval hypothesis. 
Consistent with priming models that assume that the strong retrie> al cues 
provided by recognition tasks will mask the much weaker mood effects 
(cf. G. Bower, 1981), they found no mood effects on recognition 
memory. They also found that the interaction of the two learning mood 
(when learning about target 1 and when learning about target 2) had a 
powerfiil effect on overall recall. In other words, details of both stimulus 
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characters were recalled much better when the targets were encoantered 
in contrasting rather than identical learning moods, irrespective of the 
quality of the retrieval mood. A happy-sad learning sequence resulted in 
better overall recall than did a happy-happy sequence and a saci-happy 
learning sequence led to better recall than did a sad-sad learning 
sequence. They found that recognition memory was also better when the 
2 characters were encountered in contrasting rather than in matching 
learning mood states. Results showed that, overall, children remembered 
almost twice as many negative as positive details about both stimulus 
characters. They also found a significant quality (positive vs. negative 
details about the target child). Contrary to their expectations as uell as 
most previous findings (Bartlett et al. 1982; Bower et al. 1978; Forgas 
and Bower, 1987a; Nasby and Yando, 1982), they found that more 
negative details were remembered by children who felt happy ratlier than 
sad at the time of encoding a target character. There were no sig lificant 
mood biases in the encoding of positive details. They also iound a 
significant mood main effect on judgments. In a happy mood, children 
were more likely to give extreme endorsement to both positive and 
negative descriptions of the target characters, whereas in a sad mood, 
both kinds of features were rated more conservatively, as beiig less 
typical of the stimulus person. In short the findings of the study under 
review are partially consistent with existing mood-priming models 
(Bower, 1981; Clark and Isen, 1982) and research with adult subjects. 
Moreover, they also found limited support for the mood-state de}iendent 
retrieval hypothesis. 
Moreover, Parrott and Sabini (1990) conducted a seies of 
experiments on mood and memory under natural conditions and 
presented evidence for mood incongruent recall. Experiment 1 and 2 were 
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field studies in which the effects of everyday moods were observed 
outside the laboratory on a memory task that was designee to be 
naturalistic. In both field studies, evidence of mood incongruent recall 
was obtained. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 were conducted in the laboratory 
to establish the reliability of the field studies and to evaluate alternative 
explanations of their results. Experiment 1 took advantage of a reliable 
elicitor of mood in the ecology of the undergraduate student: the return of 
the graded midterm exam (Forsyth & McMillan, 1981; Russell & 
McAuley, 1986). The mood-inducing exams were handed back at the 
beginning of class, and the lecture that followed included a memory task 
as part of a class demonstration. This memory task involved recalling 
several autobiographical memories, a task selected for its high re levance 
to mood's influence on memory in everyday life (Teasdale, Ttylor, & 
Fogarty, 1980). By comparing the affective content of memories recalled 
by students who did well with that of memories recalled by students who 
did not do well, they hoped to study the effect of naturally produced 
moods on a realistic memory task in a natural context. The inevitable 
tradeoff, however, was that for obvious ethical reason they were not able 
to assign their subjects their grades (and thus mood) at random, ror were 
they able to ensure that all students present would consent to participate. 
Thus, this study used a quasi-experimental design, and, like ill such 
studies, required greater attention to ruling out threats to internal validity 
than would a true experiment (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Students in a 
social psychology class at the University of Pennsylvania participated m 
this study on a volunteer basis. There were 233 students in attencance on 
the day of the study. Of these, 124 students (58 women, 34 men. 32 
missing sex data) contributed usable data to the study. The study was 
conducted during the class in which the graded midterm examinations 
were handed back to the students. At the beginning of class, the students 
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were introduced to a confederate posing as a visiting researcher 
conducting a study on students' expectations and perceptions of exams. 
Tlie researcher handed out blank index cards and asked the students to 
write two things: the letter grade that they expected to get on their 
midterms and a secret identification code of their own invention. The 
researcher explained that he was going to know what the students thought 
about the exam after they got it back, and that the purpose of the 
identification code was to allow him to match those later perceptic^ns with 
their expected grade while guaranteeing anonymity for each student. The 
completed cards were then collected. During the next 15 min the course 
instructor and teaching assistants handed back the graded midterrr s to the 
students and explained the graded scale and the grading of the essay 
questions as is usually done in this class. The visiting researcher then 
handed out a one-page exam questionnaire on which the students were 
asked to records their actual grade and identification code and to rate the 
exam on a number of scales designed to enhance the credibility of the 
cover story. The second part of the study was designed in such a way as 
appear unrelated to the first. The course instructor announced tliat he 
would lecture during the remainder of class and that he would begin with 
a class demonstration of an experiment on personality and memory. The 
experiment, the instructor explained, would consist of two parts. Tirst, the 
students were be asked to write a brief description of the first three 
memories they recalled from a period of time that were be specified. The 
students were assured that their responses would remain completely 
anonymous and that they therefore need not worry about censori ng their 
recollections. Second, the students were be asked to fill out a brief 
personality questionnaire. At this time booklets were handed oui to the 
students. A blank cover sheet prevented the students from learning the 
specific fime period of the memory task before being asked to begin. 
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After reporting the last memory, subjects continued on the final page. 
Consistent with the cover story, this page was titled PART TWO: 
Personality Questionnaire, but its true purpose was to provide a 
manipulation check on the effect of receiving the exam grade on the 
subjects' mood. This manipulation check was conducted a iter the 
memory task so as not to make subjects aware that their moods were 
relevant to the experiment (an arrangement that necessarily entailed not 
being able to check moods prior to recall). Subjects were instructed to 
indicate how they were feeling at the present time on a series of Likert 
scales. Students completed 7-point unipolar scales for Happy, Sad, Bad, 
Emotional, and Confused (anchored by not at all ' 1 ' , moderately 4', and 
extremely '7',) and bipolar scale for Ashamed-Proud, Angry-Cirateful, 
Lonely-Belonging and worried-optimistic, anchored by extremeh (1 and 
7) and neither (4). 
Finally, the students were asked to write in their own words how 
they believed that getting their exam back affected their recall of past 
events. They were then thoroughly debriefed by the course instructor. The 
students were told that they could elect not to hand in their data i f they 
did not wish to contribute to the study. As noted above, 109 students 
elected either to do so or never to participate in the class demonsti ation in 
the first place. This number of non-participants is quite high but is 
difficult to control in a field study. Students agreeing to contribute data 
wrote their secret idenfification code on their data booklet. To determine 
the affective tone of the student's memories of high school, each memory 
was rated by two independent judges who were unaware of all 
infonnation about its author. Each memory was rated for affect at the 
time the event occurred on two 7-point scales. One scale rated positive 
affect, the other negative affect, none (1), intense (7). In this and in all 
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subsequent experiments, judges were trained to use these scales to rate, as 
best they could, the affects specified by the student without making 
unsupported inferences. Students who received grades that were higher 
than average reported being in more of a happy mood, less of a bad or sad 
mood, more proud (less ashamed), and more grateful (less angry). 
Multivariate comparison of all nine ratings revealed a significant 
difference between groups. These differences were also apparent when 
comparing students who did worse than expected, although the 
differences are not as large and the multivariate comparison did not reach 
significant. Thus, the outcome of the exam, both relative to the absolute 
to be associated with students' subsequent moods and emotions in the 
manner predicted. This experiment provided evidence of mood 
incongruent recall under conditions similar to those that naturally occur in 
daily life. Students who received good grades, and thus were n good 
moods, tended to recall events that were significantly less positi\e and 
more negative than were those recalled by students who received lower 
grade and thus were in worse moods. This outcome seems to suggest that 
under natural conditions the predominant effect of good moods relative to 
bad moods was not based on automatic associative priming c-r other 
processes producing mood congruent recall. Perhaps it results, in part, 
from students' attempts at mood regulation (Clark & Isen, 1982). Mood 
incongruence was found not only when exam performance was measured 
in terms of absolute grade but also when it was measured in tenns of the 
deviation of the actual grade from the expected grade. 
Experiment 2 used clear and cloudy weather to produce haj)py and 
sad moods. The effect of sunlight on mood and behavior is well 
documented. For example, Cunnigham (1979) found sunshine tc be the 
most significant of 13 weather variables in predicting self-reported mood 
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and the likelihood of helping behavior, and Schwarz and Clore (1983) 
found sunny and rainy days to influence subjects' reports of lite 
satisfaction. The study was conducted inside the entrance of the 
undergraduate library on the campus of the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champain on weekdays between 11 am and 4 pm. Eveiy third 
person entering the building from outdoors was approached and asked to 
participate, excluding people who appeared to the university employees. 
Between 11 and 16 people were approached on each of three sunin days 
and three cloudy days. A total of 8 people (four in each condition) of the 
73 approached declined to participate. Thus, data were collected on sunny 
days from 30 people (13 men, 17 women) and cloudy days from 35 
people (14 men, 21 women). On sunny days subjects reported bemg in 
better moods than did subjects on cloudy days. There was no ditference 
between sexes, nor was there an interaction, so the separate un variate 
measures were inspected individually. Negative affect associated witii 
subjects' memories was substantially greater on sunny days tian on 
cloudy days, a difference that is incongruent with mood. They found no 
effect of sex or of an interaction between sunlight and sex. The })Ositive 
affect associated with subjects' memories revealed a negligible ditference 
between sunny days and cloudy days. Although the direction of this small 
difference was in the direction of congruence with mood, this difference 
did not even approach significance. Again, there was no significant 
difference between sexes, nor was there an interaction between sunlight 
and sex both. 
The goal of experiment 3 was to induce happy and sad moods in 
the laboratory using a cover story and musical mood induction that 
inform subjects of the relevance of mood to the research and that enlist 
subjects' cooperation in changing and maintaining their moods, fhe 
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memory task given to subjects was the same as that used in expernient I, 
to recall three events that happened during subjects' high school years. 34 
female undergraduates at the University of Illinois participated in this 
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requiremert. The 
unavailability of male subjects for this experiment was not regarded as a 
serious limitation because there were no sex differences in experiment 1 
and 2. One subject was not allowed to complete the experiment oecause 
she did not follow instructions. Of the remaining 33 subjects, 22 met the 
acceptance criteria for the experiment. Subject mood prior to the MMIP 
was assessed in two ways, as in the procedure of Clark and 1 easdale 
(1985). First, subjects were asked to rate 11 affective and cogniti\e states 
on a series of self-report scales. Three scales measured sadnes-s (Sad, 
Depressed, Hopeless), happiness (Cheerful, Happy, Lighthearted), and 
anxiety (Anxious, Apprehensive, fearful), and two measured uncertainly 
(Confused, Uncertain). The mean of the two or three scales measuring 
each affect was used in data analysis. Each scale asked, "At this inoment 
how-do you feel"? Afterward appeared a 9-point Likert scale anchored by 
not at all (1) and extremely (9). The second mood assessment was a 
writing speed task used to measure psychomotor retardation (Natale & 
Hantas, 1982; Velten, 1968). Subjects were given a blank sheet of paper 
and asked to write out numbers in descending order starting with 100; 
they were stopped after 60s. The number of digits written servec as the 
measure. Subjects were left alone during each of these tasks. The MMIP 
was powerfully successful. Inspection of the cell means for self-reported 
mood and for the writing speed task revealed that after the happy VIM IP, 
subjects' ratings of happiness increased relative to their ratings at the 
beginning of the experiment. While their ratings of sadness decreased and 
their counting speed increased; the sad MMIP had the reverse :lTects. 
Rating of anxiety and confusion decreased after both MMIPs. This 
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pattern of results suggested that the effect of the MMIP was recused 
primarily on the intended moods. Analysis of simple effects of tae time 
variable in these three interactions revealed that the happy MMIP 
increased subject's self-related happiness but did not significantly change 
ratings of sadness. The sad MMIP, on the other hand, significantly 
increased ratings of sadness, decreased ratings of happiness and 
decreased counting speed. The means for the effective content of 
subjects' memories of high school, as rated by the judges, suggested that 
mood had a strong effect on the affective content of memory, and that this 
effect was congruent with the subjects moods. This MANOVA re\ ealed a 
significant multivariate effect of mood, Univariate ANOVA confirmed 
that the memories of happy subjects both contained more positiv 2 affect 
and contained less negative affect than did those of sad sibjects. 
Although there were no significant effects of memory or of the 
interaction, note that the size of the effects for the first memory recalled 
was about double what it was for subsequent memories. This observation 
is supported by one-way ANOVAS performed separately for each of the 
three memories, which were significant for the first memory but not for 
the second or third memories. 
The fourth experiment is different from the previous one^ in the 
sense that in this experiment the mood was induced by musica notes. 
Thus happy and sad mood were induced by music and incongruert recall 
was investigated.49 undergraduates (28 women) at the Univeisity of 
Illinois served as subjects. They received credit toward an introductory 
psychology course requirement for participating. There were no 
significant effects of sex or order, or any interactions. Subjects who heard 
the happy music reported experiencing both more happiness a id less 
sadness than did subjects who heard the sad music. The subtle musical 
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mood manipulation did not appear to differentially affect an>iety or 
irritation. Although the comparison between these means and those from 
experiment 3 is overall remarkably similar, the differences in mood 
ratings between the happy and sad conditions are not as large as they 
were in the previous experiment. This difference does not necessarily 
mean that the subtle musical mood induction produced less intense 
moods, however, since the subjects in this study rated their moods at the 
end of the experiment, while those in experiment 3 rated them 
imrnediately after the MMIP. The significance of these differences was 
evaluated by performing a four-way, mixed-model MANOVA having 
music, task, order, and sex as between-subject variables and raemory 
number (first, second, third) as within-subject variable. The MANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction between music and memory number. 
Subsequent univariate ANOVAS showed this interaction to be significant 
both for the ratings of positive affect and for the ratings of regative 
affect. There were no other main effects or interactions. Thus, as in the 
midterm experiment, the effect of mood on memory depended on the 
serial position of the memory. For the first memory recalled, there was a 
significant incongruent effect of mood on memory. Thus, mood 
incongruent recalled occurred on the first memory recalled, and there 
were no significant effects on the second and third memories These 
results are very similar to those obtained in experiment 1, suggesting that 
the more subtle musical mood induction may be a good laboratory 
analogue of the natural mood inductions used in experiments 1 anc 2. The 
occurrence of mood incongruent recall in the present experiment refutes 
the hypothesis that this phenomenon can occur only outside the 
laboratory. Instead, it supports the hypothesis that mood inco igruent 
recall occurred when subjects are unaware of the relevance of their 
moods to the experiment. The researchers replicated the fourth 
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experiment using a different memory task in experiment 5. Hence the 
fifth experiment was conducted with this objective. In this experiment, 
therefore, subjects were asked to recall three events that happened to 
them within the past week. In all other respects the present procedure was 
identical to that of experiment 4. 31 undergraduates (23 women) at the 
University of Illinois served as subjects. They received credit toward an 
introductory psychology course requirement for participating The 
apparatus, materials, and procedure were identical to those of experiment 
4, with the exception of the memory task. Subjects were asked to recall 
three events that happened to them within the past week, a task designed 
to minimize the possibility that subjects could think of this ime as 
contrasting with the present. As in experiment 3 and 4, the number of 
subjects was insufficient for evaluation of all five self-reported affect 
ratings with a Mood X Task Order X Sex MANOVA, so only [he two 
variables directly testing the success of the manipulation were entered 
into the multivariate analysis. A significant main effect oi music 
confirmed the difference between the happy and sad conditions. 
Subsequent univariate analysis revealed that the ratings of sadness 
differed significantly, and those of happiness feel just short of 
significance. There were no significant differences in reported anxiet), 
irritation, or confusion, again suggesting fairly focal effects of th 3 mood 
manipulation. They suggested that mood incongruent recall occuried, just 
as it did with the high school memory task. A MANOVA was peifomied 
on the ratings of positive and negative affect in the memories, with music, 
task order, and sex as between- subject variables and memory number as 
the within-subject variable. The MANOVA yielded a significant main 
effect for music, confirming the occuiTcnce of mood incongrueni recall. 
Subsequent univariate ANOVAS revealed significant effects of music for 
both positive and negative affect. These ANOVAS revealed the same 
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pattern exhibited in experiment I and 4, and the reverse of that in 
experiment 3. For the first memory recalled, both the ratings of positive 
and negative affect differed significantly in the direction of mood 
incongruence. For the second and third memories recalled, the ANOVAS 
failed to reach significance. Thus, although the present experime it failed 
to produce a significant interacdon between mood and memory number 
(as occurred in experiment 1 and 4), the same general pattern of results 
nonetheless occurred. 
These results strongly contradict the hypothesis tha mood 
incongruent recall was the result of a contrast between subjects past high 
school years and their present collegiate life. On the other hand, these 
results replicate the phenomenon of mood incongruent recall occurring 
when subjects are unaware of the relevance of mood to the exp ^ riment, 
and generalize it to a recall task different from that used previously. 
Eich, Macaulay and Ryan (1994) conducted a study oi mood 
dependent memory for events of the personal past. Ihere w:re tuo 
reasons for conducting this research. One was to replicate and extend 
prior research relating to mood congruent memory: the "enhanced 
encoding and/or retrieval of material the affective valence of \/hich is 
congruent with ongoing mood" (Blaney, 1986). To clarify, and \o 
consider the results of a study by Teasdale and Fogarty (1986), in which 
elated and depressed moods were induced by instructing subiects to 
internalize the emotion implied by a series of self-referential statements, 
the technique devised by Velten (1968). Using a constrained test of 
autobiographical memory, Teasdale and Fogarty found that although the 
mean latency to generate negative events was constant across mood 
condifions, positive events were retrieved more rapidly on average in the 
elated than in the depressed state. This research provided an opportunity 
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both to replicate these results and to pose a number of novel questions 
concerning mood congruence. For instance, is greater importance 
ascribed to positive than to negative autobiographical m<3mories 
generated during a pleasant mood, and do people experiencing an 
unpleasant affect recollect negative events more vividly than positive 
ones? 
The second, more pressing reason was to promote the occuiTence 
of mood dependent memory. Although the subjects did not know t at the 
time, the autobiographical memories that they generated today (du ing the 
encoding session) would serve as the targets of a surprise test of free 
recall given 2 or more days later (during the retrieval session). Thus, on 
returning to the laboratory, subjects were reminded that th.n' had 
previously generated events from their personal past when primixt with 
common-word probes, following the induction of a mood that eiiher did 
or did not match the one they had experienced earlier, subjec s were 
asked to recall as many of these events as possible, in any preferred order, 
without benefit of any observable reminders or cues. 
The experiment 1 consisted of two session, here called eiicoding 
and retrieval, and conformed to a 2X2X2 mixed design. Whereis both 
mood at encoding (pleasure (P) vs. displeasure (U)) and mood at retrieval 
(again, P vs. U) were varied between subjects, the valence or ype of 
autobiographical event generated during the encoding session (either 
positive or negative) was varied within subjects. The crossing of the first 
two variables defined four encoding/retrieval conditions, each oi which 
was represented by 16 randomly assigned subjects. At the ercoding 
session, subjects were told that the study was part of a research p-ogram 
aimed at understanding how moods influence the performance of /arious 
cognitive tasks and how the performance of these tasks in turn in luence 
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mood. It was explained that the experiment would be divided into 60 to 
90 min sessions (designated simply as "first" and "second"), spaced 2 or 
3 days apart. Subjects were also advised that they would hi tested 
individually throughout the course of the experiment and that each 
session would entail a different set of tasks. 
Next, participants were provided with a page bearing the m itrix, an 
adaptation of the "affect grid" invented by Russell et al. (1989). Subjects 
were told that the matrix would be used to measure two aspects of their 
prevailing mood: level of pleasure (indicated along the horizonta axis of 
the matrix) and level of arousal (identified by the vertical axis) It was 
further explained that, reading from left to right, the columns ccnnote a 
mood that is extremely unpleasant, very pleasant, moderately unpleasant, 
slightly unpleasant, neutral (the shaded center square), slightly pleasant, 
moderately pleasant, very pleasant, and extremely pleasant. Similarly, the 
rows signify a state that ranges from extremely high arousal at the top 
through neutral at the shaded center to extremely low arousa at the 
bottom (with slightly, moderately, and very high or low levels in 
between). On receiving these instructions (along with the examples cited 
by Eich & Metcalfe, 1989), subjects marked the one square that best 
exemplified the levels of pleasure and arousal that they were experiencing 
at that moment. Participants were then seated in a lounge chair, bordered 
by stereo speakers. Through these speakers were played, at a comfortable 
listening volume, one of four cassette tapes, each canying 60 min of 
instrumental music. Two of these cassettes contained different se ections 
of "happy" music (excerpts of Brethoven's Minuet in G, Boccierini's 
Minuet in E, Mozart's Divertimento No. 136 Pachelbel's Canon in D, 
and Vivaldi's Four Seasons: Spring, Summer, and Fall ), and tfe other 
two contained different selections of "sad" pieces (segment of Alfinoni's 
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Adagio in G Minor, Barber's Adagio pour Cordes, Grieg's Peer Gynt: 
The Death of Ase, and Sibelius' violin Concerto: Second Movement). 
The two tapes representing each type of music were assigned at random; 
with the proviso that subjects tested under matched mood conditic^ns (P/P 
or U/U) hear one selection of the appropriate music during the encoding 
session and the alternate selection during the retrieval session. 5 ninutes 
after music onset, and every 5 min thereafter, subjects marked their 
current levels of pleasure and arousal on a clean copy of the mooc matrix 
(which, once marked, was promptly collected by the experimerter and 
never used again). The music continued to play while subjects made these 
mood ratings and did not stop until the end of the session. On he rare 
occasions in which subjects took more than 60 min to comp ete the 
session, they rewound their tape and replayed it from the beginning. On 
reaching the requisite level, subjects read a list of 16 common unrelated 
words (such as banana and bride) and rated each item in terans of its 
concreteness, imagery, and goodness of meaning on 7-point scales. 
Subjects were told that the intent of this word rating task was determined 
whether people perceive the properties of a word differently depending 
on their mood. After rating the final item, subjects marked a new mood 
matrix and then began the personality assessment task. The material for 
this task consisted of 50 adjectives, displayed one at a time in a random 
order, representing 25 pairs of trait-descriptive opposites (e.g.. warm, 
cold, sociable, shy). Subjects were told that an adjective would appear on 
a monitor and that they should indicate, as quickly as possible, whether 
the term is self-descriptive. The task, which was also administerec during 
the retrieval session in the same manner using the same materia Is, was 
included in order to test some ideas stemming from Campbell's (1990) 
work on self-concept clarity. Following the personality assessment task, 
subjects rated their current levels of pleasure and arousal in the lamiliar 
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fashion. Those who rated themselves as feeling atleast moderately 
pleasant (in the P-mood condition) or moderately unpleasant (ir the U-
mood condition) proceeded directly to the task of autobiographic al event 
generated. Those who did not, were asked to concentrate once again on 
ideas or images that make them feel pleasant (unpleasant). This "mood 
boost" period lasted 5-10 min, long enough to ensure that all subjects 
were experiencing atleast a moderate degree of pleasure or disi:)leasure 
prior to the start of the event generated task. For purposes of this task, 
subjects were asked to generate an emotionally positive evert, from 
anytime in their personal past, in response to each of 8 word probes and 
to generate an emotionally negative episode in response to ea:h of 8 
additional probes. These two types of probes were read by the 
experimenter in a randomly alternating order; to avoid item-selection 
artifacts, any probe that was associated with a positive event for one 
subject was linked to a negative event for another. All 16 of the probe, 
plus 2 other that were used for practice, were common, concrete, 
semantically unrelated, and affectively neutral nouns culled from Brov^n 
and Ure's (1969) word norms. On presentation of a given probe, aibjects 
were instructed to say OK as soon as they generated an event that was 
both appropriately valenced (either positive or negative, as stipulated by 
the experimenter) and suitably specific (one they could daie with 
precision and describe in detail). If the subjects failed to generate such an 
event within 2 min, then that probe was skipped and the next (>ne was 
read. If they succeeded, then the experimenter, after logging generation 
latency (in seconds), asked the subjects to recount aloud the particulars of 
the event: where and when (month and year) it occun-ed, what ha ^jiened, 
who was involved, and so forth. All of these details were transcribed by 
the experimenter. Next, subjects rated (a) how intense was the tmotion 
(perforce either positive or negative) they experienced at the tmie the 
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event transpired; (b) how personally important did the event seem them; 
and (c) how vividly can they recollect it now. To simplify matters, 
subjects were provided with a set of index cards containing the pertinent 
5-point scale (1 = not at all intense/important/vivid, 5 = o.tremely 
intense/important/vivid). Subjects spoke their ratings, aad the 
experimenter wrote them down. After generating, recounting, and rating 
the final (16*) event, subjects marked a new mood matrix. P-mood 
subjects were then discharged with a reminder to return, in 2 or 3 days, 
for a second session of testing, details of which would be divulged at that 
time. U-mood subject stayed longer-sharing cookies and conversation 
with the experimenter while rock or reggae music played in the 
background so that they left the lab feeling no worse than neutral. 
Procedure involved in manipulating and measuring mooc during 
the retrieval session duplicated those used in the encoding session. (3n 
reporting the requisite rating of mood (viz., atleast very pleasant or very 
unpleasant, irrespective of degree of arousal), subjects began formal 
testing, which consisted of three tasks: stem completion, personality 
assessment, and autobiographical event recall. As was the case during the 
encoding session, subjects recorded their current levels of pleasure and 
arousal on a new mood matrix both before and after each task. Subjects 
first task was to speak the first word they thought of that begar with a 
particular three-letter stem, such as ban or bri. Of the 32 stems that were 
read to the subjects, 16 corresponded to old words (banana, bride, and 
others they had rated for concreteness, imagery, and goodness of raeaning 
2 or 3 days earlier), and 16 corresponded to new words (ones they had 
neither seen nor heard in the course of any encoding session task, 
including word rating). At the outset of the third and last task, 
autobiographical event recall, all subjects rated themselves as feeling, at a 
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minimum, either moderately pleasant or moderately unpleasant ( n the P-
mood and U-mood conditions, respectively). The experimenter reminded 
the subjects generated both positive and negative autobiographical events 
in response to common-word probes. She then asked them to spend 5 min 
trying to recall, in any preferred order, the gist of as many of these events 
as possible. Subjects were told that they need not give detailed replies; 
indeed, it was sufficient-even preferable-for them to recall only the probe 
that was associated with a given event. The experimenter kept a written 
record of the subject's spoken responses. Next, subjects were asked to 
specify the date (month and year) on which every recalled event had 
occurred. To make matters easier, the experimenter reminded the subjects 
of the relevant events by reciting aloud the corresponding probe in the 
order in which they had been recalled. By comparing these dales with 
these supplied during the encoding session, they sought to determine 
whether the subjects were recalling the same events they had gt nerated 
earlier and whether these events pertained to actual, specific experiences 
of a personal nature. After marking yet another mood matrix, subjects 
were debriefed and then discharged once their level of pleasure was 
neutral or higher. 64 undergraduates (44 women and 20 men) partcipatcd 
in the study in return for course credit. Criteria for selection included first 
or second-year standing, fluency in English, and no prior particip;ition in 
research involving either autobiographical memory or experimentally 
induced moods. 
It was found that mean differences in rated pleasure betveen P-
mood and U-mood subjects were significant at the conclusion oi" both 
event generated and event recall (viz., AEG and AER ratings). P-mood 
subjects rated themselves as being more aroused than did their I -mood 
counterparts, and this was true for all ratings taken after the CMT had 
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began (viz., BEG, AEG, BER, and AER ratings). A 2X2 (Encoding 
Mood X Event Type) mood-design analysis of variance (ANO\ A) was 
applied to each of the six measures. The results of these analyses levealed 
three significant main effects for event type and one marginal mam effect 
for encoding mood. Regarding the former, negative events were not only 
older than positive events but also more intense and more important. 
Regarding the latter, U-mood subjects took somewhat longer to ^,enerate 
a given event than did P-mood subjects, a results consistent v/ith the 
claim that depressed mood impedes cognitive processing. There were no 
reliable Encoding Mood X Event Type interactions, meaning that there 
was no sign of any sort of mood congruence. P-mood subjects did not 
ascribe greater importance to positive than negative events nor did V-
mood subjects recollect negative events more vividly than positi\ e ones. 
Moreover, and in contrast to Teasdale and Fogarty's (1979) f ndings, 
there was no evidence that P-mood subjects generated positive events 
more rapidly than negative ones. The recall data were analyzed per a 
2X2X2 mixed design (Encoding Mood X Retrieval Mood X Eveni Type). 
Results were negative in all respects but two. First, there \vas a 
marginally significant main effect of encoding mood, such tiiat the 
probability of recall was higher for events (of either type) that had been 
generated under U-mood as opposed to P-mood conditions. Gi\en that 
generation latency was somewhat longer for encode-U than for ercode-P 
subjects, this result may merely reflect a difference in time spent t linking 
about the events. Second, and more important, there was a significant 
interaction between encoding and retrieval moods, a greater percer tage of 
events were recalled when encoding and retrieval moods matcht,'d than 
when they mismatched. The difference between the large/small and 
large/large groups was not significant, the overall pattern is similai to that 
found by Eich and Metcalfe (1989), thus providing a small measure of 
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added support for the idea that stronger MDM effects are associated with 
two-dimensional (pleasure plus arousal) than with one-dimt^nsional 
(pleasure only) shifts in mood state. Of the 62 correlations that were 
computed (one for every subject who recalled atleast three events), 61 
were significant, the overall mean correlation was 0.97. Additionally, of 
the 407 total events recalled by these subjects, 358 (88%) were calibrated 
within 1 year of their original date of occurrence. 
Experiment 1 showed no sign of mood congruent memory-even in 
the context of a supposedly sensitive measure (event generation latency) -
is at odds with conventional wisdom, which holds that mood congruence, 
unlike mood dependence, is a robust and readily reprc>ducible 
phenomenon. These considerations call for experiment 2 geared toward 
replicating and extending the results of the first. One difference from 
experiment 1 concerned the requirements of the event generattxl taslv. 
Although subjects in this experiment, like those in the first, were asked to 
generate a specific autobiographical incident in response to everv probe 
(16 common, neutral nouns), the type or valence of event generated was 
determined by the subjects themselves rather than by the experimenter. 
Thus, after describing and dating a given event, but before appraising its 
importance and vividness, participants in Experiment 2 rated both the 
original valence and intensity of the event on a 9-point scale ranging from 
4(extremely positive) through 0 (neutral) to_4 (extremely negativi;). This 
measure replaced the 5-point scale used to assess intensity alone in the 
initial study. In Experiment 2, however, these tasks were undertaken first 
in their respective sessions. Accordingly, subjects now had to rate 
themselves (on the mood matrix) as feeling atleast veiy pleasant oj- very 
unpleasant, irrespective of level of arousal, before they could advance to 
either task, thereby obviating the need for a mood boost. Another ctiange 
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in methodology was that all (rather than most) subjects were tested for 
free recall 2 days after event generation. Finally, the task cf event 
redating was omitted in Experiment 2. This task had served its purpose m 
Experiment 1 by showing that subjects complied with the reijuest to 
generate specific autobiographical events during the encoding session and 
to recall these same events during the retrieval session. Because subjects 
in the experiment 2 received these same instructions, they saw no point in 
saddling them with the relating task. 64 undergraduates (39 worien and 
25 men) participated and criteria for subject selection were the >ame as 
those for Experiment 1. Also like the initial study, 16 students were 
randomly assigned to each of the four combination of encod ng and 
retrieval mood, and all testing was conducted individually. Thev found 
that there were no discernible differences among encoding/ietrieval 
conditions in ratings registered at the start of either session. P-mood 
subjects rated themselves as feeling very pleasant or better prior to both 
event generated and event recall, whereas U-mood subjects fdi very 
unpleasant or worse. Differences between P-mood and U-mood subjects 
in posttask ratings, although smaller than those seen pretask, were 
significant. The mean congelation between the six principal pair oi ratings 
made by subjects in this experiment was .53. A 2X3 mixed-design 
analysis of these scores revealed a reliable effect of event type. There was 
also a reliable Event Type X Encoding Mood interaction. Relative to their 
U-mood counterparts, P-mood subjects rated more of their events as 
positive. Both the main effect of event type and the Event Type X 
Encoding Mood interaction were reliable. Whereas P-mood subjects 
perceived positive events to be more intense than negative events.^  l^ -
mood subjects saw them the same. None of the four remaining measures 
of event generation performance-latency, importance, vividness, a id age-
provided evidence of either mood congruence (Encoding Mood > Event 
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Type interaction probability levels greater than .10) or a main t-ffect of 
encoding mood. However, every measure except age did vary re iably as 
function of event type. Concerning latency, negative events were centered 
between positive events at the short end of the time-to-'enerate 
distribution and neutral events at the long end & pairwise comparison. 
Regarding importance, negative events were rated highest and neutral 
events lowest. Finally, with respect to vividness, neutral events were 
rated lower than were either positive or negative events. Although neither 
main effect was reliable, the interaction was robust. Replicating the mood 
dependent effect found in the first experiment, proportionately more 
events were recalled when encoding and retrieval moods matched than 
when they mismatched. 2X2X3 analysis of these percentages revealed a 
reliable interaction between encoding and retrieval moods, indicating an 
advantage in recall of matched over mismatched mood corditions. 
Neither the main effect of event type nor any of its affiliated interactions 
were significant, suggested that positive, negative, and neutral events 
were equally susceptible to mood dependence. Results of Expermient 2 
did not provide even slim support for the idea that a two-dimrnsional 
change in mood is more conducive to demonstrating MDM than is a one-
dimensional change. Two results of Experiment 2 rise above the rest in 
importance. First, when asked to generate specific events fron their 
personal past in response to affectively neutral probes, participants in 
Experiment 2 recollected more positive episodes, and fewer regative 
ones, if they were in a pleasant as opposed to an unpleasant mood. 
Second, when asked to freely recall the gist of these events 2 days later, 
subjects remembered more if they were tested in the same mood tliey had 
experienced during event generation than in the contrasting eirotional 
context. Together, these results mark Experiment 2 as the onl> single 
study we know of that has succeeded in demonstrating both mood 
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congruent and mood dependent memory. This is reason enough to 
wonder whether the results are rephcable-hence Experiment 3. There was 
another reason for running a third study, one that is traceablt> to the 
results of the first. Recall that in Experiment 1, the interval sepanding the 
encoding and retrieval sessions was set at 2 days for some subjeds and at 
3 days for others. They reanalyzed total event recall (i.e., posilive and 
negative events combined) with a view to this difference, and an 
intriguing pattern emerged. Selected according to the criteria applied in 
Experiment 1 and 2, 128 undergraduates (87 women and 41 men) served 
as subjects. The sample contained substitutes for students who either (a) 
generated specific events in response to less than 75% of the 
autobiographical memory probe (2 cases); (b) failed to attend the retrieval 
session (5 cases); (c) became too upset during U-mood induction to 
proceed further (2 cases); or (d) seemed unable (or unwilling) to attain the 
requistic pretask level of pleasure or displeasure (24 cases). For a random 
half of the subjects in this study, the retrieval session met 2 days c fter the 
encoding session; for the remaining subjects, the intersession interval was 
set at 7 days. The factorial combination of these two intervals with two 
encoding moods (P vs. U) and two retrieval moods (again P \ s . E) 
defined eight conditions, each of which was represented by 16 
individually tested subjects. In an effect to enhance the sensifivity of 
memory measurement, participants in Experiment 3 were asked to 
generate a specific autobiographical event in response to each of 24 
emotionally untinged probes. Otherwise, their task was identical to the 
one performed by subjects in Experiment 2 (who had generated a 
maximum of 16 events, divided as they saw fit among positive, negative, 
and neutral types). As in Experiment 2, autobiographical event generated 
was the first task undertaken during the encoding session of Experiment 
3, and autobiographical event recall was the initial task perfonned during 
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the retrieval session. Participants in Experiment 3 were required to reach 
a critical level of mood (viz., very pleasant or very unpleasant, 
irrespective of degree of arousal) before they could advance to either task. 
The methods by which moods were modified and measure paralleled 
those used in the two preceding studies. 
The findings of Experiment 3 demonstrated that rating of pleasure 
and arousal, averaged across intersession intervals^ which did not differ. 
Subjects in Experiment 3 generated a maximum of 24 rather than 16 
events. The patterns proved to be virtually identical in teiTns of event 
generation latency, event age, and ratings of event intensity, impoitance, 
and vividness. In ternis of the number of positive, neutral, and negative 
events generated, this Experiment showed a smaller mood congruent 
effect than did Experiment 2. The Encoding Mood X Evert Type 
interaction was reliable, with P-mood subjects generating more oositive 
and fewer negative events than their U-mood peers. A 2X2X2 analysis of 
the percentages of total events recalled (i.e., positive, neutral, and 
negative types combined) yielded two notable results. First, the overall 
level of recall was higher at the 2-day than at the 7-day intersession 
interval. Second, although the triple interaction among encoding mood, 
retrieval mood, and intersession interval was significant, there was a 
reliable advantage of matched over mismatched mood conditions it the 2-
day intersession interval. A separate analysis of the recall data supplied 
by 2-day subjects who had generated atleast one positive, one n(;gative, 
and one neutral event showed a significant interaction between encoding 
and retrieval moods, but no appreciable effect (whether simple or 
interactive in nature) of event type. However, instead of seeing a stronger 
MDM effect at the 7-day interval, they found no effect at all. Analysis by 
planed comparisons showed that subjects who had experienced a lai-ge as 
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opposed to a small change in both pleasure and arousal recalled fewer 
total events. Neither of the other two pairwise contrasts was significant. 
Eich (1995) investigated the mood as a mediator of place 
dependent memory. In his study each experiment was conducted n three 
locations termed the homeroom, the outside environment, and the. inside 
environment. Participants were escorted by the research assistant from 
one site to another, and as they walked they often talked about matters 
(e.g., classes, hobbies, and movies) unrelated to the experiment. The main 
task undertaken during the first session of each study was 
autobiographical event generation. Participants in experiment 1 and 2 
performed this task in either the I (inside) or the O (outside) environmenl; 
those in experiment 3 always did so in outside environment. The main 
task undertaken during the second session of each experiment was 
autobiographical event recall. This task was performed in the 1 
environment by half of the subjects in each study, and in ihe 0 
environment by the other half. Like event generation, the task c f event 
recall began following a 5-min acclimation period of wh ch the 
participants had been apprised in advance. In experiment 1. 32 
participants were randomly assigned in equal numbers to one of two 
conditions: O/I. The letter to the left of the slash mark signi les the 
environment where participants undertook autobiographical event 
generation; the letter to the right symbolizes the environment v^  here, 2 
days later, participants completed autobiographical event recal . After 
expressing their views on the study's aims and methods, participants were 
asked to describe, in their own terms, the moods they had experienced 
during the event generation and event recall tasks. The intent hert was to 
obtain a rough idea of whether the participants did indeed feel different 
(presumably better) being outside than they did being inside. As i means 
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of assessing performance on this task, six dependent measures were 
derived for each participant: (a) number of event generated (maxinum = 
16) (b) mean event generation latency (in second), (c) median ev^nt age 
(month since the event occurred), (d) mean event emotionality (range = 
_4 to 4), (e) mean event importance (range = 1 to 5), and (f) mean event 
vividness (range = 1 to 5). Participants undertook the identical event 
generation task while experiencing either a very pleasant (P) or a very 
unpleasant (U) mood, affects that had been instilled thrcugh a 
combination of music and imagery. No appreciable difference wai found 
between P and U mood subjects in five of the six measure of gerieration 
performance. The overall correlation was positive and significaat with 
both conditions contributing about equally. Thus, even though ail 
participants undertook event recall in an environment that plainly looked 
different from the one they had inhabited during event generaticn, they 
varied considerably in how similar they felt on the two occasions, fhose 
who felt most similar recalled the most events. After being asked to 
verbalize their moods, 16 of the 32 participants reported feeling happier 
in the O than in the I environment; how much more cannot be gauged 
with confidence given the concise and occasionally cryptic nfture of 
many of the participants' replies. Being outside made 4 participants feel 
more anxious or agitated. One participant each said that he or she felt 
either more serene, sadder, or sleepier while in the garden as opposed to 
the office. The remaining 7 participants claimed that they felt basically 
the same in both environments. Although most of these part cipanls 
acknowledged the garden's aesthetic appeal, it appeared not io have 
moved them emotionally, for better or for worse. 
This study sought to achieve four aims. One was to replicate the 
positive relation between event recall and subjective similarity seen in the 
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first study. A second was to discover whether more events are ecalled 
when generation and recall environments match (condition I/I ar d 0/0) 
than when they mismatch (conditions I/O and O/I). The third objective, 
which was predicated on the success of the second, was to determine 
whether the advantage in recall of matched over mismatched condition is 
more accurately construed as an instance of PDM or one of MDM. 
Finally, in an effort to measure the moods experienced in the O and 1 
environments, all participants were administered the Positive and 
Negative Schedule (PANAS) at regular intervals throughout the C( )urse of 
the study. Developed and Validated by Watson, Clark, and lellegen 
(1988), the PANAS consists of 20 emotion-relevant adjectives such as 
attentive and irritable. In second study, participants were instructed to 
respond to each item on the basis of how they were feeling "right now"'. 
The assistant read aloud the items and recorded the participants' spoken 
responses, which were made on a 5-point scale ranging from very slightly 
or not at all (1) to extremely (5). 48 participants were assigned randomly 
and in equal numbers to one of four condition: two in whici event 
generation and recall environments matched (I/I and O/O) and two in 
which they mismatched (I/O and O/I). Participants rated their current 
mood, via the PANAS, on six occasions: (a) in the home-room, moments 
after the completion of informed consent and about 5 min before they 
were escorted to the O environment (the intervening time was taken up 
with instructions and practice on the event generation task). This ]ating is 
coded as GSB, for generation session baseline; (b) immediatel} before 
and (c) immediately after event generation (rating BEG anc AEG, 
respectively); (d) in the homeroom, 2 day later, just prior to depaiture for 
the recall environment (either I or O). The symbol RSB, short for recall 
session baseline, denotes this rating; and finally, (e) immediatel) before 
and (f) immediately after event recall (ratings BER and AER, 
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respectively). Event generation in the I environment were 
indistinguishable from those generated in the O environment; this was so 
for all six measures of task performance. The most puzzling outco ne was 
that O-generated events were not rated as higher in emotionalit} than 
were I-generated events. First, as one would anticipate, there were no 
reliable differences among conditions in rating of PA made at th(.> outset 
of either the generation or the recall session (ratings GSB and RSB), for 
the main effect of condition and the Condition X Rating interaction. 
Average PA, however, was significantly lower at the second baseline than 
at the first, probably because the experiment was no longer a novel 
endeavor. Second, both the O and I environment had significant but 
somewhat transient effect on ratings of PA. PA increased an average of 
2.3 points among participants tested in the garden and decreased an 
average of 2.3 point among those tested in the office. On average, 
participants recalled more when they mismatch, a clear-cut case of place 
dependence. Ratings of subjective similarity mirrored the patten set by 
event recall, such that participants felt more similar when generation and 
recall environments matched than when they mismatched. Similarity of 
feelings accounted for more of the variance recall than did similarity in 
settings and most of these high subjective similarity participants had been 
tested under matched rather than mismatched environmental conditions. 
Participants with atypical similarity scores showed no sign of PDM. 
Since previous experiments provided indirect support for the mood 
mediation theory of PDM, experiment 3 was carried out to test this 
theory. 48 participants were randomly assigned in equal numbers to the 
four generate/recall conditions. As in experiment 2, participams rated 
their cuiTent mood, via the PANAS, on six occasions: twice in the 
homeroom (to establish baseline for event generation and recal), both 
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before and after generation, and both before and after recall. The method 
by which moods were modified at recall was similar to the cortinuous 
music technique used in recent research on mood congruent and mood 
dependent memory (e.g. Eich et al. 1994; Eich & Metcalfe, 1989). 
Specifically, participants were asked to entertain either elating or 
depressing thoughts about factual or fictional incidents whilt- mood 
appropriate music played softly in the background. The music, once 
started, did not stop until the after-recall PANAS has been comp eted. A 
high-grade portable cassette deck with detachable speakers was used in 
the garden; although small in size, its acoustic qualities rivaled ihose of 
the much larger stereo system that sat a top a table in the office. After 
assessment of the subjective similarity between their feelings at recall and 
generation but before they were debriefed, participants were asked to 
share their thoughts on the study's aims and methods. Partici])ants in 
Experiment 3 were also asked, how real or genuine was the mood you 
experienced during the test of recall? Participants were encouraged to 
answer without most Candor and to frame their response in terms of an 
11-point scale ranging from totally artificial (0) to extremely ealistic 
(10). The assistant kept a written record of the participant's spoken 
responses. Events generated in the present study tended to be older and to 
have more positive emotionality than those generated in the same (O) 
environment in either of the previous studies. Results of the analysis were 
negative in all respects except two. First, there was a marked main effect 
of recall mood, such that PA increased an average of 2.6 points after the 
positive mood induction and decreased an average of 5.4 points after the 
negative mood induction. Second, there was a marginally significant 
Recall Mood X Rating Comparison interaction. Relative to their baseline 
ratings, positive mood participants reached a higher level of PA before 
rather than after the test of recall, whereas negative mood participants 
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experienced lower PA before recall than after its completion. Theie was a 
significant main effect of recall mood, with positive mood participants 
showed a decrease in NA of 1.1 points and negative mood participants 
showed an increase of 3.4 points. The Recall Mood X Rating Coirparison 
interaction was also reliable, indicating that the difference between 
before-recall and baseline rating of NA was greater than the di Terence 
between after-recall and baselines scores. 
Baumann and Kuhl (2005) investigated positive affect and 
flexibility: overcoming the precedence of global over local processing of 
visual information. This study was conducted to test whether preferences 
for global processing observed in a positive mood condition imply an 
impaired ability to use local processing. In order to test the hy]X)thesis 
that positive affect promotes flexibility to shift the focus to non-dominant 
(local) stimulus features, they assessed reaction times in a target detection 
paradigm. Their global-local shape task consisted of single figures that 
unambiguously contained a given target shape or not. They used an 
affective priming procedure in order to test mood effects within 
participants. 78 participants (40 women and 38 men) were r.^cruited 
through flyers at the University of Osnabruck. Their mean age was 24 
years (range 15-57). The material used by Derryberry and Reed (1998), 
the shape task consisted of geometrical objects (circle, triangle, square, or 
diamond) composed of smaller geometrical objects. Participants' task 
was to decide whether a given target shape was present or not. 
Participants were asked to respond as rapidly and accurately as possible 
to target items. Personal prime words were introduced as a means to 
facilitate attention for subsequent tasks. Participants were asked to attend 
to these words and recall associated feelings. In order to further mcrease 
attention to prime words, at random intervals participants were t sked to 
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classify the affective valence of the prime. The shape-detection task 
consisted of a total of 156 trials (including 12 practice trials): 50% did not 
include the target shape, 25% included it on the global dimension, and 
25% on the local dimension. Four target shapes (circle, triangle, square, 
or diamond) were alternated block-wise. Within blocks, the 
presence/absence and global/local dimension of target shapes as v\ell as 
the affective valence of prime words were completely balanced. Positive 
negative, and neutral prime words were presented in random order. The 
findings revealed that participants responded significantly faster o local 
targets after positive compared to neutral and negative prime words. The 
typical precedence of global over local processing observed after neutral 
and negative prime words was reversed after positive prime words. 
Furthermore, findings suggest that mood-related preferences in global 
versus local processing cannot be generalized to processing ability 
In addition to the flexibility-enhancing effect of positive aflect, the 
present data also show a flexibility-reducing effect of negative atTeci: 
Negative prime words significantly increased latencies to local targets 
while not slowing latencies to global targets. This finding is consistent 
with Personality Systems Interactions (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000. 2001). 
According to the negative affect modulation assumption of PSI theory, 
negative affect reduces access to extension memory and, as a result, 
reduces cognitive flexibility. Thus, shifting from the default global to the 
required local features becomes more difficult under conditions of 
negative affect. The finding suggests that negative affect does not slow 
down cognitive processing per se, but reduces cognitive flexibility 
presumably associated with extension memory. 
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) in their study demonstrated 
posifive emotions broaden the scope of attention and thoughi-action 
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repertoires. Experiment 1 examined broadening and narrowing of the 
scope of attention using a global-local visual processing task. Experiment 
2 examined broadening and narrowing of thought-action repertoins using 
an open ended Twenty Statements Test. Participants were 104 university 
students (60% women) enrolled in an introductory psychology course. 
Subjective experiences were assessed using Emotion Report Forms 
(adapted from Ekman, Friesen & Ancoli, 1980). Participants re ted the 
greatest amount felt of the following nine emotions: amusement anger, 
anxiety, contentment, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and serenity. 
Ratings were made on 9-point Likert scales (0= none, 8= a greet deal). 
Five videotaped film clips served as the experimental manipulation in this 
research. Two clips elicited two distinct positive emotions: "Penguins" (2 
min 6 sec) shows groups of penguins waddling, swimming, and jumping 
and primarily elicits amusement. "Nature" (1 min 33 sec) shows fields, 
streams, and mountains in warm, sunny weather and primarih elicits 
contentment and serenity. Two additional clips elicited two distinct 
negative emotions: Witness" (Imin 40 sec) shows a group of young men 
taunting and insulting a group of Amish passers-by in the street and 
primarily elicits anger and disgust, "Cliffhanger" (2 min 50 sec) jhows a 
prolonged mountain climbing accident and primarily elicits anxiety and 
fear. A final clip served as a neutral control condition: "Sticks" (1 min 33 
sec) shows an abstract dynamic display of colored sticks piling up and 
elicits virtually no emotion. The findings clearly demonstrated that when 
compared to a neutral state, positive emotions broadened the scope of 
attention in Experiment 1 and thought-action repertoires in Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 2, negative emotions, relative to a neutral state, nc ri-owed 
thought-action repertoires. These findings provided empirical support to 
the broaden and build theory of positive emotions as proposed by 
Fredrickson (1998, 2001). 
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Goeleven, DeRaedt, Baert and Koster (2006a) investigated 
deficient inhibition of emotional information in depression. To study 
whether impaired inhibition of negative affect is a cognitive vulnerabihty 
factor explaining (recurrent) depression, inhibition of positi/e and 
negative affective stimuli was examined in hospitalized depressed 
patients, formerly depressed individuals and never-depressed controls. 1 o 
investigate inhibitory dysfunctions in the processing of emotional 
material, they used an affective modification of the negative priming task 
with pictures of sad and happy facial expressions. 
They compared to never-depressed controls, depressed i^atients 
showed a specific failure to inhibit negative information, whereas 
inhibition ftinction for positive material was unaffected. Surprising!}, 
formerly depressed individuals demonstrated impaired inhibi ion of 
negative and positive information. 
Goeleven, DeRaedt, and Koster (2007) investigated the influence 
of induced mood on the inhibition of emotional information. In the 
present study, they examined the influence of negative and positive mood 
states on the inhibition of emotion-relevant information in a healthy 
student population. They also examined the relation between negative 
mood and cognitive inhibition towards affective information. In two 
experiments, the same pictorial Negative Affective Priming (NAP) 
paradigm as in the depression study of Goeleven and co-workers (2006a) 
was used after a mood induction procedure (MIP; Experiment 1: leutral, 
negative and positive Velten MIP; Experiment 2: neutral and positive 
Film and Autobiographical MIP) in a healthy student population. 
In experiment first 73 first grade psychology students voluiteered 
to participate in the experiment. Provided that depression has been 
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associated with reduced inhibition of negative material, a cut-off ^ core of 
19 or less on the Dutch version of the Beck Depression Inventor} (BDI-
II-NL; Beck et al. 1996; van der Does, 2002) was used as inclusion 
criterion. A total of 67 participants between the age of 18 and A 1 were 
included in the study (55 females, 12 males). 
The three groups (neutral, negative, and positive) did not differ 
significantly with respect to male/female ratio. Participants in the 
negative mood induction reported significant higher scoes on 
Depression, Anger, and Fatigue, after the MIP as compared to the pre-
measurement. Furthermore a significant decrease was obser^ ed for 
Vigour. After the positive MIP, participants scored significantly ktwer on 
the Depression subscale. Also a significant decline was observec on the 
Anger, Fatigue, and Tension, subscales. Concerning the Vigour scale, no 
pre-post difference was found. Finally, participants in the neutral 
condition reported a significant decrease for the Vigour scale after the 
MIP. 
A similar effect was obtained on the Tension scale. Betwee \ group 
comparisons of mood state after the MIP revealed a significantl> higher 
Depression score in the negative MIP compared with the neutral 
condition, in the negative compared with the positive MIP, ant: in the 
neutral condition compared with the positive MIP. Furthernore, a 
significant lower Vigour score was found after the negative compared 
with the positive MIP. The difference in Vigour score betwi3en the 
negative MIP and the neutral condition was only marginally significani. 
In addition, a significant higher post score was found after the regatlve 
MIP compared with the neutral condition for Tension, and Fatigue, and 
after the negative compared with the positive MIP for Anger. First, a 
significant interaction effect of Priming condition X MIP emerLed. No 
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interaction effects were found with Picture valence. Furthermore, the 
ANOVA revealed a marginally significant main effect for Priming 
condition. Mean reaction time's show that RT is slower in the 
experimental condition as compared with the control condition, indicating 
a mild NAP-effect over all conditions. In addition, a main effect of 
Picture valence was found. Mean reaction time scores indicated that RT 
was generally slower for negative trials than for positive trials. 
An exploration of the significant Priming condition X MIP 
interaction effect using contrast analyses on the differences in responding 
to the control and experimental trials, independent of Picture /alence, 
revealed significantly slower responding on the experimental i rials in 
comparison with the control trials, in the negative MIP. The same 
significant effect was obtained in the neutral condition. However, in the 
positive MIP no NAP-effect was found. Contrast analyses revealed no 
difference in NAP-effect (regardless of Picture Valence) between the 
negative MIP and the neutral condition, whereas a significant di Terence 
in NAP-effect was found between the positive MIP and the neutral 
condition, and between the positive and the negative MIP condition 
In both cases the NAP-effect was smaller in the positive MIP 
condition. In the second experiment, the effect of positive vs. neutral MIP 
on NAP performance was examined in a female-only population. For the 
mood induction a combination of Film and an Autobiographiccl recall 
MIP was used. The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson 
et al. 1988) was conducted as pre/post MIP mood measure. In order to 
assemble information concerning the sustaining effects of the cifferent 
MIP's, mood was also measured directly after NAP perfoiTnance. In 
addition the 11 statements of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Des rabilily 
Scale (MCSDS, Crowne and Marlowe 1960) were included in order to 
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control for social desirability-tendencies. 60 female psychology students 
volunteered to participate in the experiment. As in Experiment 1 a cut-
off score of 19 on the BDI-II-NL was used as inclusion criterion Based 
on this criterion three participants were excluded. Two participants were 
excluded because of an unreliable NAP measurement. The final sample 
comprised 55 female participants between the age of 18 and 22. The 
procedure was similar as in Experiment 1: after fulfilling the informed 
consent form and the BDI-II-NL, participants were randomly assi;^ned to 
a positive MIP or a neutral condition. The autobiographical recall phase 
was always preceded by the film clip. Before and immediately after the 
MIP, current mood was measured with the PANAS. After the induction 
procedure, participants conducted the NAP. After performing the NAP, 
current mood was measured again with the PANAS, followed by the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (1960). 
An independent t-test revealed a significant difference in 3D1-1I-
NL score between groups. No main or interaction-effects were fojnd for 
BDI-II-NL in the analyses on NAP. Participants in the positive mood 
induction reported significant higher scores on the PA after the induction 
as compared with the pre-MIP measurement. Furthermore a sigiificant 
decline was observed for the NA score. In the neutral condition, 
participants reported no significant difference on the PA scale, from pre 
to post induction. For the score on the NA scale a marginal sigiificant 
decline was observed. A comparison of post-mood induction scores 
between groups revealed a significantly higher PA score in the positive 
MIP group, compared with the neutral condifion. For the NA scale, a 
significant lower score was obtained in the positive group compar.xl with 
the neutral condition. The same data pattern was preserved during the 
post-NAP measurement: the positive MIP group still showed a significant 
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higher PA-score, and a significant lower NA-score, after performing the 
NAP as compared with the neutral condition. They explored the effect of 
social desirability as covariate in an ANOVA on the mood analyses. 
Importantly, no significant main or interaction effect with this \ariable 
was found. Resuhs revealed a main effect of Valence, and a main affect 
of Priming condition. Both main effects were in the same directicn as in 
the omnibus model of Experiment 1. All other effects wtre not 
significant, including the MIP X Priming condition effect. 
As expected, in the neutral condition results revealed a mai i effect 
for Priming condition. Mean reaction times show that RT is slower in the 
experimental condition as compared with the control condition, indicating 
the standard NAP-effect or normal inhibitory processing. In adcition, a 
main effect for Picture valence was found. Mean reaction time scores 
indicate that RT was generally slower for negative trials than for positive 
trials. 
For the positive MIP group, only a main effect of Picture valence was 
found, RT is slower for negative trials as compared with positive trials. 
No main effect was revealed for Priming Condition, indicaiing an 
absence of inhibitoiy functioning. 
In this study, the data of both experiments show that attentional 
inhibition as measured by the NAP task is sensitive to positive mood 
state. Yet, in contrast with Experiment 1, the expected interaction effect 
between MIP group and priming condition was not significant in 
Experiment 2. However, using a within subjects ANOVA malysis 
(priming condition X picture valence) for each MIP condition seixirately 
our specific a-priori hypotheses were confirmed: in the neutial MIP 
condition nornial inhibitory processing (NAP effect) was observed, while 
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the positive MIP group showed an absence of inhibitoiy fmction. 
Although the data as a whole are indicative that positive affect letds to a 
reduced or even absence of inhibitory functioning, given these data, 
conclusions are only tentative at this point. 
Reduced inhibition of information at the level of attention rright be 
at the basis of enhanced cognitive elaboration and flexibility observed in 
positive mood state. It can be stated that irrelevant information which is 
processed as a consequence of weakened inhibition during positive mood 
might be linked with task-relevant material in working memory, resulting 
in an "enrichment" of the memory representation (Hasher et al. 2007). 
Considering reduced inhibitory control as the underlying micro prc»cess of 
this "broadened", more flexible processing mode matches the growing 
body of literature which suggest that positive affect leads tc better 
problem solving and creativity possibilities and the ability to see 
alternative cognitive perspectives (Estrada et al. 1994; Isen et al. 1987). 
However, it is important to note that the results of this study also fit with 
other studies in which it is demonstrated that positive mood is associated 
with increased distractibility, causing poor performance on inliibition 
dependent processes such as deductive reasoning (Oaksford et al. 1996). 
Indeed, the abovementioned irrelevant information might cause intrusions 
and memory lapses (Hasher et al. 2007). An increased activation of task-
irrelevant information in working memory as a consequence of i educed 
attention inhibition could thus be an important factor in enhanced t reative 
divergent thinking and decreased deductive reasoning. 
The forgoing exhaustive review of literature reveals_(l) therr is still 
inconsistency in the findings obtained by numerous researchers regarding 
the effect of mood on memory and (2) no study has been undertaken so 
far to investigate conversation memory of humorous-nonhumorcus and 
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congruent-incongruent version of conversation under different shade of 
listener's mood. Hence, fijrther research is needed to resolve the existing 
inconsistency in findings and to explore how conversation memory 
(relatively less researched aspect of memory) is affected by mood and 
versions of conversation. In short in the light of existing findings 
regarding mood dependent memory and mood congruent memory, it is 
highly logical to assume that if the listener is in a state of elated mood 
then he may recall humorous content of the conversation mo e than 
nonhumorous content of the conversation. Further more it may also be 
assumed that if the listener is in a state of depressed/sad mood, le may 
recall humorous content of the conversation less than the subject with 
elated mood. It is further hypothesized that both subjects with elated 
mood and subjects with depressed/sad mood are likely to recall 
incongruent content of the conversation more as compared to co igruent 
content of the conversation. The present study is designed to test these 
assumptions also. The findings of the present study will not only open a 
new area of research in memory but will also provide significant 
information about the development of interpersonal relations and will 
highlight the process of impression formation. Furthermore, the fmdings 
of the present study may also be applied in education settings like 
preparing syllabai and teaching methods. 
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CHAPTER - HI 
ii 
Jied^MltUc^fy^ 
As mentioned in the previous chapters the present reseaich was 
initiated to study conversation memory of humorous-nonhumorous and 
congruent-incongruent versions of conversation under different shades of 
Hstener's mood. The main objectives of the study were (1) to investigate 
the impact of humorous-nonhumorous version of conversation on 
conversation memory, i.e. to what extent humorous and nonhumorous 
versions of conversation facihtate or inhibit conversation memor}; (2) to 
investigate the influence of congruent-incongruent version of 
conversation on conversation memory, i.e. to what extent congruent and 
incongruent versions of conversation facilitate or inhibit conversation 
memory; (3) to investigate the effect of listener's mood on conversation 
memoi-y, i.e. to what extent Elated, Depressed, and Neutral mood of the 
listener facilitate or inhibit the conversation memory; and (4) to examine 
the various interactional effects of independent variables i.e. humorous-
nonhumorous, congruent-incongruent versions of conversation and mood 
on our dependent variable i.e. conversation memory. To be more specific 
the present study was designed to answer the following questions: 
(1) Does humorous-nonhumorous version of conversation irfluence 
conversation memory? 
(2) Does congruent-incongruent version of conversation influence 
conversation memory? 
(3) Does listener's mood influence conversation memory? 
(4) Is there an interactional effect between humorous-nonhumorous 
and congment-incongruent versions of conversation on 
conversation memory? 
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(5) Is there an interactional effect between humorous-nonhumorous 
version of conversation and listener's mood on conversation 
memory? 
(6) Is there an interactional effect between congruent-incoigruent 
version of conversation and listener's mood on convi.Tsation 
memory? 
(7) Is there an interactional effect among humorous-nonhumorous, 
congruent-incongruent versions of conversation and listener's 
mood on conversation memory? 
Design of the study -
In order to answer the above questions, a 2X2X3 factorial d'isign in 
which two task variables (two versions of conversation i.e. huinorous-
nonhumorous and congruent-incongruent) and one personality variable 
(listener's mood) were used in this experiment. The two values of first 
task variable were (a) humorous version of conversation Mnd (b) 
nonhumorous version of conversation. Similarly the two values oi second 
task variable were (a) congruent version and (b) incongruent version. The 
third variable i.e. personality variable was varied in three ways and the 
two task variables were varied in two ways. The three values of 
personality variable i.e. listener's mood were (a) elated mood, (b) 
depressed mood and (c) neutral mood. Thus there were twelve groups of 
subjects as given below: 
Group I Elated mood, Humorous and Congruent versions of convtrsation. 
Group II Elated mood, Humorous and Incongruent versions c^ f 
conversation. 
Group III Elated mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
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Group IV Elated mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group V Depressed mood, Humorous and Congruent versons of 
conversation. 
Group VI Depressed mood. Humorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group VII Depressed mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group VIII Depressed mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group IX Neutral mood, Humorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group X Neutral mood. Humorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group XI Neutral mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent vers ons of 
conversation. 
Group XII Neutral mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent xersions of 
conversation. 
The design of the experiment is diagramatically given in Table I. 
169 
c 
P!5 
H 
o 
u 
J3 
o 
t 3 
a 
<L) 
k4 
.1 s 
t^-^ 
O 
B 
o 
-6 
a 
< 
3 
O 
Li 
in 
cS 
o 
3 
s 
oj 
0) 
3 
O 
a 
o 
C3 
<L> 
!Z1 
O 
a. 
> 
'Si) 
(U 
-S ^ 
3 
C 
o 
o 2 
s 
o 
n 
V 
(U 
P!j 
^ 
es 
t 
a* 
-(-» & 1 — ( 
s 
o « 
.2f 
u 
*-" 
s 
s 
WD 
S 
• ^ 
o 
c 
cs 
c 
CO 
> 
c 
o 
<u 
cc 
c 
C3 
so 
> 
o 
C M 
O 
13 
> 
cs 
> 
c 
o 
U 
'4=! 
< 
o 
-2 
JO 
3 
1/5 
c2 
O H 
T 3 
in 
cd 
O 
+-» o 
c/3 
00 
3 
T3 
o 
3 
O 
a c 
i n > 
j=l 
-4—* 
o 
on 
KS 
(U 
x : 
-*—» 
03 
c/O 
3 U 
UH 
% 6 
t/l 
a 
in 
—^^  
a> 
s 
« 
s 
o 
•4-> 
o 
s 
T5 
O 
O 
w 
- 3 
i/:i 
cd 
o 
IS" 
3 
C/5 
Si 
o 
.2 
O 
u 
w 
CI 
o 
^ -5 S 
lA 
> 
4*» O 
t /1 
3 
g 
3 
O 
o 
I 
3 
O 
;-i 
O 
a 
3 
J3 
3 
u 
3 
i-i 
bS] 
3 
O 
o 
_c 
iz i 
3 
O 
C 
3 
CO 
3 
O 
V-. 
O a 
3 
j : : 
3 
O 
3 
T3 
3 
c3 
a 
(D 
3 ;-! 
tJ) 
3 
O 
o 
3 
O 
o 
a 
3 
3 
O 
G 
3 
OJ 
3 
5i) 
3 
O 
o 
3 
- 3 
3 
O 
O 
c/5 
3 
O 
; - H 
O 
3 
3 
X 
3 
O 
\-> O 
a 3 
ffi 
3 
3 
i n 
3 
O 
o 
3 
3 
(D 3 ' 
Li 
3 
O 
U 
CO 
3 
O 
S-i 
O 
a 3 
^ 3 
O 
:^ 
C/) 
3 
O 
» - i 
o 
a 3 
^ 3 
O 
z 
c 
3 
l -H 
DO 
3 
O 
o 3 
3 
u 3 
'51) 
O 
U 
CO 
3 
O 
! - i 
o 
a 3 
D^  
CO 
3 
O 
S-i 
O 
a 3 
K 
3 
<u 
3 
bO 
3 
O 
o 
3 
3 
« 
3 
tJ) 
3 
O 
U 
CO 
3 
O 
3 
x; 
3 
o 
3 
3 
i-< 
bO 
3 
O 
o 3 
t/3 
3 
O ;-! 
O 
a 
3 
O 
CO 
a 
3 O 
in 
o 
o *-W MH K ^ l -H h H * H I—< 
o o o o 
t3 
a> 
CO 
1/1 
&. 
3 
U 
3 
5b 
O 
U 
CO 
3 
O 
v-< O 
a 3 
i : 
ro 
3 
O 
!-< O 
a 3 
X 
3 
(U 
3 
5b 
3 
O 
o 
3 
ID 
3 
51) 
3 
O 
U 
3 
a> 
3 
bX) 
3 
O 
o 
CO 
3 
O 
3 
- 3 
3 
O z 
CO 
3 
O 
O 
3 
j ^ 
3 
O 
Z 
N H M M ^ 
> > > > 
o o a o 
3 
Z 
^ X >< >? 
o o o c 
Sample- 180 subjects were used in the present study. More specifically there 
were 15 subjects in each group. These 180 subjects were randomly selected 
from undergraduate students. Faculty of Social Sciences A.M.U, /vligarh. 
All the subjects were matched on all relevant variables like age, ed\ication, 
physical and mental health and sex. 
Stimulus material -A fictional conversation (see Appendix I) was pepared 
by the author which was used in the present study. This fictional 
conversation consisted of large number of statements forming conversation 
between two persons (Mr. Ahmad and Mr. Sharma). The concent of 
conversation focused on two issues namely health and business deal. The 
conversation on the issue of health was so prepared that either the 
conversation was humorous or nonhumorous. The conversation on tl e issue 
of business deal was so prepared that it was totally nonhumorous These 
conversations on the issues on 'health' and 'business deal' were gi\en to a 
group of 50 subjects who were asked to rate humorousne:;s and 
nonhumorousness of each statement on five point rating scale. On the basis 
of these ratings only those statements were retained which were rated either 
as humorous or as nonhumorous. The mean rating of humorous statement 
was 4.0, whereas the mean rating of nonhumorous statements was l.I 5. It is 
important to mention that this group of subjects did not participate in the 
actual experiment. 
Humorous-Congruent version of conversation was prepared h]' using 
all the statements which were humorous in nature and were on the same 
issue i.e. 'health'. Humorous-incongruent version of conversation was 
prepared by using the statements half of which were humorous (on the issue 
of health) and the remaining half were nonhumorous (on the issue of 
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business deal). Nonhumorous-congruent version of conversation was 
prepared by using all the nonhumorous statements about one issue i.e. 
'business deal'. Nonhumorous-incongruent version of conversatijn was 
prepared by using the statements half of which were concerned \/ith the 
issue of health and remaining half were concerned with the issue of business 
deal and both types of statements were nonhumorous.. 
In each four versions of conversation 20 statements were cor sidered 
as target statements uttered by Mr. Ahmad. These were the statements which 
were to be recalled by the subjects. 
Tool- Following tool was used in the present study. 
Modified Velten Mood Induction Technique (MVMIT) -
Originally this technique was developed by Vehen (1968) but Sinclair 
et al. (1994) modified this technique to make it more effective. This 
modified technique enhanced the duration of mood as compared to original 
Velten technique; with the inclusion of an incubation period leading t) mood 
change lasting up to 35 minutes. Further this MVMIT resulted ii mood 
differences, even after various intervening tasks. 
This mood induction technique consisted of mood relating statc-ments. 
There were 60 happy (elated) statements, 60 depressed statements and 60 
neutral statements. The happy statements (e.g. "I do feel pretty good -oday'\ 
I have a sense of power and vigor" were related with positive mood as joy, 
happiness and elation). The depression statements contained in NIVMII 
were of two types: statements regarding self devaluation and statements 
concerning somatic states that were associated with depression (e.g. I have 
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doubt I am a worthwhile person", "I feel rather sluggish now"). For inducing 
a particular mood among subjects the following written instructiois were 
given to them. 
"You will be shown a series of cards with statements typed en them. 
These statements will represent a certain mood and your success will be 
largely a question of your willingness to be receptive and responsi\e to the 
idea in each statement. Allow each idea to act on you without interference. 
First, as you go through the cards, you should simply read each to your self. 
You should concentrate on it with intended seriousness. Then 'ou are 
required to go over each statement again and again in your head \>/ith the 
determination and willingness to really believe it. You should experience 
each idea. You should concentrate your full attention on it. You should 
exclude other ideas which are unrelated to the mood so respond to the 
feeling suggested by each item. You should then think of your self v\ ith as 
much clarity and realism as possible, as definitely being and moving into 
that mood state". 
After reading these instructions, subjects were started reading the 
mood related statements from one category (Happy, Depressed and Neutral). 
After reading all the 60 mood related statements of one category; subjects 
were asked to read the incubation instructions of concerned cate^orv to 
enhance the duration of mood state. In this way a particular mood was 
induced among the subjects. 
Procedure- As mentioned earlier four forms of conversation betweeii Mr. 
Ahmad and Mr. Sharma were prepared namely (1) humorous-cotigrueni 
version of conversation, (2) humorous-incongruent version of conversation. 
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(3) nonhumorous-incongruent version of conversation, ard (4) 
nonhumorous-incongruent version of conversation. In each form of 
conversation, 20 statements uttered by Mr. Ahmad were designated as target 
items. As dictated by the design of the experiment, each group of ^ ubjects 
namely elated depressed, and neutral, read the conversation ten times and 
recalled 20 target statements uttered by Mr. Ahmad after a retention nterval 
of 5 minutes which was filled with a distractor task. 
To be more specific, a rapport with the subject was made, the i either 
elated, depressed, or neutral mood was induced by Modified Velteii Mood 
Induction Technique. Immediately after the induction of mood, subject was 
given ten trials on one of the four forms of fictional conversation that was 
followed by a 5 minutes distraction task. The purpose of distraction task was 
to prevent the subjects from rehearsing the stimulus material i.e. f ctional 
conversation. Immediately after distraction task, the subject was instructed 
to recall in writing as many of Mr. Ahmad's statements as she coulci. fhe 
subject was also instructed to use wording as close to the original as 
possible. Subject was given 10 minutes to complete the recall task. In short 
the data were collected groupwise but conversation memory was tested 
individually. For example all the 15 subjects of elated group with 
humorous-congruent conversation were tested individually on conversation 
memory. Then all the 15 subjects of elated group with huniorous-
incongruent conversation were tested individually on conversation memory. 
Next all the 15 subjects of elated group with nonhumorous-congruent 
conversation were tested individually on conversation memory and then all 
the 15-subjects of elated group with nonhumorous-incongruent conversation 
were tested individually on conversation memory. The same procedi re was 
174 
used to test the conversation memory of the remaining groups of sjbject's 
i.e. depressed group and neutral group. 
After collecting data on twelve groups of subjects, the recall protocols 
of the subjects were coded by two coders. These two coders v\orked 
independently to code the protocols for the presence of target items, i.e. 
whether a statement recalled by subjects was one of the twenty targets. 
Coders were instructed to use a gist or general meaning criterion. That is, a 
recalled statement was to be coded as one of the targets if it conveyed the 
general meaning of the target, regardless of the wordings. Thus al of the 
recall protocols were scored for the number of the target correctly lecalled 
(regardless of the recalled wording). The numbers of target correctly 
recalled, as given by the two coders, were added and divided by 2 to get 
mean number of target correctly recalled. This was done to remc ve any 
discrepancy if it exists between two coders with respect to the nuiaber of 
targets correctly recalled. 
The data so obtained was tabulated groupwise and statistically 
analyzed by three way analysis of variance to draw necessary infereni es. 
175 
m 
CHAPTER - W 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the present invesligation 
was undertaken to study conversation memory of humorous-
nonhumorous and congruent-incongruent version of conversatior under 
different shades of listener's mood. In order to achieve this objective a 
2X2X3 factorial design of experiment was employed in the present study. 
Thus there were three independent variables i.e. humorous-nonhuniorous, 
congruent-incongruent versions of conversation and listener's mood. The 
first task variable i.e. humorous-nonhumorous variable was varied in two 
ways: (a) humorous version of conversation and (b) nonhumorous /ersion 
of conversation. The second task variable i.e. congruent-incongruent 
version of conversation was also varied in two ways: (a) congruent 
version and (b) incongruent version of conversation. The third \ariable 
was a personality variable i.e. listener's mood which was varied i i three 
ways: (a) elated mood, (b) depressed mood, and (c) neutral mooc. Thus 
three were twelve groups of subjects namely, elated mood, humorous and 
congruent versions of conversation; elated mood, humorous and 
incongruent versions of conversation; elated mood, nonhumoroas and 
congruent versions of conversation; elated mood, nonhumorous and 
incongruent version of conversation; depressed mood, humorous and 
congruent versions of conversation; depressed mood, humorous and 
incongruent versions of conversation; depressed mood, nonhumorous and 
congruent versions of conversation; depressed mood, nonhumoroas and 
incongruent versions of conversation; neutral mood, humoroi s and 
congruent versions of conversation; neutral mood, humorous and 
incongruent versions of conversation; neutral mood, nonhumoro\is and 
176 
congruent versions of conversation; and neutral mood, nonhumoi ous and 
incongruent versions of conversation. As dictated by the design of the 
experiment (Ref. Chapter III), each group of subjects was tested for 
conversation memory. Since the main objective of the present -esearch 
was to determine the influence of humorous-nonhumorous, co igruent-
incongruent versions of conversation and listener's mood on con\ersation 
memory, analysis of variance was used to draw necessary inferences. 
Thus F-ratios were calculated for the variation of each independent 
variable and also for any possible interaction between two or more than 
two variables. The raw scores obtained by twelve groups of subjects on 
conversation memory test are given in Table-II and their mean scores in 
Tables-Ill a. III b, III c and F-values in Table-IV. 
177 
on 
o 
O 
a 
3 
• ^ 
O 
3 
O 
V-c 
O 
s 
3 
DO 
c 
o 
o 
-4-> 
a 
o 
CJ 
Dfi 
c 
O 
O 
c 
1 — I 
c 
o 
U 
"3 
• * — » 
3 
T3 
1/5 
ex 
Q 
-a 
-4—' 
13 
-*—» 
3 
T3 
(U 
C/2 
(U 
a, 
Q 
"3 
3 
on 
Q 
"3 
-4—* 
3 
-0 
C/5 
00 
a 
Q 
-0 
0 
3 
C/2 
0 
0 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
0 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
r-1 
--
0 
0 
0 
ON' 
0 
in 
in 
0 
0 
0 
in 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
0 
0 
ON" 
0 
0 
NO 
0 
in 
00 
0 
0 
0 
r-i 
0 
0 
06 
0 
in 
0 
0 
NO 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
in 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
0 
0 
r~-" 
0 
0 
NO 
cn 
0 
0 
00 
0 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0^ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(N 
0 
0 
o< 
0 
0 
NO 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NO 
0 
0 
0^ 
0 
in 
-* 
0 
0 
00 
0 
0 
0 
in 
•0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
in 
0 
0 
06 
0 
in 
0 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
0 
in 
00 
0 
0 
NO 
in 
0 
0 
in 
0 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
NO 
0 
00 
0 
06 
0 
0 
in 
in 
0 
0 
0 
CM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
00 
NO 
0 
in 
0 
in 
0 
in 
0 
>n 
ON 
0 
in 
00 
0 
0 
0 
in 
00 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
0 
in 
ON 
0 
in 
in 
r^  
0 
0 
00 
0 
0 
00 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
in 
1^ 
0 
0 
(N 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
in 
0 
in 
NO 
0 
in 
00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
00 
0 
>n 
0 
0 
ON 
0 
in 
0 
in 
0 
0 
NO 
0 
in 
0 
in 
in 
0 
in 
06 
0 
0 
06 
0 
in 
0 
in 
NO 
0 
0 
ON 
0 
in 
0 
0 
00 
0 
0 
NO 
0 
>n 
0 
p 
0 
in 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
ON 
0 
0 
00 
0 
0 
06 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
in 
0 
in 
0 
p 
ON 
0 
ON 
0 
in 
0 
0 
00 
0 
p 
0 p 
0 
in 
in 
0 
in 
0 p 
-
0 p 
0 
0 
as 
0 
in 
0 p 
0 
0 p 
NO 
0 
in 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 p 
iri 
0 
in 
0 
p 
00 
0 p 
06 
0 
0 
NO' 
CNI 
0 
0 
0 
01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
r4 
0 p 
in 
0 
0 
NO 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in 
in 
0 
in 
in 
0 p 
00 
0 
in 
0 p 
ON, 
m 
0 
in 
0 
in 
0 p 
NO 
0 
in 
00 
C5 
in 
m 
0 p 
ON 
0 
0 
0 p 
0 
in 
00 
0 p 
00 
0 p 
rn 
0 
in 
ON 
^ 
0 P 
NO 
0 P 
06 
0 P 
in 
0 
in 
0 
0 
0 
ON 
0 
CN) 
0 P 
0 P 
C3 
in 
06 
CD 
>n 
0 
in 
06 
in 
oc 
00 
00 
00 
in 
ON 
in 
ON, 
in 
in 
0 
NO 
in 
00 
r-i 
in 
0 
0 
in 
0 
0 
m 
ON 
0 
in 
"5 
r 
ir 
r! 
N£ 
C 
NT! 
c" 
r i 
C5^ 
f 1 
r -
r ~ 
r i 
C5 
1/ 1 
J 
0 0 
Table - III (a): Showing mean of the means of subjects under humorous and 
nonhumorous conditions. 
Conditions 
Humorous 
Nonhumorous 
Elated 
11.50 
10.94 
Congruent 
Depressed 
12.77 
9.37 
Neutral 
13.43 
10.6 
Elated 
13.7 
10.64 
Incongruent 
Depressed 
14.07 
12.54 
Neutral 
12.4 
12.54 
Mean of 
the means 
12.98 
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Table - III (b): Showing mean of the means of subjects under congrifent and 
incongruent conditions. 
Conditions 
Congruent 
Incongruent 
Elated 
11.50 
13.7 
Humorous 
Depressed 
12.77 
14.07 
Neutral 
13.43 
12.4 
Elated 
10.94 
10.64 
Nonhumorous 
Depressed 
9.37 
12.54 
Neutral 
10.6 
12.54 
Mean of 
the means 
11.43 
12.65 
Table - III (c): Showing mean of the means of subjects under elated, depressed 
and neutral moods. 
Conditions 
Elated 
Depressed 
Neutral 
Humorous 
Congruent 
11.50 
12.77 
13.43 
Incongruent 
13.7 
14.07 
12.4 
Nonhumorous 
Congruent 
10.94 
9.37 
10.6 
Incongruent 
10.64 
12.54 
12.54 
Me 
11.69 
12.18 
12.: 4 
K lean of the 
means 
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Table - IV: Showing F-ratios. 
Source of variations 
Humorous (H) 
Congruent (C) 
Mood (M) 
H X C 
H X M 
C X M 
H X C X M 
Error 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
160.5547 
67.2223 
11.9453 
6.4231 
8.7112 
24.4102 
60.2820 
3641.0957 
3980.6445 
df 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
168 
179 
Mean Squares 
160.5547 
67.2223 
5.9727 
6.4231 
4.3556 
12.2051 
30.1410 
21.6732 
1'-ratios | 
:.4i 
3.10 
('.28 
{'.30 
(i.20 
('.56 
1.39 
The F-ratio for humorous-nonhumorous variation is 7.41 (Ref Tcble-I\ ) 
which is significant at 0:01 level indicating that humorous and 
nonhumorous versions of conversation has differential effect on 
conversation memory. Disregarding other variables i.e. corgrueni-
incongruent version of conversation, and mood, we find in TaMe-111 a 
that mean of the means for humorous version of conversation groups is 
12.98 (i.e., 11.50+12.77+13.43+13.70+14.07+12.40/6) and mean of 
means for nonhumorous version of conversation groups is 11. 0 (i.e., 
10.94+9.37+10.60+10.64+12.54+12.54/6). Since the mean of the means 
for humorous version of conversation groups of subjects (i.e. 1 2.98) is 
higher than the mean of the means for nonhumorous version of 
conversation groups of subjects (i.e., 11.10), it can safely be co icluded 
that the variation in humorous-nonhumorous version of conversai ion has 
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differential effect on conversation memory. More specifically, the results 
make it crystal clear that humorous version of conversation is better 
remembered than nonhumorous version of conversation. In other words, 
conversation memory was found better when version of conversation was 
humorous rather than nonhumorous. 
The F-ratios, as shown in Table-IV, for congruent-incongruent 
variation is 3.10 which is very slightly statistically insignificant (for 
significant at .o5 level, F-ratio of 3.89 is required). The result Aveakly 
suggests that congruent and incongruent version of conversatior has no 
differential effect on conversation memory. However, if probabil ty level 
of .08 is accepted then the F-ratio for congruent-incongruent \ ariation 
becomes significant. Ignoring humorous-nonhumorous version of 
conversation and mood variables, it is found in Table-Ill b that mean of 
the means for congruent version of conversation group of subjects is 
11.43 and mean of the means for incongruent version of conversation 
group of subjects is 12.65. Since there is perceptible difference between 
these two mean of the means, it is, therefore, concluded that co igruent 
version of conversation and incongnient version of conversation have 
differential effect on conversation memory. More specifically, it is found 
that conversation memory for congruent version of conversation is lower 
than conversation memoiy for incongruent version of conversation. In 
other words, incongruent version of conversation is better remembered 
than congruent version of conversation. 
The F-ratio for mood variation, as given in Table-IV, is 0.28 which 
is also insignificant at .05 level. The result reveals that subjects with 
elated mood, depressed mood and neutral mood do not differ with respect 
to conversafion memory i.e. all the three groups of subjects shovs same 
conversational memory perfomiance. Disregarding humoroiis-
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nonhumorous and congruent-incongruent variables, it is found in lable-
III c that mean of the means for the subjects with elated mood is 11.69, 
the mean of the means for the subjects with depressed mood is 12.18 and 
mean of the means for the subjects with neutral mood is 12.24. Since 
there is a negligible difference among the mean of the means foj these 
groups of subjects, it is, therefore, concluded that mood variation las no 
differential effect on conversation memory. More specifically, 
conversation memory performance was found more or less the same 
among elated, depressed and neutral subjects. In other words mood 
variation has no differential impact on conversation memory. 
The F-ratio for interaction between humorous-nonhumoroiis and 
congruent-incongruent version of conversation, as shown in Table-IV, is 
0.30 which is also insignificant. The result suggests that there is no 
interactional effect of humorous-nonhumorous and contruent-
incongruent versions of conversation on conversation memory This 
finding is depicted in Figurel.O. In this figure, the two values ol 
humorous-nonhumorous are shown on the horizontal axis. The data 
points represent means of the four conditions. Point 1 is the mean br the 
group with humorous-congnient version of conversation; Point 2 is the 
mean for the group with humorous-incongruent version of conversation; 
Point 3 is the mean for the group with nonhumorous-congruent ven ion ol 
conversation and Point 4 is the mean for the group with nonhum ^rous-
incongruent version of conversation. The line that connect point 1 and 3 
represents the mean conversation memory scores of congruent vers ion of 
conversation, half of which were humorous version and the othtr half 
were nonhumorous version of conversation. The line that connect points 
2 and 4 represents the mean conversation memory scores of incongruent 
version of conversation half of which were humorous version and the 
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remaining half were nonhumorous version of conversation. Since; these 
two lines do not intersect each other, it is concluded that there is no 
interactional effect of humorous-nonhumorous and congruent-
incongruent versions of conversation on conversation memory. Th; same 
conclusion may also be drawn by turning our attention to Table-V. 
Table - V: Showing mean scores on conversation memory obtained 
by humorous-congruent, humorous-incongruent, nonhumorous-
congruent and nonhumorous-incongruent groups of subjects. 
Conditions 
Humorous 
Nonhumorous 
Difference 
Congruent 
12.56 
10.30 
2.26 
Incongruent 
13.39 
11.90 
1.49 
Differenct 
0.83 
1.60 
In Table-V we find that the difference in mean convesation 
memory scores between humorous-congruent version and nonhumorous-
congruent version is 2.26 which is not greater enough than the difierence 
in mean conversation memory scores between humorous-incongruent 
version and nonhumorous-incongruent version of conversation (i.e 1.49) 
to make the interactional effect significant. The same conclusion :an be 
drawn when differences in the other direction are compared, i e. the 
difference in the mean conversation memory scores between humorous-
congruent and humorous-incongruent versions of conversation (i.e 0.83; 
ref. Table-V) is more or less similar to the difference in mean 
conversation memory scores between nonhumorous-congruent version 
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and nonhumorous incongruent version of conversation (i.e. ].')(); ref. 
Table-V). These results clearly indicate the non-existence of an 
interactional effect of humorous-nonhumorous and corgruent-
incongruent versions of conversation on conversation memory. 
F-ratio for interaction between humorous-nonhumorous ven ions of 
conversation and mood, as shown in Table-IV, is 0.20 which is also 
insignificant. Results show that there is no interactional ef ect of 
humorous-nonhumorous version of conversation and mood on 
conversation memory. In Figure 1.1, the two values of humorous-
nonhumorous (i.e. humorous version and nonhumorous versicn) are 
shown on the horizontal axis. The data points represent means of the six 
conditions: Point 1 is the mean for humorous-elated mood group, ^oint 2 
is for the humorous-depressed mood group. Point 3 is for the hun orous-
neutral mood group, Point 4 is for the nonhumorous-elated mood group. 
Point 5 is for the nonhumorous-depressed mood group and Point (> is for 
the nonhumorous-neutral mood group (see Table VI). 
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Table - VI: Showing mean scores on conversation memory obtained 
by humorous-elated mood group, humorous-depressed mood group, 
humorous-neutral mood group, nonhumorous-elated mood group, 
nonhumorous-depressed mood group and nonhumorous-neutral 
mood group. 
Conditions 
Humorous 
Nonhumorous 
Elated 
(E) 
12.60 
10.79 
Depressed 
(D) 
13.42 
10.95 
Neutral 
(N) 
12.91 
11.57 
The line that connects the point land 4 represents tht mean 
conversation memory scores of elated mood group half of which were 
given humorous version and the other half were given nonhumorous 
version of conversation. The line that connects points 2 and 5 represents 
mean conversation memory scores of depressed subjects half o'' them 
were given humorous version and the remaining half were given 
nonhumorous version of conversation. The line that connects points 3 and 
6 represents mean conversation memory scores of neutral subjects iialf of 
them were given humorous version and the remaining half were given 
nonhumorous version of conversation. Though F-ratio for interaction 
between humorous-nonhumorous and mood is statistically insign ficant 
(i.e.0.20) but Figure 1.1 clearly reveals an interaction between humorous-
nonhumorous and depressed-elated mood and between humcrous-
nonhumorous and depressed-neutral mood. However there is no 
interactional effect "between humorous-nonhumorous and elated-neutral 
mood as these lines do not cross each other rather they are parallel it is 
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concluded there is no interactional effect of humorous-nonhumc rous and 
elated-neutral mood on conversation memory. 
The interactional effects, as shown in Figure 1.1, between 
humorous-nonhumorous and depressed-elated and interaction between 
humorous-nonhumorous and depressed neutral are disordinal interaction. 
A disordinal interaction is said to exist when lines are not parallel and 
they do cross. 
The F-ratio for interaction between congruent-incongnient \ ersion 
of conversation and mood is 0.56 (ref. Table-IV) which is also 
insignificant. Results show that there is no interactional el feet of 
congruent-incongruent version of conversation and mood on conversation 
memory. In Figure 1.2, the two values of congruent-incongrutnt (i.e. 
congruent version and congruent version) are shown on the hoi izontal 
axis. The data points represent means of six conditions: Point 1 is the 
mean for the congruent-elated mood group; Point 2 is the mean for the 
congruent-depressed mood group; Point 3 is the mean for the congruent-
neutral mood group; Point 4 is the mean for the incongruent-elatec mood 
group; Point 5 is the mean for the incongruent-depressed mood gro ip and 
Point 6 is the mean for the incongruent-neutral mood group (see fable-
VII). 
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Table - VII: Showing mean scores on conversation memory obtained 
by congruent-elated mood group, congruent-depressed mood group, 
congruent-neutral mood group, incongruent-elated mood group, 
incongruent-depressed mood group, and incongruent-neutral mood 
group. 
Conditions 
Congruent 
Incongruent 
Elated 
(E) 
11.22 
12.15 
Depressed 
(D) 
11.07 
13.30 
Neutral 
(N) 
12.01 
12.47 
The line that connects the point 1 and 4 represents the mean 
conversation memory scores of elated mood group half of whic i were 
given congruent version and the other half were given incongruent 
version of conversation. The line that connects points 2 and 5 rep esents 
mean conversation memory scores of depressed mood group half of them 
were given congruent version and the remaining half were given 
incongruent version of conversation. The line that connects points 3 and 6 
represents mean conversation memory scores of neutral mood group half 
of them were given congruent version and the remaining half were given 
incongruent version of conversation. Though F-ratio for interaction 
between congruent-incongruent and mood is statistically insignificant 
(i.e. .56) but Figure 1.2 reveals an interaction between congruent-
incongruent and depressed-elated and congruent-incongruent and 
depressed-neutral mood. These interactions are also disordinal 
interaction. Moreover there is no interactional effect between congruent-
incongruent and elated-neutral mood. 
The F-ratio for the interactional effect among hunorous-
nonhumorous, congruent-incongruent version of conversation and mood 
is 1.39 which is also insignificant. To examine the nature of HXCXM 
interaction, we have considered congruent-incongruent and mood 
interaction separately for each value of humorous-nonhumorons (i.e. 
humorous and nonhumorous version of conversation as given in Table-
VIII). 
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Table - VIII: Showing Two-Way Table of mean for congruent-
incongruent and mood for each value of humorous-nonhumorous 
version of conversation. 
Conditions 
Congruent 
Incongruent 
Humorous 
Elated 
11.5 
13.7 
Depressed 
12.77 
14.07 
Neutral 
13.43 
12.4 
Nonhumorous 
Elated 
10.94 
10.64 
Depressed 
9.37 
12.54 
Neutral 
10.6 
12.54 
The graph for congruent and incongruent against mood for humorous 
version is shown in Figure 1.3 and the graph for congruent and 
incongruent against mood for nonhumorous version is shown in Figure 
1.4. As is evident from Figure 1.3 and 1.4, the congruent-incongruent X 
mood interaction for each value of humorous-nonhumorous versions is 
quite in the same direction and form. It may, therefore, be safely 
concluded that no interaction exists among HXCXM with respect to 
conversation memory. 
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The findings of the present research are given below: 
1. Humorous and nonhumorous informations have differential effect 
on conversation memory. More specifically, conversation memory 
for humorous version of conversation was found much superior 
than for nonhumorous version of conversation. 
2. Congruent and incongruent versions of conversations have 
differential effect on conversation memory. In other words, 
conversation memory for congruent version is lower than for 
incongruent version of conversation. 
3. Mood has no impact on conversation memory. More specifically, 
listener's mood be it elated, depressed or neutral has no diffneniial 
effect on conversation memory. 
4. No significant interactional effect was found between humorous-
nonhumorous and congruent-incongruent versions of conversation 
on conversation memory. 
5. No significant interactional effect was found between humorous-
nonhumorous and mood on conversation memory. 
6. No significant interactional effect was found between con^juent-
incongruent versions of conversation and mood on conversation 
memory. 
7. No significant interactional effect was found among humorous-
nonhumorous, congruent-incongruent versions of conversation and 
mood on conversation memory. 
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The first finding of the present research, i.e. conversation memory ibr 
humorous version of conversation was found much superior than tor 
nonhumorous version of conversation, is in consonance with the findings 
obtained by numerous researchers. For instance, Kaplan and Pascoe 
(1977), Johnson (1990), Schmidt (1994), Kher, Molstad and Donahue 
(1999), Berk (2000), Powers (2005), Bacay (2006), and Berk (2007) have 
consistently demonstrated that humorous information facilitates earning 
speed, solving problems and memory. Numerous explanations may be 
offered for the beneficial effect of humorous version of converse tion on 
conversation memory. First humorous information reduces anxiety, 
tension and stress (Berk, 1997, 1998c, 1999, 2000, and 2007) which in 
turn prepares a fertile ground for the enhancement of memory. St condly 
humor promotes an objectivity that buffers the negative response 
(Galloway and Cropley, 1999) and provides a sense of empowerment 
over the testing situations (Sherman, 1998; Thorson 1985; and \A'oolen, 
1996) that can improve subject's mental fiinctioning and performance. A 
bulk of research evidences, on the psychological benefits, thus. 
concentrate on three outcomes: first, anxiety reduction (Cann, Holt, and 
Calhoun 1999; DeSpelder and Srickland, 1983; Doris and FieiTnan. 1956; 
Dworkin and Efran, 1967; Liechty 1987; Nezu, Nezu and Blissett, 1988; 
Singer 1968; Yovetich, Dale, and Hudak 1990); second, tension 
reducfion (Brill 1940; Goodheart 1994; O'Connell 1960; Wooten 1996) 
and third is stress reduction (Bizi, Keinan, and Beit-Hallahmi, 1988; 
Dixon, 1976, 1980; Labott and Martin 1987; Lefcourt et al. 1995; 
Lefcourt and Martin 1986; Lefcourt and Thomas 1998; Martin ei al. 
1993; Martin and Lefcourt, 1983; Nezu et al. 1988; Prerost 1988; ^Vhite 
and Camarena, 1989; and Wooten 1996). Moreover, Berk (2000) and 
Berk et al. (2006) who carried out six year study, found that hun or is 
196 
effective in reducing anxiety and making it possible to perform best on 
examinations. 
The first finding of the present research may also be explained 
interms of improved immune system. It has been demonstrated by 
numerous researchers that laughter generates an increase in positive 
emofion (Backorowski and Owren, 2001) and produces self-ieported 
improvements in immune system functioning (Mahoney, Burroughs and 
Lippman, 2002). Importantly, the effect of laughter on the self-re oorts of 
immune system functioning is mediated by subjective experiences of 
positive emotion, especially for older adults (Mahoney et al. 2002). fhis 
suggests that positive emotions produced by the behavior of laughing 
may be important in predicting healthy outcomes for the immune system. 
Positive emotions mediate the effects of coping with humor and immune 
system funcfioning (Dillon, Minchoff, and Baker, 1985-1986). LcUghter 
(a behavior) is often associated with humor (a cognitive construct). 
Individual vaiy in the content to which they use humor to cop; with 
stressful situation. Those with greater tendencies to cope with (lumor 
report greater daily positive mood (Dillon et al., 1985-1986). 
Consequently, in response to stress, those with greater propensiiies to 
cope with humor show increases in levels of salivary immunoglobulin A 
(S-Ig A), a vital immune system protein, which is the body's first I me of 
defense against respiratory illnesses (Dillon et al., 1985-1986). 
Corroborating work in an experience-sampling study show that self-
reported positive emotions (vs. negative emotions) predict increases in S-
Ig levels, thereby enhancing immune functioning (Stone, Valdinarsdattir, 
Jandorf, Cox, and Neale, 1987). These findings indicate that persons who 
are able to regain and maintain positive emotional states when faced with 
a stressful life experience (e.g., via laughter, coping with humor, can 
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show improvements in immune function. In short humor i nproves 
immune system which in turn improves physical and mental heahh. It is 
an open secret that health increases the efficiency of cognitive activities 
including memory. The first finding of our research, i.e. humorous 
version of conversation is better remembered than nonhumorous version, 
provides strong empirical evidence to the contention that humor 
strengthens immune system which in turn strengthens physical and 
mental health leading to enhancement of memory. 
The first finding of our research also provides strong empirical 
evidence to the hypothesis proposed by McGhee (1983). Accordirg to his 
hypothesis humor produces physiological arousal. McGhee noted 
increased heart rate and respiration rate in response to humor and argued 
that these responses were indicative of activation of sympathetic nervous 
system. A number of researchers have demonstrated that physiological 
arousal enhances memory of the subject (Craik and Blankstein 1975; 
Ellis, Detterman, Runcie, MaCarver, and Craig, 1971; Maltzman, vantor, 
and Langdon, 1966; Walker and Taite, 1963; Bohannon, 1988; Brown 
andKulik, 1977; Christianson 1989; Pillemer, 1984). 
Another potential explanation for our first finding may be found in 
"differential rehearsal hypothesis". According to this hypothesis, sjbjects 
intentionally rehearse humorous material at the expense of nonhumorous 
material and this increased rehearsal is responsible for increased re; ention 
(Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968). 
Apart from "differential rehearsal hypothesis", "differential 
attention hypothesis" also received empirical support from our Imding 
under discussion. According to this hypothesis, humorous sentences 
receive more attention than nonhumorous sentences and this increased 
198 
attention is responsible for increased retention (Bandes, 1988; Bryant et 
al., 1979; Wandersee, 1982; Gorham and Christophel, 1990; Schmidt, 
1991; Bobek, 2002; Friedman, Halpen, and Salb, 1999; Mclaughlin, 
2001; Power, 2005). 
Our first finding may also be explained interms of ' surprise 
hypothesis" or retrieval strategies. This hypothesis asserts that subject 
may not expect to read humorous material as part of an experiment and 
subject may develop a bias toward retrieving humorous material 
(Schmidt, 1994). Thus, the first finding of our research jMovides 
empirical support to these hypotheses. 
A survey of literature reveals that the theoretical background of 
humor is varied and controversial (Levine, 1969; Mon-eall, 1987; 
Nahemow, MaCluskey-Fawcett, and McGhee, 1986). Hundeds of 
theories of humor were proposed by early philosophers and theorists 
(Liechty, 1987). Initially these theories were grouped into three 
categories namely incongruent, superiority and tension reduction 
(DeSpelder and Strickland, 1983; Lefcourt and Martin, 1986; Liechty, 
1987). However, later on the nomenclature of these three categories of 
theories were changed and were labled as cognitive-perceptual, social-
behavioral and psychoanalytical theories of humor (Davies, 1977; Levine, 
1969; Sullivan and Deane, 1988). Among these theories, psychoanalytical 
theory is considered as the best theory that provides best explanation for 
the use of humor to teach sensitive topics. This theory views hunor as a 
mechanism for releasing fears and constantly associated with difficult 
situations (Liechty, 1987). Humor is seen to enable release of internal 
tensions and to provide the needed mechanisms for coping with 
misfortunes. Moreover, humor is emotional chaos remembered in 
tranquility. The first finding of our research strongly suppots the 
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psychoanalytical theory of humor by demonstrating significantly higher 
conversation memory for humorous material than for nonhumoro is ones. 
This higher conversation memory for humorous material is due to the fact 
that humorous material reduced stress and anxiety as advocated by 
psychoanalytical theory. 
Somewhat recently a scientific discovery is reported in a reputed 
newspaper in which it has been reported that researchers at the Un!\ersity 
and Imperial College in London played a series of sounds to volunteers 
while measuring their brains response using a functional MRI scanner. 
Some of the sounds were positive such as laughter while otheis were 
unpleasant like screaming. They found that hearing laughter proc uced a 
greater response in the premotor cortical region of a listener's brain—an 
area which is activated when one smiles. It should be noted here that 
cortex also play important role in the storage of memories. This report not 
only demonstrates the existence of an actual physical mechanism which 
facilitates the spread of humor but implicitly suggests that this 
mechanism may also facilitate retention of humorous material (Tht Time 
of India, New Delhi, Monday, December 18, 2006, pp.14). Our first 
finding is consistent with this report. 
The second finding of our research i.e. incongruent version of 
conversation shows higher conversation memory than congruent version 
of conversation, is in line with the finding obtained by nuirerous 
researchers (Eysenck, 1979; Humphreys, 1976; Hunt and Eistein, 1981; 
Jacoby and Craik, 1979; Hunt, 1995; Hunt and McDaniel, 1993; Hunt and 
Smith, 1996; Rajaram, 1998; Smith and Hunt, 2000; Hunt, 2003; C eraci 
and Rajaram, 2004; Brandt, Gardiner, and Macrae, 2006; Park, /rndt, 
and Reder, 2006). This finding not only provides empirical support to 
numerous researchers just mentioned but also helps in resolving, the 
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controversy regarding the influence of congruent-incongruent information 
on memory. A number of researchers have also shown that inccngruent 
information is unHkely to be remembered (Cantor and Mischei, 1977; 
Cohen, 1981; Hamilton, 1979; Markus, 1977). Since more imj)ressive 
evidences are available to the effect that incongruent information \ s better 
remembered than congruent information, the finding of our research 
strongly strengthens further these evidences. 
The second finding of our research, however, apparently appears 
inconsistent with the finding obtained by Hunt and Elliott (1980) who 
found that meaningfulness was directly related to recall but ortho^!,raphic 
distinctiveness (incongruent) has no reliable effect on recall. Hunt and 
Elliott (1980), however, found higher recognition memory for 
orthographic distinctiveness than for common words. This finding clearly 
demonstrated that distinctiveness or incongruency influences memory 
depending on the type of memory measures. In this light it is log cal to 
argue that our finding under discussion is not conflicfing wilh the 
findings obtained by Hunt and Elliott (1980). 
The second finding of the present research, i.e. conversation 
memory is higher for incongruent version of conversation thai for 
congruent version of conversation, may also be explained in atleast two 
ways. As suggested by Fiske (1980) incongruent information receives 
more attention and more weight. This mechanism may be responsib e for 
better conversation memory when incongruent information is ised. 
Similarly, Crocker, Hannah, and Weber (1983) argued that incongruent 
items should be more informative than congruent items when the^ are 
attributed to dispositional causes. Consequently, incongruent, 
dispositionally-attributed items may receive more attention and be bitter 
recalled (Taylor and Fiske, 1978). 
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Another potential explanation of our finding under discussion may 
be found in the concept of pathways or links. According to Hastie and 
Kumar (1979) incongruent behaviors spend more time in working 
memory because they must be explained and integrated, \\hile in 
working memory, incongruent items are linked to other items also present 
in working memory. Consequently, incongruent items are linked o more 
other items than congruent items. Since the probability of retrie zing an 
item depends on the number of pathways or links to tha item, 
incongruent items are particularly likely to be found in a search of 
memory. The second finding of our research provides empirical e> idence 
to this suggestion made by Hastie and Kumar (1979). 
Still another possible explanation of the finding under discussion 
may be that incongruent items might have served as discriminati\ e cues 
which in turn helped in enhancing memory (Hirshman and Jackson. 
1997). 
Distinctive processing may also provide explanation for the second 
finding of the present research. Distinctive processing has been defiled as 
unique processing of an item at encoding that enhances discriminability 
of that item at retrieval (Jacoby and Craik, 1979; Lockhart, Craik, and 
Jacoby, 1976). Continuing research along this line has refined the 
definition of distinctive processing to the processing of differences 
among elements that are similar on some dimension, a definition that 
explicitly states the relativity of distinctive processing (Hunt and 
McDaniel, 1993). Thus distinctive processing is not the absolute 
processing of differences but is processing that marks somethirg as 
different from other things that are related on some dimension. Such 
processing then facilitates accuracy because the combined processing of 
similarity and difference is highly diagnostic of a particular item (1 lunt, 
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2003). These ideas may be applied to the encoding and retrieval piocesses 
of memory. The finding under discussion provides empirical su})port to 
these ideas. 
Perhaps the best explanation of the second finding comes fiom the 
isolation or von Restorff effect (1933). It refers to the finding that the 
people tend to have very good memory for unusual or incongrueiit item. 
In other words the isolation effect refers to the finding that peop e have 
superior memory for an item when it is different from the other items in 
the list than when it is not (Geraci and Rajaram, 2004). Our finding is in 
total agreement with this contention. 
It is highly logical to describe briefly the "distinctive-t!uenc> 
framework" proposed by Rajaram (1996). According to her framework 
manipulations that encourage distinctive or elaborate processing would to 
the elicitation of "remember" responses. On the other hand, items that 
were processed more on the basis of fluency would yield a prepordence 
of "know" responses. This framework received empirical support froin 
Wickham, Morris, and Fritz (2000) and from the studies carried out by 
Brandt, Macrae, Schloerscheidt and Milne (2003) and Brandt, Gardiner, 
and Macrae (2006). Our second finding also provided undisputed si ppott 
to Rajaram's framework by showing that incongruent (or distinctive) 
items are better remembered as compared to congruent (or non-
distinctive) items. 
Though Berk (2007) was mainly interested in the influence of 
humor on memory but he also developed an interesting incongruent 
formula which according to him, is the foundation of most all typ^s of 
jokes. Accordingly it is the juxtaposition of the "expected" with the 
unexpected when we expect everything to be serious, the unexpected 
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twist not only creates humor but also incojagruity which in turn leads to 
better recall of humorous or incongruent information. Our second 
findings totally agree with this contention. 
The third finding of the present research, i.e. different shades of 
mood (elated, depressed and neutral) have no differential effect on 
conversation memory, is not in the expected direction. However, many 
explanations may be offered. First, it may be recalled that different 
shades of mood were induced by Modified Velten Mood Induction 
Technique (MVMIT). Though this technique is widely ueed by 
researchers for inducing mood, the technique is not free from cr ticism. 
For instance, Frost, Graf, and Becker (1979) failed to support the 
hypothesis that depressed mood are induced by reading self-devaluative 
statement. They further noted that reading self-devaluative statements did 
not induce more depressed mood among subject than subject in the neural 
condition. If it is so, it is logical to assume that reading uplifting mood 
statements may not induce as strong elated mood as desired ly the 
experimenter. Thus non-existence of differential effect of different shades 
of mood on conversation memory may be attributed to this contention. 
This contention was further strengthened by Riskind, Rholes, and loggers 
(1982) who failed to find a correlation between changes produced w the 
VMIP in mood ratings and memory latencies. This finding sugges s that 
mood cannot account for the memory results and that VMIP state Qients 
may have a direct cognitive priming effect on the avaibability of 
memories (Teasdale and Fogarty, 1979). 
Second, there are conflicdng results regarding the effect of aiousal 
on memory. Craik and Blankstein (1975), Pettigrew (1978), and Zajonc 
(1980), for instance, have shown facilitative effect of arousal on memory 
whereas other investigators, on the other hand, have argued that 
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consolidation and retrieval may depend not so much on arousal as on the 
importance of the consequences for subsequent interaction (Brc wn and 
Kulik, 1977; MacWhinney, Keenan and Reinke, (1982). MacWh nney et 
al. (1982) made it crystal clear that arousal, as measured by 
Electrodermal response (EDR), is not a good predictor of long term 
memory for natural conversation. They found that though EDR is i useful 
indicator of people's immediate reaction to conversation, it does not 
appear to be a major determinant of the processing and storage of 
sentences for long tenn retention. They admitted that arousal jnay be 
important in the initiation of rich memories for perceptual deiail but 
retention of these memories depends on their consequences for 
subsequent interactions. Since mood whether elated or depressed 
increases arousal level, the third finding of our research may be exj^ lained 
interms of interactional content of the sentences used in conveisation. 
Our finding is also in agreement with the finding obtained by Clark. 
Milberg and Ross (1983) who demonstrated that enhanced arousal is nol 
necessary for positive mood to cue positive material from memory. 
Third, absence of differential effect of different shades of mood on 
memory indirectly provides empirical support to those studies which 
failed to demonstrates the existence of mood congruent memory (Eiower, 
Gilligan, and Monteiro, 1981; Bower and Mayer, 1985; Bower, Mouteiro, 
and Gilligan, 1978; Brown and Taylor, 1986; Clark, Teasdale, Broadbent, 
and Martin, 1983; Coleman, 1975; Gerrig and Bower, 1982; Gotlib and 
McCann, 1984; Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp, 1978; Mecklenbiauker 
and Hager, 1984; Siegel, Johnson, and Sarason, 1979; and Parroit and 
Sabini 1990). This empirical evidence becomes relevant as stimulus 
material used in the present research may be considered as hixing 
positive (humorous) and negative (nonhumorous—totally dry discussion) 
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valence. Moreover, the third finding of our research is totally in 
agreement with the finding obtained by Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan 
(1978) and Gotlib and McCann (1984) who also found no effect 3 f mood 
on recall. 
Fourth, a closely related phenomenon of mood congruence is mood 
dependent memory. The mood dependent memory was first of all 
demonstrated by Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan in 1978, ir which 
subjects showed better recall when the mood at retrieval matches vvith the 
mood at encoding. However after few replications of these tmdings, 
numerous researchers failed to find mood dependent memory (Bovver and 
Mayer, 1985a, 1989). These inconsistencies in the findings forcec Bower 
(1985) to generate a hypothesis known as "causal belongirgness''. 
According to this hypothesis what is needed for mood dependent retrieval 
to occur is for mood related structures (schemas) to be created at ttie time 
of presentation in storage. If such mood related structures are not treated, 
mood dependent retrieval does not occur. The third finding of our 
research may be explained interms of absence of mood related structures. 
As pointed by Eich, Macaulay and Ryan (1994) the more one relies on 
external resources rather than on internal resources, the more liK;ely is 
one's memory for the events to be mood independent. Thus il' two 
individuals—one happy, the other sad—are shown, say, a 'rose" and after 
some retention interval if these individuals are asked to identi "y and 
describe what they had seen before retenfion interval, both individuals are 
apt to say much the same thing and to encode the 'rose' event in mi ch the 
same fashion. In other words, a 'rose' is a 'rose' regardless of whether it 
is seen with through a happy or sad eye. Our third finding pr()^ides 
empirical support to this "do-it-yourself principle" proposed by liich, 
Macaulay and Ryan (1994). Thus the subjects of our study who were 
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under positive, negative and neutral moods might have reUed heivily on 
external resources rather than internal resources, hence they did noi differ 
with respect to their memory performance. 
Fifth, somewhat recently Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) 
published a research paper entitled "positive emotions broaden the scope 
of attention and thought-action repertoires" in which they prc)vided 
empirical support to "broaden-and-build theory" of emotions. The 
broaden-and-build theory was originally proposed by Fredrickson (199K, 
2001). The 'broaden-and-build theory' of positive emotion is btsed on 
two hypotheses—broaden hypothesis and narrow hypothesis. Broaden 
hypothesis states that positive emotions broaden the scope of attention, 
cognition and action, widening the array of percepts, thoughts and ictions 
presently in mind whereas narrow hypothesis assert that nt^gative 
emotions have opposite effects on attention, cognition and action, narrow 
the array of percepts and thoughts. Though these hypotheses have 
received empirical support from the studies carried out by Fredr ckson 
and Branigan (2005), the third finding of our present researci. i.e. 
positive and negative mood have no differential effect on conversation 
memory, does not provide any support to these two hypothesis gen^ r^ated 
from 'broaden-and-build theory' of positive emotion, rather our finding 
provides empirical support to 'opponent-process theory of eirotion 
proposed by Solomon (1980). According to this theory when an 
environmental stimulus (e.g., a stressor) elicits an initial emoiional 
reaction (e.g., distress), this emotion in turn elicits an opponent emotion 
(e.g., happiness or well being). The theory further advocates that a any 
given fime, a person's emotional state is the sum of the initial and 
opponent emofion. If a stressfiil event occurs, the initial negitive 
emofional response will be dominant while the stressor lasts. Aftei the 
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stressful event ends, however the opponent positive emoton will 
dominate, and a person will be in a better mood than usual. This 
mechanism, perhaps, is responsible for the absence of differential effect 
of positive and negative mood on conversation memory. 
Sixth plausible explanation of the third finding of our research lies 
in the phenomenon widely known as inhibition of emotional infonnation. 
It has been demonstrated by Goeleven, DeRaedt and Koster (200 0 that as 
compared with a neutral mood, negative mood state did not lead to 
inhibitory dysfunction of emotional information whereas positi /e mood 
results in a reduction or absence of inhibitory functioning as compared 
with a neutral mood condition. They further found that positive mood is 
associated with increased distractibility, causing poor performance on 
inhibition depend processes suggest deductive reasoning (Oaksf )rd et al. 
1996) and might cause intrusions and memory lapses (Hasher et al. 
2007). Like Joormann (2004) and Goeleven et al. (2006a), Goelcv'en et al. 
(2007) concluded that reduced inhibition of affective (or negative) 
information is not linked with negative mood state itself but seems to be 
due to a rather stable cognitive vulnerability factor of depression. Thus 
our third finding is in agreement with the above mentioned findirgs. 
Finally, our third finding provides empirical support to both 
associative network theory in particular and to Resource Allocation 
Model (Ellis and Ashbrook, 1987) in general. So far as associative 
network theory is concerned, it predicts that mood dependent aid mood 
congruent effects should be symmetrical—that is, the shifting fi-om 
happiness to sadness should have the same effect as shifting from sadness 
to happiness; and the effects of sadness on negative material stiould be 
the same as the effects of happiness on positive material. So far as 
resource allocation model is concerned, it asserts that both positive and 
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negative moods alike should induce extra-task processing, -educe 
attentional capacity, and impair performance on effortful cognitive tasks. 
In other words this model predicts that positive and negative noods 
should have same effect on performance. Here it is important to note that 
our finding, i.e. positive and negative moods have same effect on 
conversation memory, may be explained by both associative network 
theory and resource allocation model. 
The first interactional effect of humorous-nonhumorou; and 
congruent-incongruent versions of conversation on conversation m iraory 
is insignificant. This insignificant interactional effect suggests that 
conversation memory of humorous and nonhumorous versicns is 
independent of congruent and incongruent versions of conversation. The 
finding reveals that though humorous-nonhumorous and congruent-
incongruent versions of conversation influence conversation m<Mnory 
when considered separately but when both variables are combint'd, its 
interaction becomes insignificant. 
The remaining three interactional effects, i.e. interaction beiween 
humorous-nonhumorous version of conversation and mood; inter iction 
between congruent-incongruent versions of conversation and mood; and 
interaction among humorous-nonhumorous, congruent-incongruent 
versions of conversation and mood on conversation memoty, are 
insignificant. These insignificant interactional effects may ako be 
explained in the same way as we have explained the first insignificant 
interactional effect. 
The overall findings of the present research not only open nev area 
of research in memory but also highlight a new mechanism under-King 
interpersonal attraction, inteipersonal relationship and impression 
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formation. Moreover, the findings of present research may also be appHed 
in educational setting like preparing syllabi and teaching methods 
The fact that humorous and incongruent versions of conv ersation 
was better recalled reveals that subjects encoded humorous and 
incongruent information more effectively which, in turn, helped n better 
memory performance. Now a question arises why humorous and 
incongruent information was encoded more effortfully and effectively 
and was better recalled? From social point of view it may suggested that 
subjects found more attraction and interest in humorous and incongruent 
versions of conversation hence they paid more attention to humojous and 
incongruent versions of conversation. This mechanism migal have 
contributed to higher conversation memory for these two types of 
versions of conversation. It is an open secret that if we like con\ ersation 
of a person than we not only like the person but also developed positive 
impression about that person. The findings of our research lead us lo 
emphasize that in order to develop interpersonal attraction or good 
intei-personal relationship, we must use humorous statement m our 
conversation with others. It is interesting to note that incongruit> usually 
itself creates humorous context. It is very common experience that 
humorous statements attract us toward the person who has uttered them 
and we developed a strong urge to meet that person again and again. Thus 
frequent meeting with the person may sow the seed for the development 
of inteipersonal attraction and interpersonal relationship. Tuis the 
findings of our study may be considered to contribute not only in the area 
of experimental psychology but also to the area of social ps>chology 
particularly area of interpersonal attraction and impression format on. 
We firmly believe that findings of our investigation, if applied in 
educational settings, would be highly beneficial not only for academic 
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performance of the students but would also be helpful in the dev ilopment 
of a rapport between teachers and taught. Early studies hive also 
demonstrated this fact. Twenty-six studies identified humor as o le of the 
quality of effective teachers (Ford, 1978). Moreover Hildebramd (1973) 
found that those faculty members who possess dynamism/emhusiasm 
receive high rating among students. Similarly, Highet (1958) identified 
humor as one of the most important qualities of a good teacher. He saw 
the true purpose of humor to be the establishment of a link between 
students and teachers through enjoyment. It has been found thai humor 
helps students to be attentive, presents a true picture of subjects and 
establishes rapport in a classroom setting and produces a relaxed, jX)sitive 
atmosphere conducive to better learning; promotes increased 
comprehension and retention; aiding cognitive development; n anages 
undesirable behavior; build self confidence; and enhances the I \es of 
both teachers and taught (Desberg, Henschel, Marshall, and McGhee, 
1981; Hunsaker, 1988; Hyman, 1974; MacAdam, 1985; Powdl and 
Andresen, 1985; Watson and Emerson, 1988; Ziv, 1988; and Schmidt, 
1994). Powers (2005) has cited a very interesting as well as important 
quote of Baughman (1979). The quote is "one of the greatest sins in 
teaching is to be boring". Powers (2005) has advocated that effective use 
of humor can help teacher engage students and establish rappon with 
them, maintain their attention, create an open classroom atmospher*.', and 
even ease distress during examinations. 
It has been further advocated that if teachers want students to earn, 
then they should consider making learning more palatable, even 
enjoyable. This contention not only supports the use of humor in the 
classroom, but humor should be incoiporated across all academic levels 
(White, 2001; Torok, et al., 2004; and Bacay, 2006). The same poim is 
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emphasized by learner-centered psychological principles of the Arierican 
Psychological Association (2006). 
The above findings vindicate our contention that findings of our 
research, if implemented, would contribute a lot in raising the academic 
standard and academic excellence in educational settings. 
Though we have attempted to provide best possible and most 
satisfactory explanations of our findings but an element of doubt still 
haunts our mind with regard to the effect of mood on conversation 
memory. In fact we were expecting different magnitude of conversation 
memory under different shades of mood. The third findings of our 
research did not fulfill our expectation rather we found no dif erential 
effect of elated, depressed, and neutral mood on conversation nemory. 
As mentioned somewhere else Modified Velten Mood Induction 
Technique (MVMIT) might have not induced different shades of nood of 
desired intensity resulting into absence of any differential effect oi'mood 
on conversation memory. It is therefore suggested that in futurt studies 
on mood and memory, mood should be induced not only by MWIfl but 
also by other effective and well tested technique like music. If mood is 
induced by a combination of mood induction techniques it is pos^ble that 
we can obtain differential effect of different shades of mood on memory. 
Thus further research is required in this direction so that ambiguity 
regarding the role of mood in memory may be resolved. 
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Sfi&fi^nuii/i/u/ 
Memory issues are extremely important to communication inquiry. 
Conversational interaction requires participants to utilize their memory for a 
great variety of tasks. Everyday people meet, converse with each o her, and 
depart with memories of their interactions. These memories affe:t future 
interactions, feelings about others, and even judgment of self and others. 
Stafford and Daly (1984) highlighted the demands made upon 
memory in conversation: "A critical requirement for successfully completing 
any interaction is a functioning memory that permits people (1) generate 
relevant topic from the store of memories they have from previous 
interactions with others involved in the current exchange; (2) access and use 
diverse psychological schemes that hold and integrate both gereral and 
specific topical information; (3) recall general rules of social interaction and 
mesh them with the particular conversation; (4) adjust to new messages that 
arise as the conversation progress within the frame of remembered materials; 
(5) devise expectancies and trajectories for likely direct ons the 
conversations may take; and (6) Store in some suitable fashion, impressions 
and memories of the conversation for future use". 
It has been observed that sentences spoken in natural conversation 
convey to fundamentally different type of information: proj)ositional 
information and pragmatic information. Propositional information is 
characterized as information about the objects and events referred to by the 
sentence. Pragmatic information is defined as information about the contents 
of the sentence in the social interaction, including information about the 
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speaker and his intentions, beliefs and his relations with the speaker. 
Sentences that convey a lot of pragmatic information referring th<j speaker-
listener interaction are said to be rich in interactional content. Ii has been 
found that sentences with high interactional content were remembered much 
better than sentences with low interactional content (Keenan, Mc Whinney, 
andMayhew 1977). 
Since interactions must be capable of storing and retrieving a great 
deal of information from memory in order to engage in communication, 
theories of interaction must be sensitive to the capabilities and limitations of 
memory. An exemplar is Capella and Folgar (1981) account of 
inconsistencies in attitudes and behaviours which is based on the distinction 
between semantic and episodic memory. Cognitive theories of 
communication appear promising (Planalp and Hewes, 1982) but will 
require careful consideration of the cognitive capacities of human beings, 
including their ability to retrieve information from memory to guide their 
own behaviors and interpret the behavior of conversational partners. Planalp 
and Hewes (1982) argued that retrieval issues have for reading implications 
for the communication scholars. 
Moreover, an adequate conception of memory is also ciiiical for 
communication research, which frequently employs verbal reports as a form 
of data. Limitations of subject's ability to remember information bear 
directly on the veracity of verbal reports. Self report data is quite ccmmon in 
our literature. For example we ask subjects to reflect on their rela ionships, 
recall their viewing habits, remember critical incidents, or rate ht)w likely 
they are to use various compliance gaining strategies. De:;pite the 
importance of the verbal report data to communication inquiry ve know 
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little about human information retrieval capacities or the accessibility of 
particular kinds of information. 
Conversation Memory- The information we acquire about people or 
environment is often conveyed in informal conversations. A person may tell 
us about someone he met or we may listen to people exchanging anecdotes 
about mutual acquaintance; later we may be called to convey our own 
impression of the individual who was described. We presumably d(> this on 
the basis of cognitive representation we had formed of the person while 
listening to the conversation. So conversation memory may be defined as 
"The ability of an individual to correctly recall or recognise the cor tents of 
the conversation either verbatim or semantic". 
Stafford and Daly (1984) investigated the conversational memory of 
the participants in conversation. They used free recall and reported that only 
10% of all ideas units in the conversation were recalled by participants (The 
best subject only 40%), prompting the conclusion that people abilities to 
recall something as complex as conversations are limited. 
However other researches obtained results showing higher recall of 
conversation than Stafford and Daly's results. MacWhinney, Keenan and 
Reinke (1982), using both participants and observers as subjects, reported 
that recognition memory ranged from 71%o to 82%. Kintsch and Bates 
(1977) indicated that students were able to recognise a considerable amount 
of information from a lecture.even after 5 days. Benoit and Benoit (1986) 
employing a recognition test reported that conversation interactants \vere 
able to remember over 90%o of specific verbal communicative behi\'ior. 
These studies demonstrated that a considerable amount of conversai ional 
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information is stored in memory and subjects are able to retrieve it 
accurately. 
The obvious difference between these studies that carried out by 
Stafford and Daly (1984) and that of other studies is that Stafford and Daly 
used a form of recall (free recall), whereas other researchers used 
recognition test and hence reported a great amount of retention of 
conversation. Recognition tests are generally accepted to be more sensitive 
than recall, as Bahrick (1964) notes "It has been found in most instances that 
recognition performance is superior to recall performance of the same target 
items," The free recall procedure employed by Stafford and Daly (1984) 
instructed the subjects at the end of their conversation "to write dcwn (or 
orally report) everything that he or she could remember abcut the 
conversation. Stafford and Daly argued recognition tests are less useful 
because memory structures are not isomorphic with the form of these tests. 
They suggested that free recall procedures "more clearly tap mechanisms 
that operate during everyday Conversation". Because interactant^ must 
access information quickly by drawing "freely from his or her store of 
memories". 
Irrespective of the differences in the findings obtained by different 
researches, the importance of conversation memory can net be 
underestimated. In fact conversation memory has for reaching implications 
in the social network. Some of the major implications and significance of 
conversation memory may be summarized as follows: 
1. Conversation memory for various aspects of conversation is an 
important component of social interaction. Impressionii are 
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often formed and social judgement made on the basis of what is 
remembered from verbal interactions. 
2. Conversation memory may play a crucial role n social 
bonding, exchanging and concurring on reactions and 
prospective probably makes an interaction more enjo}abIe and 
a partner more likeable. 
3. The descriptive studies of conversation memory (Edward & 
Middleton, 1986a, b; Tenny, 1986) support the impoitance of 
personal reactions; exchange of personal information, teach 
others about what the person is: What one likes, dislikes, cares 
about etc. 
4. The purpose of conversation memory is to search for meaning 
to learn about others and explain ourselves; and to build and 
maintain social bonds. 
Verbal communication is a central and ubiquitous features of social 
interaction, and researcher have paid increasing attention to the social 
psychology of language in recent years (e.g. Clark, 1985; Higgins 1981; 
Kraut and Higgins, 1984). 
A consideration of language is important because, as Kraat and 
Higgins (1984) have suggested, verbal communication represents a rich 
intersection of social and cognitive processes. The social cognitions of 
speakers and listeners play a crucial role in many different aspects of 
language use. For example, the successful use of referential expression 
depends on social knowledge that is shared by the interlocutors (Clark and 
Carlson, 1982; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Krauss, Vivekananthan and 
Weinheimer, 1968). Moreover, social cognition also plays an important role 
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in the interpersonal aspects of language use. Speaker often talks c ifferently 
as a function of various aspects of the social situations (Blom and Gumperz, 
1972; Giles & St. Clair, 1979) and certain characteristics of the listeners 
such as relative status (Cansler and Stiles, 1981) and age (DeFaulo and 
Coleman, 1986). Thus various features of language use may nflect the 
speaker's view of his or her relationship with the hsteners and situation they 
are in. 
To address the question of what is remembered from a conversation, it 
is first necessary to consider what is potentially memorable from a 
conversation. In other words, it is necessary to first delimit some of the 
dimensions of language use. One important distinction is often made 
between the surface structure of a sentence (i.e. the exact wording) and the 
underlying meaning or propositional content. When people talk, they are 
trying to do the things with their words (e.g., requesting, in brming, 
promising etc) that is, they are performing what are commonly referi ed to as 
speech acts. Thus, speech acts can be regarded as an important dime ision of 
language. 
An important point about speech acts is that, depending on the 
context, the same speech act (e.g., to request x) can be performtid with 
different syntactic forms (e.g. declarative - "I would like x"; imperative -
"Give me x") and with utterances having different propositional content 
(e.g. "I need x," "I would like x"etc). 
Hence, Grice's (1975) theory suggests that the ability of speakers to 
mean more than they say (i.e. convey non literal meaning) depe ids on 
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shared knowledge regarding a set of maxims for how conversation should 
proceed. 
It has been suggested that there are a numbers of dimensions of 
language (Brown and Levinson, 1978; Clark and Shunk, 1980; Er\in-Tripp, 
1976; Lakoff, 1973). Among these dimensions, assertiveness, politeness, 
request, humorous, congruent and incongruent may be regarded as social 
dimension of language. 
Much of early work on memory for verbal material has suggested that 
memory for the surface structure of sentences is poor relative to memory for 
the underlying content (Jarvella, 1971; Sachs, 1967, 1974). In other words, 
there is a strong tendency for individuals to remember what was said 
(Prepositional Content) but not how it was said. Later research has suggested 
a number of exceptions to this general finding. For example, memory for 
wording of remarks can be quite good if subjects are forced to attend to this 
dimension (Graesser and Mandler, 1975) or if the remarks (e.g. jokes or 
insults) have interactional value (Bates, Kintsch, Fletcher and Giuliani, 
1980; Bates, Masling and Kintsch, 1978; Keenan MacWhinney and 
Mayhew, 1977). 
There is substantial body of evidence suggesting the existence of 
systematic biases in memory for the wording of remarks (Bock ar d Bower, 
1974; Brewer and Hay, 1984; Wertsch, 1975). For example, Brewe • and Hay 
(1984) had subjects read a text that had been written in one of five different 
styles (e.g. academic, business etc) subjects were later asked to recall the 
text. One of the major findings was that subjects did not recall thi- material 
verbatim but did produce items that were consistent with the st> le of the 
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presented text. Brewer and Hay interpreted this as evicence for 
reconstructive processes. This, study along with others (e.g. Wertsch 1975) 
demonstrated the importance of Contextual factors in memory for surface 
structure. Consistent with a suggestion made by Neisser (1967), this work 
suggests that memory for verbal material is a synthesis of the actuil trace of 
the verbalization and more general information as well. 
As stated earlier there are a numbers of dimensions of language. More 
specifically verbal information may be expressed using different version of 
the language. These versions may be categorized as assertivt version, 
request version, humorous versions and congruent-incongrueni version. 
There are considerable researches which have demonstrated the effect of 
assertive and request version of conversation on conversation memory. 
Holtgrave, SruU & Socall (1989) carried out three experiments, td examine 
the effect of information about a speaker's status on memory for 
assertiveness of his or her remarks. The findings of their stucy clearly 
demonstrated that information does affect conversation memor/ for the 
assertiveness of his or her remarks, i.e. under certain conditions the remark 
of the high status speaker were remembered as more assertive than the same 
remarks uttered by low status speaker. Subject in the high status speaker 
condition recalled both the assertive and non-assertive remarks as more 
assertive than did subjects in equal status condition. These investigators also 
found that subjects recalled assertive version of remarks more ihan non-
assertive version of remarks. Though these findings provided evidence for 
the existence of relation between one's speech form (assertiveness) and 
interpersonal variable (speaker^s status), the result cannot be laken for 
granted as these investigators have ignored two important variables i.e. 
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listener's (subjects) status and listener's emotional mood. Thus it h possible 
that if the listener himself has high status, he might have not remembered the 
remarks of high status speakers as more assertive. In othtr words 
conversation between high status speaker and a low status addressee' is heard 
by a person who also occupies high status, his conversation memc'ry might 
have been affected in different way i.e. he might have not recalled, the 
assertive and non-assertive remarks as more assertive since social c jgnitions 
of both speakers and listener play a crucial role in the memorization of 
conversational remarks. Hence, Ahmad (1997) studied conversation memory 
as a function of listener's emotional mood, status, version of conversation 
and speaker status. The main finding of our concern was that emotional state 
of the listener had differential effect on conversation memory. He found that 
depressed subjects have better conversation memory than elated subjects. 
However, Schmidt (1994) found that humorous sentences aie better 
remembered than nonhumorous sentences. These conflicting findings 
obtained by Ahmad (1997) and Schmidt (1994) infact motivated thi present 
author to undertake this investigation. 
There is substantial body of evidence to the effect that humorous 
stimulus material influence memory to a great extent. Hence con>'ersation 
memory is not likely to remain unaffected by humorous stimulus material. 
Thus, it has been found by numerous researchers that humorous 
material is retrieved in greater amount than nonhumorous material. For 
instance Kintsch and Bates (1977), Duncan, Nelson and Frontzak (1984), 
Gelb and Zinkhan (1989) and Schmidt (1994), have reported positive effect 
of humor on memory. However, there are some studies which ha\e found 
just opposite results. For instance, Kaplan and Pascoe (1977) and 2illmann 
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et al. (1980) have found negative effect of humour on memory. The findings 
of these investigators, though conflicting, make it crystal clear that 
humorous material has an effect on memory. It is therefore, logically 
assumed that conversation memory is also likely to be affected by iiumorous 
version of conversation. It is one of the objectives of the present 
investigation. More specifically, the present study is designed to explore 
how humorous version of conversation affects conversation memory. 
Another consideration that motivated the present researcher to 
undertake this study is substantial body of evidence showing significant 
impact of incongruity not only on learning and memory but also on the 
formulation of impressions about other persons which is turn affect the 
development of interpersonal relationship. Since conversation and retention 
of conversation also affects interpersonal relationship, it becomes highly 
significant to investigate the effect of incongruity on conversation memory. 
Hastie and Kumar (1979) published their classic paper in which they 
demonstrated that expectancy-incongruent items of information arc recalled 
with higher probability than expectancy-congruent items. Hastie (1980) 
introduced an associative network model to account for these findings. This 
model was further developed and enormous researches were carried out to 
test the model (Srull, 1981; and Srull 8c Wyer, 1980). This model provided 
an elegantly simple account of why incongruent items are better recalled. 
The model has remarkably specified about underlying proctsses. In 
particular, the model specified effects that occur during information 
encoding, it detailed the consequences of those effects for how iniormation 
is represented in memory and it described the process by which sto) ed items 
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are retrieved from memory. The model also makes very specific statements 
about the cognitive processes that underlie social information proct ssing. 
However, Crocker and Vitkus (1983) have observed that 
impressions of people are resistant to change. Information that contradicts an 
initial impression of a person has relatively little impact on impression 
(Schneider, Hastrof, and Ellsworth, 1979). At the same time, research on 
memory for social information indicates that information that contradicts an 
impression of another person is particularly likely to be retailed i.e. 
information that violates our impressions of another is more lively to be 
recalled than information that confirms an impression. 
Prior theorists have suggested two basic types of distinctiveness 
effects: those due to primary distinctiveness and those due to secondary 
distinctiveness (Schmidt, 1991). Primary distinctiveness effects occur when 
the properties of an item deviate from the properties of other items m a given 
study list. Such distinctiveness effects have been demonstrated b\ isolating 
physical features, such as font size or color of an item, from other items in a 
list (e.g., Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 2003) or by 
isolating an item from other items in a list via membership in a semantic 
category (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Geraci & Rajaram, 2004; Hunt & 
Lamb, 2001; Schmidt, 1985; von Restorff, 1933). In these cases, the 
isolating feature was contrasted with other homogeneous featuies in the 
experimental context. Secondary distinctiveness, on the other hard, occurs 
when the properties of an item deviate from the properties of items in one's 
semantic memory, or long-term store. Thus, this type of distinctiveness 
effect occurs when deviance can be defined in terms of dissimila-ity of an 
inherent characteristic of an item relative to the characteristics of i class of 
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items or a particular study list. An example of this type of distinctiveness 
effect is the memory advantage of orthographically uncommon/ext:eptional 
words over regular words (Hirshman & Jackson, 1997; Hunt & Ellictl, 1980; 
Rajaram, 1998). Given this characterization of distinctiveness effects, font 
fan effects may be thought of as an instance of primary distinctiveness. 
One central question in the literature on distinctiveness effects is the 
extent to which the memory advantage for distinctive items deri\es from 
encoding-based processes (e.g., salience or enhanced attention; Fabiani & 
Donchin, 1995) or retrieval-based processes (e.g., item-specific processing 
used to access details of an encoding episode; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). 
Whereas the literature on distinctiveness effects in recall has generally 
suggested that retrieval processes must play at least some role (Schmidt, 
1991), the literature on distinctiveness effects in recognition memory has 
been less clear on the mechanisms involved. 
Reder et al. (2002) attributed fan effects, and by association, font 
distinctiveness effects, to retrieval-based processes. Hunt and his col leagues 
(Dunlosky, Hunt, & Clark, 2000; Hunt, 2003; Hunt & Lamb, 2001; Hunt & 
McDaniel, 1993; Hunt & Smith, 1996; Smith & Hunt, 200C) have 
consistently argued that distinctiveness functions to separate items in 
memory from one another at retrieval. Further, Hunt (2003) has recently 
argued that distinctiveness can play a role both to enhance recollection of 
studied items as well as to reject familiar, unstudied items. Rajaram (1998) 
argued that distinctiveness is critical to the experience of recollection 
phenomenology, whereby items that contain perceptually or conceptually 
distinctive features give rise to the experience of recollection. Thus, these 
three perspectives would all argue that font fan effects are a product of 
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retrieval-based processes. On the other hand, Kishiyama and Yonelinas 
(2003) have suggested that distinctiveness influences recognition memory 
due to processes occurring at both encoding and retrieval. In particular, 
Kishiyama and Yonelinas argue that distinctiveness influenc(;s both 
recollection and familiarity-based recognition memory. Further, these 
authors argue that the effect of distinctiveness on recollection is procuced by 
encoding-based factors, whereas the effect of distinctiveness on familiarity 
is produced by retrieval-based factors. Finally, many standard \iews of 
distinctiveness effects largely attribute the memorial advantage of 
distinctiveness to encoding-based processes, such as enhanced attention 
(e.g., Jenkins & Postman, 1948) or salience (e.g.. Green, 1956; Schmidt, 
1991). 
Related to concept of incongruently is the construct known as 
distinctiveness. The constructs of incongruency and distinctiveness may be 
used interchangeably in the memory literature. Distinctiveness lias been 
variously defined as the property that separate items or events that share few 
rather than many features with other items in memoiy (Nelson, 1979). 
According to Hunt and McDaniel (1993) and Schmidt (1996) distinctiveness 
emerges due to differences rather than similarities among items. In the 
opinion of Hunt and Mitchell (1982) distinctiveness arises from presentation 
of isolated items in the context of background items. Moreover, Schmidt 
(1991) says that distinctiveness characterizes events that are iniongruent 
with active conceptual frameworks or that contain salient features not 
present in active memory. These definitions of distinctiveness make it 
crystal clear that there is a common thread among these definitions: the 
differences among items that presumably uniquely specify some items or the 
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salience of items that make them standout from among the background 
items. 
It has been observed that distinctiveness has different effects on 
memory performance, depending on how it is defined; suggestiag that 
concept of distinctiveness has been over applied. Theoretical explanations of 
the effect of distinctiveness on memory fail to specify what the different 
definitions of distinctiveness have in common and fail to cDmpass 
adequately the broad range of phenomena to be explained. In view of this 
theoretical problem, incongruity hypothesis was developed as a refinement 
of the distinctive hypothesis (Eysenck, 1979; Hunt and Elliott, 1980}. Since 
the concept of distinctiveness has been difficult to define and clear 
operational definition of distinctiveness has not offered, the incoigruity 
hypothesis was proposed. Unlike, distinctiveness, incongruity has been 
clearly defined. Incongruity results from a mismatch between features 
present in working memory and features activated by an item. The 
incongruous items lead to an orienting response and, as a result, receive 
extra attention during encoding and increased storage of individual item 
information (Schmidt 1991). These processes are thought to be automatic in 
the sense that they are not the result of an intentional strategy and do not 
deprive other cognitive processes of attentional resources. 
The theoretical construct of distinctiveness/incongruity emphasi ze that 
the presentation of unique properties enhance memory (Hunt and JiUiott, 
1980; Hirshman and Jackson, 1997). The isolation or von Restorff, eifect is 
perhaps the best known demonstration of the distinctiveness effect in 
memory and refers to the finding that people tend to have very good memory 
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for unusual or incongruent items (Hunt, 1995; Geraci and Rajarani, 2004; 
Brandt, Gardinar and Macrae, 2006; Park, Amdt and Reder, 2006). 
As stated earlier, while dealing with the processing of congruent and 
incongruent information, Crocker and Vitkus (1983) observed that 
impressions of people are resistant to change while information that 
contradicts an initial impression of a persona is recalled better ihan the 
information that confirms an impression (Hastie and Kumar, 1979: Hastie; 
1980; Srull, 1981). Hence there was an apparent pradox of person 
perception. The researchers suggested three ways to resolve this paradox. 
The first was that the information recalled about a persona and the 
impression one has of him or her may be independent. The second possible 
resolution was that the process of integrating incongruent informal ion into 
an impression, people may link the incongruent information to the 
information they have that fit their initial impression. Thus, the additional 
thought given to incongruent items may actually strengthen the existing 
links to congruent information in memory, and reinforce the initial 
impression. The third possible solution, as suggested by Crocker and Vitkus 
(1983), stems from the findings that people generally attribute behavior that 
is inconsistent with their impression of a person to situational causes (Bell, 
Wicklund, Macko and Larpin, 1976; Deaun and Emswiller, 1974; Feldman-
Summers and Kiesler, 1974; Hayden and Mischel, 1976; Kulik, 1983). 
Behavior that is attributed to situational causes is irrelevant to an impression 
of what the person is like. Thus, when incongruent behavior can be 
attributed to situational causes the behavior may be recalled but it should 
have less impact on impression. Crocker and Vitkus (1983)"provided an 
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empirical support, for all three of the possible resolutions of paradox of 
person perception. 
Though Crocker and Vitkus (1983) obtained empirical support for 
their all the three resolutions, their findings may be subjective to alte mative 
explanation. First, it may be possible that incongruent information 
commanded greater amount of attention leading to more rehearsal as 
compared to congruent information. Thus, this attention-rehearsal 
mechanism may be responsible for greater recall of incongruent information 
as compared to congruent information. Secondly, the mood of the subject 
may be a critical factor in determining whether an information is perceived 
as congruent or incongruent, for example if a subject is in an elated mood 
than humorous information mixed with nonhumorous information may not 
be perceived as incongruent information whereas a subject with depressed 
mood may perceive the same information as incongruent. The presen study 
is designed to test these assumptions in the area of conversation memory, for 
it is a conversation memory that play vital role in the format on of 
impression about the other persons. 
Still another important consideration that motivated us to undertake 
this proposed research is the existence of substantial body of ev dence 
demonstrating mood biasing effect in memory. While studying the rt lation 
between different emotional states and memory, subjects are induced io feel 
happy or sad while learning list of words. They recall those lists better if 
they are induced to the same mood at the time of recall than if tht)/ are 
induced to a different mood, an effect usually called mood dependents 
retrieval (Bower et al., 1978; Bartlet et al., 1982; & Schare et al, 19841. The 
mood dependent retrieval effect is also demonstrated/by the tendency of the 
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subjects to show better recall performance when they experience same mood 
during encoding and retrieval as compared to when they experience different 
moods during encoding and retrieval. (Teasdale & Fogarty 1979; Taylor 
1981; Natale & Hantas, 1982; Snyder & White, 1982). Thus Schmidt (1994) 
studied memory for humorous and nonhumorous version of sertences. 
Subjects recall performance was affected by their emotional states. Those 
who were in elated mood remembered humorous sentences moie than 
nonhumorous versions of sentences. But those who were in depressed mood 
recalled more nonhumorous version of sentences than humorous version of 
sentences. 
The above mentioned well established findings make it crystal clear 
that emotional mood of the subjects is a potent determiner of memory and 
hence, conversation memory is not an exception. 
A topic of major theoretical interest within cognitive psyciiology 
pertains to the bidirectional relations among cognitive and emotional 
processes. In the existing literature, most attention has been focused on 
memory phenomena of various kinds (Blaney, 1986; Bower; 1981; Tllis & 
Ashbrook, 1987, 1988; Johnson & Magaro, 1987). And almost ^Aithout 
exception, the research has focused on "conscious" or explicit memoiy: the 
person's conscious, intentional recollection of some previous episode, most 
commonly reflected in standard tests of recall and recognition. So, for 
example, congruence between the individual's mood states at encodirg and 
retrieval appears to affect the accessibility of memories (Eich & Me calfe, 
1989). The effects of mood on memory fall into three general categoritis: (a) 
Mood-dependent memory effects, where retrieval is facilitated by a natch 
between encoding and retrieval mood states; (b) Mood-congment memory 
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effects, where mood at time of encoding or retrieval facilitates retrieval of 
affectively congruent material; and (c) resource allocation effects, where 
extreme or negative mood states at encoding or retrieval impair processing. 
All these effects have been documented in studies of explicit memory', 
employing conventional tests of recall or recognition. Moreovei, it is 
important to recognize that mood is not just a state, like sleep or hypnosis 
that alter perception or induces a kind of amnesias. Mood is also a 
contextual cue, like other cues, that is processed when memor es are 
encoded and guides the course of retrieval. In an effort to understand the 
apparent unreliability of context dependent memory, Eich (1980, 1989) has 
argued that state-dependent memory is a cue-dependent phenomenon that 
critically depends on the nature of the cues available at retrieval. Fr^m his 
point of view, a primary reason for inconsistency in the results of studies on 
context-dependent memory findings is the tendency for other strongt;r cues 
to overshadow the usually weak context cue. These potentially strongc^ r cues 
may include experimenter presented or subject generated cues. So, for 
example, state dependent effects on memory are greatest under condit ons of 
free recall, as opposed to cued-recall or recognition tests (Eich, 1980, 1989). 
And environment-dependent memory effects are abolished when subjects 
are instructed to imagine the environment in which the items had been 
studied (Smith, Glenberg & Bjork, 1978). 
The foregoing analysis suggests two conditions under which cliances 
of finding mood dependency would be increased: (a) if the link between the 
subjects' mood and the list items is strengthened; and (b) if other poteatially 
superseding cues are eliminated, thereby highlighting the mood cue. With 
respect to the mood-item link, there is no reason to think that this assoc iation 
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is encoded automatically (Kihlstrom, 1989). Rather, it seems likely tiat the 
mood-item comiection will most likely be made if subjects actively atiend to 
their moods. 
In contemporary psychology, the cognitive processing of emotional 
information has been assigned a special status. An important idea is that 
emotion-relevant information has a high priority in demanding atention 
because of its high motivational relevance (Lang et al. 1997): threat signals 
danger to be dealt with; happiness signals opportunities for elaboration, 
social bonding, mating behavior, etc. At the same time, the ability to 
selectively attend and respond to relevant stimuli is of crucial importance to 
display adaptive behavior and depends on our ability to focus on re levant 
information and inhibit irrelevant or distracting information. 
In the past decades, a wealth of studies has examined se ective 
attention for emotional information. These studies have most frequentl y used 
emotional modifications of cognitive-experimental tasks, with the emotional 
Stroop task (Stroop 1935) as the best-known example. The typical finding in 
the emotional Stroop task is that patients are often slower to name the colors 
of words associated with concerns relevant to their clinical cordition 
(Williams et al. 1996). These results have been interpreted in terms of 
selective attention for and reduced inhibition of emotional information. A 
problem of the majority of the cognitive-experimental tasks used to 
investigate selective attention is that they only provide a coarse measure of 
attentional processing: attention is conceived as a unitary concept, wliereas 
several models suggest that selective attention involves multiple components 
(e.g., Posner et al. 1987). Hereby, at least two different mechanisms can be 
distinguished: active selection of relevant information and active inhibition 
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of irrelevant stimuli (Hasher and Zacks 1988). In most tasks, it is not 
possible to distinguish between those two aspects. For instance, in the 
emotional Stroop task the task-relevant (color of the word) as wi.'U as the 
task-irrelevant informations (semantic content) are presented within the 
same stimulus presentation, which causes difficulties in disentangling the 
contribution of activation and inhibition mechanisms. A paradigm that offers 
a more valid operationalization of the mechanisms underlying the i ihibition 
of attention to emotional information is an affective modification of multi-
stimulus task named negative priming (Tipper 1985; Wentura 1999; 
Joormann 2004). This selective attention task allows measuring atientional 
inhibition of affective information. A complete trial in the negative affective 
priming paradigm (NAP) includes two separate trials: prime trial and a probe 
trial. Prime as well as probe trials consist of a stimulus pair consisting of a 
distracter and a target (e.g., pictures of emotional faces). The participant is 
instructed to evaluate the target (e.g., picture in a black frame) as po^ itive or 
negative, while ignoring (inhibiting) the distracter (e.g., picture in a grey 
frame). In the experimental condition the valence of the distractei m the 
prime trial corresponds with the valence of the target in the probe trial. In the 
control condition there is no such similarity between prime and probe. 
Effective inhibition of the stimulus valence of the distracter in the pririe trial 
leads to a slowdown in responding to the target in the probe trial when this 
target shares the same valence. This slowdown is called the Negative 
Affective Priming (NAP) effect and can be considered as a valid index of 
inhibitory function towards affective material (Wentura 1999). 
Positive affective states are generally related to a more intjitive, 
generative and "loosening" or broadening cognitive processing style 
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associated with an increased cognitive elaboration and flexibilit;/ (Fiedler 
1988; Isen 2001; Aspinwall 1998). An interesting framework vithin this 
context is the broaden-and-build theory of Fredrickson (2001). This theory 
states that positive emotions are characterized by a broadenirg of the 
thought-action repertoire, expanding the range of cognitions and behaviors 
that come to mind. One prediction of this model is that positive emotions 
widen the scope of attention. Several studies have shown that individuals in 
a positive mood display a global, holistic attention processing (e.g., Gasper 
and Clore 2002; Fredrickson and Branigan 2005). Other research could 
prove that positive mood leads to an increased cognitive flexibili > that is 
accompanied by an increased distractibility (Dreisbach and Goschke 2004). 
Reduced inhibitory functioning in a positive mood might explain the 
observed broadened "thought-action" repertoire as well as the observed 
increased distractibility during positive mood (Seibert and Ellis 19'M). Yet, 
research on the role of attentional inhibition processes under positi v'c affect 
is rather scarce. Kuhl and Kazen (1999) demonstrated that Stroop 
interference disappeared under induction of positive affect. Based on the 
above-mentioned argumentation, they hypothesized that inhibitory function 
during a positive mood will be significantly reduced as compared with a 
neutral mood condition. 
Recently, the NAP-task has been applied to investigate inhibition of 
positive and negative emotional stimuli in dysphoric students (Joonnann 
2004) and depressed patients (Goeleven et al. 2006a). In those studies, 
results revealed that participants with elevated depression scores filled to 
inhibit mood-congruent information (reduced NAP-effect), showi ig that 
depression is associated with a specific inhibitory deficit for negative 
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information. At present an important question remains whether this observed 
inhibitory deficit is a vulnerabiUty factor related to a stable trait or i variable 
component associated with emotional state. Based on the existing literature, 
arguments can be found for both ideas. An indication for the trait hypothesis 
is that high levels of rumination, which are observed in depressed 
individuals and related to its maintenance (Nolen-Hoeksema 19')1), have 
been linked to dysfunctional inhibition mechanisms (e.g., Linvi le 1996; 
Joormann 2006). However, the inhibition concept also fits with the general 
assumption that a negative mood impairs the amount of available i:ognitive 
capacity that can be allocated to a certain task as a consequence of ntruding 
irrelevant information in attentional sources (Ellis and Ashbrooc 1988). 
Indeed, it has been found that induced stress reduces inhibition fur ction by 
using a non-emotional negative priming task (Braunstein-Bercovitz 2003; 
Skosnik et al. 2000). 
The most recent study was carried out by Goeleven, DeRaedt and 
Koster (2007) in which they demonstrated that the ability to inhibit affective 
information plays a major role in efficient cognitive processing. In tl is study 
the effect of mood induction on inhibitory processing of emotional naterial 
was investigated. In Experiment 1, performance on a negative affective 
priming task (NAP) following negative and positive mood induction (MIP) 
was compared to a neutral mood condition. Resuhs revealed ihat, as 
compared with the neutral mood condition, inhibitory function for affective 
material was unaffected by negative MIP. However, after the positi\ e MIP, 
inhibitory processes were significantly impaired. In Experiment 1, they 
replicated and extended the findings on positive affect and inhibitit n. The 
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data concerning positive mood fit with the general findings that positive 
mood often leads to a "loose, flexible" processing mode. 
As far as effect of mood on memory is concerned, it has been widely 
investigated by numerous researchers. The main interest of these researchers 
was mood dependent memory and mood congruent memory: Some 
researchers demonstrated dependent memory in implicit memory but not in 
explicit memory (Mathews, Mogg, May, and Eysenck, 1989), whereas other 
researchers found just opposite results i.e. they demonstrated mood 
dependent memory in explicit memory (Teasdale and Fogarty 19''9; Taylor 
1981; Natale and Hantas, 1982; Snyder and White, 1982). Howe/er, mood 
congruent memory has been demonstrated consistently by large number of 
investigators (Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Laird, Wagner, Halal, and Szegda, 
1982; Madigan & Bollenbach, 1982; Snyder & White, 1982; T(;asdale & 
Fogarty, 1980; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981; Teasdale & Russell, 1983). 
The foregoing discussion highlights the facts that mood is an 
important variable in memory studies. Like physiological state and 
environmental surround, mood is a feature of an event that can be encoded 
along with other aspects of a memory and serve as a potential retrieval cue. 
Like the physiological states induced by psychoactive drugs, it can affect the 
deployment of attention towards some features of environment as oppose to 
others. Thus it is established beyond doubt that emotion evoking qualities of 
stimulus have a profound impact on memory processes. It is evident from 
the publication of large numbers of journal articles and books on memory 
processes and emotion. The "Handbook of Emotion and Memory: Research 
and Theory" by Christianson (1992) is a recent addition in the existing 
literature on memory and emotion. 
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Further more, the mood and memory research induces a new, 
intriguing variable to the memory equation. Though, since the time of 
Aristotle cognition and affect have been assumed to be radically different so 
different that they might have little to do with each other. Howev er, recent 
work in mood and memory has made it crystal clear that emotions affects 
memory processes in the same way as other cognitive activities are affected. 
Generally a question is raised: How can two such different things as 
emotions and cognitions have such similar affect? The answer of this 
question was scientifically given by Ellis and Ashbrook (1989) and Bower 
(1981) who believed that it is the feelings, not some other component of 
emotional episode which produces memory affects. According to them a 
normal emotional episode consists of atleast six easily distir guished 
components: the eliciting event, the appraisal of that event, pat ems of 
autonomic response, expressive behavior, instrument action, and the feeling. 
Ordinarily, all these components occur together. Consequently, any t)f these 
components could mediate the memory affects. Thus, Laird, Wagenc, Halal 
and Szegda (1984) have demonstrated that only the feelings affect ccgnitive 
processes. In short, the theories identify the emotional feeling as that which 
affect memory. 
A few studies have investigated the effects of emotional state on the 
retrieval of personal experiences, such as early childhood memories or more 
recent personal events (Goldstein & Ellis, 1983; Siegal et al., 1979; Madigan 
& Bollenbach, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale et al., 1980). The 
evidence has been rather inconsistent with regard to mood effect on these 
memories. For instance, some investigators have obtained findings whiih are 
consistent with a mood congruency effect on the recall of personal men odes 
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(Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Madigan 8L Bollenbach, 1982, Teasdale & 
Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale et al., 1980). Other researchers have been unable to 
support a mood congruency effect on the recall of early childhood memories 
(Siegal et al., 1979). 
Whereas the network theory would suggest a facilitation of tiie mood 
with regard to the recall of personally-relevant events which are ass(3ciated 
with one's prevailing mood (Bower, 1981), the resource allocation model 
predicts the recall of personal memories which are highly integrated in the 
memory system to be relatively impervious to the effects of emotion il states 
(Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). Clearly, more research needs to be coaducted 
focusing on the effects of moods on the recall of personal memories to 
resolve these inconsistent findings evidenced in the literature. He ice the 
present study is designed to explore how listeners' mood affects 
conversation memory. In short in the light of existing findings regarding 
mood dependent memory and mood congruent memory, it is highly logical 
to assume that if the listener is in a state of elated mood then he ma} recall 
humorous content of the conversation more than nonhumorous conent of 
the conversation. Further more it may also be assumed that if the listener is 
in a state of depressed/sad mood, he may recall humorous content of the 
conversation less than the subject with elated mood. It is further 
hypothesized that both subjects with elated mood and subjects with 
depressed/sad mood are likely to recall incongruent content of the 
conversation more as compared to congruent content of the conversation. 
The present study is designed to test these assumptions also. The findings of 
the present study will not only open a new area of research in memory but 
will also provide significant informafion about the developmert of 
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interpersonal relations and will highlight the process of impression 
formation. Furthermore, the findings of the present study ma} also be 
applied in education settings like preparing syllabai and teaching mt;thods. 
The main objectives of the study were (1) to investigate the impact 
of humorous-nonhumorous version of conversation on conversation 
memory, i.e. to what extent humorous and nonhumorous versions of 
conversation facilitate or inhibit conversation memory; (2) to investigate the 
influence of congruent-incongruent version of conversation on con\ ersation 
memory, i.e. to what extent congruent and incongruent versions of 
conversation facilitate or inhibit conversation memory; (3) to investigate the 
effect of listener's mood on conversation memory, i.e. to what extent elated, 
depressed, and neutral mood of the listener facilitate or inhibit the 
conversation memory; and (4) to examine the various interactional effects 
of independent variables i.e. humorous-nonhumorous, congruent-
incongruent versions of conversation and mood on our dependent \ ariable 
i.e. conversation memory. To be more specific the present study was 
designed to answer the following questions: 
(1) Does humorous-nonhumorous version of convesation 
influence conversation memory? 
(2) Does congruent-incongruent version of conversation inf uence 
conversation memory? 
(3) Does listener's mood influence conversation memory? 
(4) Is there an interactional effect between humorous-nonhumorous 
and congruent-incongruent versions of conversatioi on 
conversation memory? 
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(5) Is there an interactional effect between humorous-noniumorous 
version of conversation and listener's mood on conversation 
memory? 
(6) Is there an interactional effect between congruent-int:ongment 
version of conversation and listener's mood on conversation 
memory? 
(7) Is there an interactional effect among humorous-nonh amorous, 
congruent-incongruent versions of conversation and listener's 
mood on conversation memory? 
In order to answer the above questions, a 2X2X3 factorial design in 
which two task variables (two versions of conversation i.e. humorous-
nonhumorous and congruent-incongruent) and one personality variable 
(listener's mood) were used in this experiment. The third variible i.e. 
personality variable was varied in three ways and the two task \ariables 
were varied in two ways. The three values of personality variable i.e. 
listener's mood were (a) elated mood, (b) depressed mood and (c) neutral 
mood. The two values of first task variable were (a) humorous ve-sion of 
conversation and (b) nonhumorous version of conversation. Similarly the 
two values of second task variable were (a) congruent version md (b) 
incongruent version. Thus there were twelve groups of subjects a? given 
below: 
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Group I Elated mood, Humorous and Congruent versions of conversat ion. 
Group II Elated mood, Humorous and Incongruent versions of conversation. 
Group III Elated mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group IV Elated mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group V Depressed mood. Humorous and Congruent versi 3ns of 
conversation. 
Group VI Depressed mood, Humorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group VII Depressed mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group VIII Depressed mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent ven ions of 
conversation. 
Group IX Neutral mood, Humorous and Congruent versions of conversation. 
Group X Neutral mood, Humorous and Incongruent versions of conversation. 
Group XI Neutral mood, Nonhumorous and Congruent versions of 
conversation. 
Group XII Neutral mood, Nonhumorous and Incongruent versions of 
conversation. 
The design of the experiment is diagramatically given in Table I. 
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180 subjects were used in the present study. More specifically there 
were 15 subjects in each group. These 180 subjects were randomly selected 
fi-om undergraduate students, Faculty of Social Sciences A.M.U, Aligarh. 
All the subjects were matched on all relevant variables like age, ecucation, 
physical and mental health and sex. 
A fictional conversation (see Appendix I) was prepared by the author 
which was used in the present study. This fictional conversation consisted of 
large number of statements forming conversation between two persons (Mr. 
Ahmad and Mr. Sharma). The content of conversation focused on tv/o issues 
namely health and business deal. The conversation on the issue of health was 
so prepared that either the conversation was humorous or nonhumoious. The 
conversation on the issue of business deal was so prepared that it w is totally 
nonhumorous. These conversations on the issues on 'health' and business 
deal' were given to a group of 50 subjects who were askec to rate 
humorousness and nonhumorousness of each statement on five po nt rating 
scale. On the basis of these ratings only those statements were retained 
which were rated either as humorous or as nonhumorous. The mean rating of 
humorous statement was 4.0, whereas the mean rating of nonlumorous 
statements was 1.25. It is important to mention that this group oJ subjects 
did not participate in the actual experiment. 
Humorous-Congruent version of conversation was prepared by using 
all the statements which were humorous in nature and were on the same 
issue i.e. 'health'. Humorous-incongruent version of conversation was 
prepared by using the statements half of which were humorous (on the issue 
of health) and the remaining half were nonhumorous (on the issue of 
business deal). Nonhumorous-congruent version of conversa ion was 
242 
prepared by using all the nonhumorous statements about one Issue i.e. 
'business deal'. Nonhumorous-incongruent version of conversat on was 
prepared by using the statements half of which were concerned vith the 
issue of health and remaining half were concerned with the issue of business 
deal and both types of statements were nonhumorous. 
In each four versions of conversation 20 statements were considered 
as target statements uttered by Mr. Ahmad. These were the statements which 
were to be recalled by the subjects. 
Modified Velten Mood Induction Technique (MVMIT) developed by 
Sinclair et al. (1994) was used to induce different shades of mood i.t. elated, 
depressed, and neutral to form the above mentioned twelve groups of 
subjects. 
As dictated by the design of the experiment, each group of subjects 
namely elated, depressed, and neutral, read the conversation ten times and 
recalled 20 target statements uttered by Mr. Ahmad after a retention interval 
of 5 minutes which was fdled with a distractor task. 
To be more specific, a rapport with the subject was made, then either 
elated, depressed, or neutral mood was induced by Modified Velten Mood 
Induction Technique. Immediately after the induction of mood, subject was 
given ten trials on one of the four forms of fictional conversation that was 
followed by a 5 minutes distraction task. The purpose of distraction task was 
to prevent the subjects from rehearsing the stimulus material i.e. Ictional 
conversation. Immediately after distraction task, the subject was instructed 
to recall in writing as many of Mr. Ahmad's statements as she could. The 
subject was also instructed to use wording as close to the original as 
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possible. Subject was given 10 minutes to complete the recall task. In short 
the data were collected groupwise but conversation memory was tested 
individually. For example all the 15 subjects of elated group with humorous-
congruent conversation were tested individually on conversation rremory. 
Then all the 15 subjects of elated group with humorous-inco igruent 
conversation were tested individually on conversation memory. Nex' all the 
15 subjects of elated group with nonhumorous-congruent conversation were 
tested individually on conversation memory and then all the 15 subjects of 
elated group with nonhumorous-incongruent conversation were tested 
individually on conversation memory. The same procedure was used to test 
the conversation memory of the remaining groups of subject's i.e. depressed 
group and neutral group. 
After collecting data on twelve groups of subjects, the recall p-otocols 
of the subjects were coded by two coders. These two coders worked 
independently to code the protocols for the presence of target items, i.e. 
whether a statement recalled by subjects was one of the twenty targets. 
Coders were instructed to use a gist or general meaning criterion. That is, a 
recalled statement was to be coded as one of the targets if it conveyed the 
general meaning of the target, regardless of the wordings. Thus aJ of the 
recall protocols were scored for the number of the target correctly recalled 
(regardless of the recalled wording). The numbers of target correctly 
recalled, as given by the two coders, were added and divided by 2 to get 
mean number of target correctly recalled. This was done to remove any 
discrepancy if it exists between two coders with respect to the number of 
targets correctly recalled. 
244 
The data so obtained was tabulated groupwise and statistically 
analyzed by three way analysis of variance to draw necessary inferences. 
The F-ratio for humorous-nonhumorous variation is 7.41 Vvhich is 
significant at 0.01 level indicating that humorous and nonhumorous \ ersions 
of conversation has differential effect on conversation nemory. 
Disregarding other variables i.e. congruent-incongruent vers on of 
conversation, and mood, the mean of the means for humorous version of 
conversation groups is 12.98 (i.e., 11.50 + 12.77 + 13.43 + 13.70 + 14.07 + 
12.40/6) and mean of means for nonhumorous version of conv(;rsation 
groups is 11.10 (i.e., 10.94 + 9.37+ 10.60+ 10.64 + 12.54+12.54/6). Since 
the mean of the means for humorous version of conversation groups of 
subjects (i.e. 12.98) is higher than the mean of the means for nonhumorous 
version of conversation groups of subjects (i.e., 11.10), it can safely be 
concluded that the variation in humorous-nonhumorous version of 
conversation has differential effect on conversation memory. More 
specifically, the results make it crystal clear that humorous version of 
conversation is better remembered than nonhumorous version of 
conversation. In other words, conversation memory was found better when 
version of conversation was humorous rather than nonhumorous. 
The F-ratios, for congruent-incongruent variation is 3.10 wnich is 
very slightly statistically insignificant (for significant at .o5 level, F-iatio of 
3.89 is required). The result weakly suggests that congruent and incoiigruent 
version of conversation has no differential effect on conversation memory. 
However, if probability level of .08 is accepted then the F-ra :io for 
congruent-incongruent variation becomes significant. Ignoring humorous-
nonhumorous version of conversation and mood variables, the mean of the 
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means for congruent version of conversation group of subjects is 11.43 and 
mean of the means for incongruent version of conversation group of subjects 
is 12.65, Since there is perceptible difference between these two meai of the 
means, it is, therefore, concluded that congruent version of conversation and 
incongruent version of conversation have differential effect on conv(5rsation 
memory. More specifically, it is found that conversation memory for 
congruent version of conversation is lower than conversation memory for 
incongruent version of conversation. In other words, incongruent version of 
conversation is better remembered than congruent version of conversation. 
The F-ratio for mood variation is 0.28 which is also insignificant at 
.o5 level. The result reveals that subjects with elated mood, depressed mood 
and neutral mood do not differ with respect to conversation memor> i.e. all 
the three groups of subjects show same conversational nemory 
performance. Disregarding humorous-nonhumorous and congruent-
incongruent variables the mean of the means for the subjects with elated 
mood is 11.69, the mean of the means for the subjects with depressed mood 
is 12.18 and mean of the means for the subjects with neutral mood i^  12.24. 
Since there is a negligible difference among the mean of the means for these 
groups of subjects, it is, therefore, concluded that mood variation has no 
differential effect on conversation memory. More specifically, conversation 
memory performance was found more or less the same among elated, 
depressed and neutral subjects. In other words mood variation has no 
differential impact on conversation memory. 
The F-ratio for interaction between humorous-nonhumorous and 
congruent-incongruent version of conversation is 0.30 which s also 
insignificant. F-ratio for interaction between humorous-nonhumorous 
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versions of conversation and mood is 0.2G which is also insignificant. The F-
ratio for interaction between congruent-incongruent version of conversation 
and mood is 0.56, which is also insignificant. The F-ratio tor the 
interactional effect among humorous-nonhumorous, congruent-incongruent 
version of conversation and mood is 1.39 which is also insignificant. 
The findings of the present research are given below: 
1. Humorous and nonhumorous informations have differential ef ect on 
conversation memory. More specifically, conversation memc ry for 
humorous version of conversation was found much superior tban for 
nonhumorous version of conversation. 
2. Congruent and incongruent versions of conversations have differential 
effect on conversation memory. In other words, conversation memory 
for congruent version is lower than for incongruent version of 
conversation. 
3. Mood has no impact on conversation memory. More speciiically, 
listener's mood be it elated, depressed or neutral has no differential 
effect on conversation memory. 
4. No significant interactional effect was found between humorous-
nonhumorous and congruent-incongruent versions of conversation on 
conversation memory. 
5. No significant interactional effect was found between humorous-
nonhumorous and mood on conversation memory. 
6. No significant interactional effect was found between conguent-
incongruent versions of conversation and mood on conversation 
memory. 
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7. No significant interactional effect was found among humorous-
nonhumorous, congruent-incongruent versions of conversation and 
mood on conversation memory. 
The first finding of the present research, i.e. conversation memory for 
humorous version of conversation was found much superior than for 
nonhumorous version of conversation, is in consonance with the findings 
obtained by numerous researchers. For instance, Kaplan and Pascot- (1977), 
Johnson (1990), Schmidt (1994), Kher, Molstad and Donahue (1999), Berk 
(2000), Powers (2005), Bacay (2006), and Berk (2007) have consistently 
demonstrated that humorous information facilitates learning speed, solving 
problems and memory. Numerous explanations may be offered for the 
beneSlcial effect of humorous version of conversation on conversation 
memory. First humorous information reduces anxiety, tension and stress 
(Berk, 1997, 1998c, 1999, 2000, and 2007) which in turn prepares i fertile 
ground for the enhancement of memory. Secondly humor promotes an 
objectivity that buffers the negative response (Galloway and Cropley. 1999) 
and provides a sense of empowerment over the testing situations (Sh irman, 
1998; Thorson 1985; and Wooten, 1996) that can improve subject's nental 
functioning and performance. A bulk of research evidences, en the 
psychological benefits, thus, concentrate on three outcomes: first, aixiety 
reduction (Cann, Holt, and Calhoun 1999; DeSpelder and Srickland, 1983; 
Doris and Fierman, 1956; Dworkin and Efran, 1967; Liechty 1987; Mezu, 
Nezu and Blissett, 1988; Singer 1968; Yovetich, Dale, and Hudak 1990); 
second, tension reduction (Brill 1940; Goodheart 1994; O'Connell 960; 
Wooten 1996) and third is stress reduction (Bizi, Keinan, and Beit-
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Hallahmi, 1988; Dixon, 1976, 1980; Labott and Martin 1987; Lefcourt et al. 
1995; Lefcourt and Martin 1986; Lefcourt and Thomas 1998; Martin et al. 
1993; Martin and Lefcourt, 1983; Nezu et al. 1988; Prerost 1988; White and 
Camarena, 1989; and Wooten 1996). Moreover, Berk (2000) and Berk et al. 
(2006) who carried out six year study, found that humor is effective in 
reducing anxiety and making it possible to perform best on examinaions. 
The first finding of the present research may also be explained interms 
of improved immune system. It has been demonstrated by numerous 
researchers that laughter generates an increase in positive emotion 
(Backorowski and Owren, 2001) and produces self-reported impro ^ e^ments 
in immune system functioning (Mahoney, Burroughs and Lippman, 2002). 
Importantly, the effect of laughter on the self-reports of immune system 
functioning is mediated by subjective experiences of positive emotion, 
especially for older adults (Mahoney et al. 2002). This suggests that jxisitive 
emotions produced by the behavior of laughing may be important in 
predicting healthy outcomes for the immune system. Positive enotions 
mediate the effects of coping with humor and immune system funcioning 
(Dillon, Minchoff, and Baker, 1985-1986). Laughter (a behavior) is often 
associated with humor (a cognitive construct). Individual vary in the content 
to which they use humor to cope with stressful situation. Those with greater 
tendencies to cope with humor report greater daily positive mood (Di Ion et 
al., 1985-1986). Consequently, in response to stress, those with greater 
propensities to cope with humor show increases in levels of salivary 
immunoglobulin A (S-Ig A), a vital immune system protein, which is the 
body's first line of defense against respiratory illnesses (Dillon et al., '985-
1986). Corroborating work in an experience-sampling study show that self-
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reported positive emotions (vs. negative emotions) predict increases in S-Ig 
levels, thereby enhancing immune functioning (Stone, Valdinarsdattir, 
Jandorf, Cox, andNeale, 1987). These findings indicate that persons who are 
able to regain and maintain positive emotional states when faced with a 
stressful life experience (e.g., via laughter, coping with humor) can show 
improvements in immune function. In short humor improves immure system 
which in turn improves physical and mental health. It is an open secret that 
health increases the efficiency of cognitive activities including memory. The 
first finding of our research, i.e. humorous version of conversation is better 
remembered than nonhumorous version, provides strong empirical t;vidence 
to the contention that humor strengthens immune system which in turn 
strengthens physical and mental health leading to enhancement of mt mory. 
The first finding of our research also provides strong empirical 
evidence to the hypothesis proposed by McGhee (1983). Accordin;^ to his 
hypothesis humor produces physiological arousal. McGhee noted increased 
heart rate and respiration rate in response to humor and argued that these 
responses were indicative of activation of sympathetic nervous system. A 
number of researchers have demonstrated that physiological arousal 
enhances memory of the subject (Craik and Blankstein, 1975; Ellis, 
Detterman, Runcie, MaCarver, and Craig, 1971; Maltzman, Kantcr, and 
Langdon, 1966; Walker and Tarte, 1963; Bohannon, 1988; Brov^n and 
Kulik, 1977; Christiansen 1989; Pillemer, 1984). 
Another potential explanation for our first finding may be found in 
"differential rehearsal hypothesis". According to this hypothesis, siibjects 
intentionally rehearse humorous material at the expense of nonhun-orous 
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material and this increased rehearsal is responsible for increased retention 
(Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968). 
Apart from "differential rehearsal hypothesis", "differential attention 
hypothesis" also received empirical support from our finding under 
discussion. According to this hypothesis, humorous sentences receive more 
attention than nonhumorous sentences and this increased atteition is 
responsible for increased retention (Bandes, 1988; Bryant et al, 1979; 
Wandersee, 1982; Gorham and Christophel, 1990; Schmidt, 1991; Bobek, 
2002; Friedman, Halpen, and Salb, 1999; McLaughlin, 2001; Power, 2005). 
Our first finding may also be explained interms of "surprise 
hypothesis" or retrieval strategies. This hypothesis asserts that subj(^ ct may 
not expect to read humorous material as part of an experiment and subject 
may develop a bias toward retrieving humorous material (Schmidt, 1994). 
Thus, the first finding of our research provides empirical support 13 these 
hypotheses. 
A survey of literature reveals that the theoretical background of humor 
is varied and controversial (Levine, 1969; Morreall, 1987; Nahemow, 
MaCluskey-Fawcett, and McGhee, 1986). Hundreds of theories of humor 
were proposed by early philosophers and theorists (Liechty, 1987). Initially 
these theories were grouped into three categories namely incon^ruent, 
superiority and tension reduction (DeSpelder and Strickland, 1983; Lefcourt 
and Martin, 1986; Liechty, 1987). However, later on the nomenclature of 
these three categories of theories were changed and were labled as cognitive-
perceptual, social-behavioral and psychoanalytical theories of humor 
(Davies, 1977; Levine, 1969; Sullivan and Deane, 1988). Among these 
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theories, psychoanalytical theory is considered as the best theory that 
provides best explanation for the use of humor to teach sensitive tcpics. This 
theory views humor as a mechanism for releasing fears and constantly 
associated with difficult situations (Liechty, 1987). Humor is seen to enable 
release of internal tensions and to provide the needed mechanisms for coping 
with misfortunes. Moreover, humor is emotional chaos remembered in 
tranquility. The first finding of our research strongly sup])orts the 
psychoanalytical theory of humor by demonstrating significant y higher 
conversation memory for humorous material than for nonhumorous ones. 
This higher conversation memory for humorous material is due to the fact 
that humorous material reduced stress and anxiety as advocated by 
psychoanalytical theory. 
Somewhat recently a scientific discovery is reported in a reputed 
newspaper in which it has been reported that researchers at the Uaiversity 
and Imperial College in London played a series of sounds to volunteers 
while measuring their brains response using a functional MRI scanntT. Some 
of the sounds were positive such as laughter while others were unpleasant 
like screaming. They found that hearmg laughter produced a greater 
response in the premotor cortical region of a listener's brain—an area which 
is activated when one smiles. It should be noted here that cortex a so play 
important role in the storage of memories. This report not only demoastrates 
the existence of an actual physical mechanism which facilitates the spread of 
humor but implicitly suggests that this mechanism may also facilitate 
retention of humorous material (The Time of India, New Delhi, ]V onday, 
December 18, 2006, pp.14). Our first finding is consistent with this report. 
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The second finding of our research i.e. incongruent version of 
conversation shows higher conversation memory than congruent version of 
conversation, is in Hne with the finding obtained by numerous researchers 
(Eysenck, 1979; Humphreys,. 1976; Hunt and Eistein, 1981; Jacoby and 
Craik, 1979; Hunt, 1995; Hunt and McDaniel, 1993; Hunt and Smith, 1996; 
Rajaram, 1998; Smith and Hunt, 2000; Hunt, 2003; Geraci and Rajaram, 
2004; Brandt, Gardiner, and Macrae, 2006; Park, Amdt, and Red*jr, 2006). 
This finding not only provides empirical support to numerous researchers 
just mentioned but also helps in resolving the controversy regarding the 
influence of congruent-incongruent information on memory. A n amber of 
researchers have also shown that incongruent information is unlikely to be 
remembered (Cantor and Mischel, 1977; Cohen, 1981; Hamiltcn, 1979; 
Markus, 1977). Since more impressive evidences are available to (he effect 
that incongruent information is better remembered than congruent 
information, the finding of our research strongly strengthens furtner these 
evidences. 
The second finding of our research, however, apparently appears 
inconsistent with the finding obtained by Hunt and Elliott (1980) who found 
that meaningfulness was directly related to recall but orthographic 
distinctiveness (incongruent) has no reliable effect on recall. Hunt ar d Elliott 
(1980), however, found higher recognition memory for orthographic 
distinctiveness than for comrnon words. This finding clearly demt^nstrated 
that distinctiveness or incongruency influences memory depending, on the 
type of memory measures. In this light it is logical to argue that oui finding 
under discussion is not conflicting with the findings obtained by M unt and 
Elliott (1980). 
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The second finding of the present research, i.e. conversatioa memory 
is higher for incongruent version of conversation than for congruent version 
of conversation, may also be explained in atleast two ways. As suggested by 
Fiske (1980) incongruent information receives more attention and more 
weight. This mechanism may be responsible for better conversation memory 
when incongruent information is used. Similarly, Crocker, Haonah, and 
Weber (1983) argued that incongruent items should be more iriformative 
than congruent items when they are attributed to disposition.il causes. 
Consequently, incongruent, dispositionally-attributed items may receive 
more attention and be better recalled (Taylor and Fiske, 1978). 
Another potential explanation of our finding under discussion may be 
found in the concept of pathways or links. According to Hastie aid Kumar 
(1979) incongruent behaviors spend more time in working memory because 
they must be explained and integrated. While in working memory, 
incongruent items are linked to other items also present in working memory. 
Consequently, incongruent items are linked to more other items than 
congruent items. Since the probability of retrieving an item depends on the 
number of pathways or links to that item, incongruent items are particularly 
likely to be found in a search of memory. The second finding of our research 
provides empirical evidence to this suggesfion made by Hastie and Kumar 
(1979). 
Still another possible explanation of the finding under discussion may 
be that incongruent items might have served as discriminative cues which in 
turn helped in enhancing memory (Hirshman and Jackson, 1997). 
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Distinctive processing may also provide explanation for the second 
finding of the present research. Distinctive processing has been defined as 
unique processing of an item at encoding that enhances discriminabiHty of 
that item at retrieval (Jacoby and Craik, 1979; Lockhart, Craik, and facoby, 
1976). Continuing research along this line has refined the definition of 
distinctive processing to the processing of differences among elements that 
are similar on some dimension, a definition that explicitly states the 
relativity of distinctive processing (Hunt and McDaniel, 1993 . Thus 
distinctive processing is not the absolute processing of differences but is 
processing that marks something as different from other things that are 
related on some dimension. Such processing then facilitates accuracy 
because the combined processing of similarity and difference is highly 
diagnostic of a particular item (Hunt, 2003). These ideas may be applied to 
the encoding and retrieval processes of memory. The finding under 
discussion provides empirical support to these ideas. 
Perhaps the best explanation of the second finding comes from the 
isolation or von Restorff effect (1933). It refers to the finding that the people 
tend to have very good memory for unusual or incongruent item. In other 
words the isolation effect refers to the finding that people have superior 
memory for an item when it is different from the other items in the list than 
when it is not (Geraci and Rajaram, 2004). Our finding is in total agreement 
with this contention. 
It is highly logical to describe briefly the "distinctive-fluency 
framework" proposed by Rajaram (1996). According to her framework 
manipulafions that encourage distinctive or elaborate processing \vouId to 
the elicitation of "remember" responses. On the other hand, items t lat were 
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processed more on the basis of fluency would yield a prepondence of 
"know" responses. This framework received empirical support from 
Wickham, Morris, and Fritz (2000) and from the studies carried out by 
Brandt, Macrae, Schloerscheidt and Milne (2003) and Brandt, Gardiner, and 
Macrae (2006). Our second finding also provided undisputed support to 
Rajaram's framework by showing that incongruent (or distinctive) it(jms are 
better remembered as compared to congruent (or non-distinctive) items. 
Though Berk (2007) was mainly interested in the influence oi humor 
on memory but he also developed an interesting incongruent formula which 
according to him, is the foundation of most all types of jokes. Accordingly it 
is the juxtaposition of the "expected" with the unexpected when we expect 
everything to be serious, the unexpected twist not only creates huraor but 
also incongruity which in turn leads to better recall of humorous or 
incongruent information. Our second findings totally agree with this 
contention. 
The third finding of the present research, i.e. different shades cf mood 
(elated, depressed and neutral) have no differential effect on conv<;rsation 
memory, is not in the expected direction. However, many explanations may 
be offered. First, it may be recalled that different shades of mood were 
induced by Modified Velten Mood Induction Technique (MVMIT). Though 
this technique is widely used by researchers for inducing mood, the 
technique is not free from criticism. For instance, Frost, Graf, and Becker 
(1979) failed to support the hypothesis that depressed mood are induced by 
reading self-devaluative statement. They further noted that reading self-
devaluative statements did not induce more depressed mood among subject 
than subject in the neural condition. If it is so, it is logical to assume that 
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reading uplifting mood statements may not induce as strong elated mood as 
desired by the experimenter. Thus non-existence of differential effect of 
different shades of mood on conversation memory may be attributed to this 
contention. This contention was further strengthened by Riskind, Rholes, 
and Eggers (1982) who failed to find a correlation between :hanges 
produced by the VMIP in mood ratings and memory latencies. This finding 
suggests that mood cannot account for the memory results and that VMIP 
statements may have a direct cognitive priming effect on the avaibability of 
memories (Teasdale and Fogarty, 1979). 
Second, there are conflicting results regarding the effect of arcusal on 
memory. Craik and Blankstein (1975), Pettigrew (1978), and Zajonc (1980), 
for instance, have shown facilitative effect of arousal on memory ^vhereas 
other investigators, on the other hand, have argued that consolidat on and 
retrieval may depend not so much on arousal as on the importancf of the 
consequences for subsequent interaction (Brown and Kulik, 1977; 
MacWhinney, Keenan and Reinke, (1982). MacWhinney et al. (1981) made 
it crystal clear that arousal, as measured by Electrodermal response (EDR), 
is not a good predictor of long term memory for natural conversation. They 
found that though EDR is a useful indicator of people's immediate reaction 
to conversation, it does not appear to be a major determinant of the 
processing and storage of sentences for long term retention. They admitted 
that arousal may be important in the initiation of rich memories for 
perceptual detail but retention of these memories depends on their 
consequences for subsequent interactions. Since mood whether elated or 
depressed increases arousal level, the third finding of our research may be 
explained intemis of interactional content of the sentences used in 
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conversation. Our finding is also in agreement with the finding obtained by 
Clark, Milberg and Ross (1983) who demonstrated that enhanced arDusal is 
not necessary for positive mood to cue positive material from memor/. 
Third, absence of differential effect of different shades of rr ood on 
memory indirectly provides empirical support to those studies whici failed 
to demonstrates the existence of mood congruent memory (Bower, Ciilligan, 
and Monteiro, 1981; Bower and Mayer, 1985; Bower, Monteio, and 
Gilligan, 1978; Brown and Taylor, 1986; Clark, Teasdale, Broadbent, and 
Martin, 1983; Coleman, 1975; Gerrig and Bower, 1982; Gotlib and McCann, 
1984; Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp, 1978; Mecklenbrauker and Hager, 
1984; Siegel, Johnson, and Sarason, 1979; and Parrott and Sabini 1990). 
This empirical evidence becomes relevant as stimulus material used in the 
present research may be considered as having positive (humorous) and 
negative (nonhumorous—totally dry discussion) valence. MoreoAer, the 
third finding of our research is totally in agreement with the finding obtained 
by Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1978) and Gotlib and McCann (1984) 
who also found no effect of mood on recall. 
Fourth, a closely related phenomenon of mood congruence i s mood 
dependent memory. The mood dependent memory was first of all 
demonstrated by Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan in 1978, in which subjects 
showed better recall when the mood at retrieval matches with the riood at 
encoding. However after few replications of these findings, numerous 
researchers failed to find mood dependent memory (Bower and Mayer, 
1985a, 1989). These inconsistencies in the findings forced Bower (1985) to 
generate a hypothesis known as "causal belongingness". According to this 
hypothesis what is needed for mood dependent retrieval to occur is fcr mood 
258 
related structures (schemas) to be created at the time of presentation in 
storage. If such mood related structures are not created, mood de})endent 
retrieval does not occur. The third finding of our research may be explained 
interms of absence of mood related structures. As pointed by Eich, Macaulay 
and Ryan (1994) the more one relies on external resources rather ihan on 
internal resources, the more likely is one's memory for the events to be 
mood independent. Thus if two individuals—one happy, the other sad—are 
shown, say, a 'rose' and after some retention interval if these individuals are 
asked to identify and describe what they had seen before retention interval, 
both individuals are apt to say much the same thing and to encode thu 'rose' 
event in much the same fashion. In other words, a 'rose' is a 'rose' 
regardless of whether it is seen with through a happy or sad eye. Our third 
finding provides empirical support to this "do-it-yourself principle" 
proposed by Eich, Macaulay and Ryan (1994). Thus the subjects of our 
study who were under positive, negative and neutral moods might have 
relied heavily on external resources rather than internal resources, hence 
they did not differ with respect to their memory performance. 
Fifth, somewhat recently Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) published 
a research paper entitled "positive emotions broaden the scope of attention 
and thought-action repertoires" in which they provided empirical sup^port to 
"broaden-and-build theory" of emotions. The broaden-and-build thecry was 
originally proposed by Fredrickson (1998, 2001). The 'broaden-and-build 
theory' of positive emotion is based on two hypotheses— broaden 
hypothesis and narrow hypothesis. Broaden hypothesis states that positive 
emotions broaden the scope of attention, cognition and action, widening the 
array of percepts, thoughts and actions presently in mind whereas larrovv 
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hypothesis assert that negative emotions have opposite effects on attention, 
cognition and action, narrow the array of percepts and thoughts. Fhough 
these hypotheses have received empirical support from the studies carried 
out by Fredrickson and Branigan (2005), the third finding of our present 
research, i.e. positive and negative mood have no differential effect on 
conversation memory, does not provide any support to these two hypothesis 
generated from 'broaden-and-build theory' of positive emotion, rather our 
finding provides empirical support to 'opponent-process theory of t-motion 
proposed by Solomon (1980). According to this theory wlien an 
environmental stimulus (e.g., a stressor) elicits an initial emotional i eaction 
(e.g., distress), this emotion in turn elicits an opponent emotioi (e.g., 
happiness or well being). The theory fiirther advocates that at any given 
time, a person's emotional state is the sum of the initial and o])ponent 
emotion. If a stressful event occurs, the initial negative emotional n.^ sponse 
will be dominant while the stressor lasts. After the stressful evert ends, 
however the opponent positive emotion will dominate, and a person will be 
in a better mood than usual. This mechanism, perhaps, is responsible for the 
absence of differential effect of positive and negative mood on convtirsation 
memory. 
Sixth plausible explanation of the third finding of our research lies in 
the phenomenon widely known as inhibition of emotional information. It has 
been demonstrated by Goeleven, DeRaedt and Koster (2007) hat as 
compared with a neutral mood, negative mood state did not lead to 
inhibitory dysfunction of emotional information whereas positive mood 
results in a reduction or absence of inhibitory functioning as companxl with 
a neutral mood condition. They further found that positive mood is 
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associated with increased distractibility, causing poor performance on 
inhibition depend processes suggest deductive reasoning (Oaksfo'-d et .ai. 
1996) and might cause intrusions and memory lapses (Hasher et a I. 2007). 
Like Joormann (2004) and Goeleven et al. (2006a), Goeleven et a I. (2007) 
concluded that reduced inhibition of affective (or negative) inforraation is 
not linked with negative mood state itself but seems to be due to a rather 
stable cognitive vulnerability factor of depression. Thus our third finding is 
in agreement with the above mentioned findings. 
Finally, our third finding provides empirical support to both 
associative network theory in particular and to Resource Allocatioi Model 
(Ellis and Ashbrook, 1987) in general. So far as associative network theory 
is concerned, it predicts that mood dependent and mood congruent effects 
should be symmetrical— that is, the shifting from happiness to sadness 
should have the same effect as shifting from sadness to happiness; and the 
effects of sadness on negative material should be the same as the efects of 
happiness on positive material. So far as resource allocation model is 
concerned, it asserts that both positive and negative moods alike should 
induce extra-task processing, reduce attentional capacity, and impair 
performance on effortful cognitive tasks. In other words this model predicts 
that positive and negative moods should have same effect on performance. 
Here it is important to note that our finding, i.e. positive and negative moods 
have same effect on conversation memory, may be explained by both 
associative network theory and resource allocation model. 
The first interactional effect of humorous-nonhumorous and 
congruent-incongruent versions of conversation on conversation me nory is 
insignificant. This insignificant interactional effect suggests that 
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conversation memory of humorous and nonhumorous venions is 
independent of congruent and incongruent versions of conversation. The 
finding reveals that though humorous-nonhumorous and congruent-
incongruent versions of conversation influence conversation memory when 
considered separately but when both variables are combined, its interaction 
becomes insignificant. 
The remaining three interactional effects, i.e. interaction between 
humorous-nonhumorous version of conversation and mood; interaction 
between congment-incongruent versions of conversation and mood; and 
interaction among humorous-nonhumorous, congruent-incongruent v^ ersions 
of conversation and mood on conversation memory, are insignificant. These 
insignificant interactional effects may also be explained in the same way as 
we have explained the first insignificant interactional effect. 
The overall findings of the present research not only open ne\\ area of 
research in memory but also highlight a new mechanism undei-lying 
interpersonal attraction, interpersonal relationship and impression foimation. 
Moreover, the findings of present research may also be applied in 
educational setting like preparing syllabi and teaching methods. 
The fact that humorous and incongruent versions of conversat on was 
better recalled reveals that subjects encoded humorous and incongruent 
information more effectively which, in turn, helped in better raemory 
performance. Now a question arises why humorous and incoigruent 
information was encoded more effortfiilly and effectively and was better 
recalled? From social point of view it may suggested that subject; found 
more attraction and interest in humorous and incongruent versions of 
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conversation hence they paid more attention to humorous and incongruent 
versions of conversation. This mechanism might have contributed id higher 
conversation memory for these two types of versions of conversatior. It is an 
open secret that if we Hke conversation of a person than we not onl> Ulce the 
person but also developed positive impression about that person. The 
findings of our research lead us to emphasize that in order to develop 
interpersonal attraction or good interpersonal relationship, we must use 
humorous statement in our conversation with others. It is interesting to note 
that incongruity usually itself creates humorous context. It is very c ommon 
experience that humorous statements attract us toward the person vho has 
uttered them and we developed a strong urge to meet that person ai^ ain and 
again. Thus frequent meeting with the person may sow the seed for the 
development of interpersonal attraction and interpersonal relationsh p. Thus 
the findings of our study may be considered to contribute not onl / in the 
area of experimental psychology but also to the area of social psychology 
particularly area of interpersonal attraction and impression fomiation 
We firmly believe that findings of our investigation, if apolied in 
educational settings, would be highly beneficial not only for academic 
performance of the students but would also be helpful in the development of 
a rapport between teachers and taught. Early studies have also demo istrated 
this fact. Twenty-six studies identified humor as one of the quality of 
effective teachers (Ford, 1978). Moreover Hildebramd (1973) found that 
those faculty members who possess dynamism/enthusiasm receiAC high 
rating among students. Similarly, Highet (1958) identified humor as one of 
the most important qualities of a good teacher. He saw the true puroose of 
humor to be the establishment of a link between students and teachers 
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through enjoyment. It has been found that humor helps studerts to be 
attentive, presents a true picture of subjects and establishes rap})ort in a 
classroom setting and produces a relaxed, positive atmosphere conducive to 
better learning; promotes increased comprehension and retention; aiding 
cognitive development; manages undesirable behavior; build self 
confidence; and enhances the lives of both teachers and taught ()esberg, 
Henschel, Marshall, and McGhee, 1981; Hunsaker, 1988; Hymai, 1974; 
MacAdam, 1985; Powell and Andresen, 1985; Watson and Emerson, 1988; 
Ziv, 1988; and Schmidt, 1994). Powers (2005) has cited a very interesting as 
well as important quote of Baughman (1979). The quote is "on i^ of the 
greatest sins in teaching is to be boring". Powers (2005) has advocated that 
effective use of humor can help teacher engage students and establish 
rapport with them, maintain their attention, create an open classroom 
atmosphere, and even ease distress during examinations. 
It has been further advocated that if teachers want students io learn, 
then they should consider making learning more palatable, even enjoyable. 
This contention not only supports the use of humor in the classroom, but 
humor should be incorporated across all academic levels (White, 2001; 
Torok, et al., 2004; and Bacay, 2006). The same point is emphasized by 
learner-centered psychological principles of the American Psychological 
Association (2006). 
The above findings vindicate our contention that findings of our 
research, if implemented, would contribute a lot in raising the academic 
standard and academic excellence in educational settings. 
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Though we have attempted to provide best possible and most 
satisfactory explanations of our findings but an element of doubt sti 11 haunts 
our mind with regard to the effect of mood on conversation memory. In fact 
we were expecting different magnitude of conversation memory under 
different shades of mood. The third findings of our research did not fulfill 
our expectation rather we found no differential effect of elated, depressed, 
and neutral mood on conversation memory. As mentioned somewhere else 
Modified Velten Mood Induction Technique (MVMIT) might have not 
induced different shades of mood of desired intensity resulting into absence 
of any differential effect of mood on conversation memory. It is therefore 
suggested that in future studies on mood and memory, mood should be 
induced not only by MVMIT but also by other effective and we 1 tested 
technique like music. If mood is induced by a combination of mood 
induction techniques it is possible that we can obtain differential effect of 
different shades of mood on memory. Thus fiirther research is required in 
this direction so that ambiguity regarding the role of mood in memc ry may 
be resolved. 
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(A) Fictional conversation (Humorous-Congruent) 
Prepared by 
Huma Hilal 
A.M.U. Aligarh. 
Sharma: Hello Ahmad. 
Ahmad: Hello Sharma. 
Sharma: How are you? 
Ahmad: I am fine. 
Sharma: I am interested to know about man and his health. 
Ahmad: What exactly do you want to know? 
Sharma: How man may be defined? 
Ahmad: A man is like tea bags, he does not know his strength until Jie gets 
into hot water. 
Sharma: Tell me tips to keep good health. 
Ahmad: The only way to keep your good health is to eat what you d) not 
want, drink what you do not like, and do what you would ra her not. 
Sharma: Are you serious? 
Ahmad: Certainly. 
295 
Sharma: Can you tell me why surgeons wear a mask during operation. 
Ahmad: They wear a mask to cover their face like robbers as they hive to 
handover a huge bill to their patients. 
Sharma: Is there any permanent treatment of headaches? 
Ahmad: Yes, chope off your head, you will never experience any headache. 
Sharma: In some pathological reports NAD is written, what does it mean? 
Ahmad: Not Actually Done. 
Sharma: Please tell me about the relationship between hygiene and \ ealth. 
Ahmad: Hygiene impairs the health of bacterias. 
Sharma: What is the main cause of high blood pressure? 
Ahmad: Arrival of unwanted guest. 
Sharma: What is cancer? 
Ahmad: It removes all the worries of life. 
Sharma: After so much humorous talk, please be serious and tell me low 
strength of people can be understood? 
Ahmad: People do not know how strong they are until they get into serious 
trouble. 
Sharma: What is the mantra of good health? 
Ahmad: The only way to keep your good health is to eat good food, orink 
healthy drinks and do healthy activities. 
Sharma: It looks very simple but in practice it is very difficult. 
Ahmad: In order to keep good health we have to fellow this principle 
otherwise we have to pay heavy price to the doctors. 
Sharma: You are very right. Now a days doctors fees is very high. 
Ahmad: I agree with you. Last year I got a bill for my surgery - those 
doctors are like robbers who charge very highly. 
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Sharma: Not only doctors charge, but pathologists make huge money. 
Ahmad: Very much true. 
Sharma: Last week I got my urine examined. They charged Rs 60/- with 
three letters in their report i.e., NAD. What does it mean? 
Ahmad: It simply means no abnormality detected. 
Sharma: I frequently suffer from headache. Is there any permanent 
treatment of it? 
Ahmad: Do not worry, consult a good physician. It is not like a cancer that 
can not be treated. 
Sharma: Cancer is certainly fatal disease. 
Ahmad: Yes, there is no doubt about it. 
(B) Fictional conversation (Humorous-Incongrucnt) 
Prepared by 
Huma Hilal 
A.M.U. Aligarh. 
Sharma: Hello Ahmad. 
Ahmad: Hello Sharma. 
Sharma: How are you? 
Ahmad: I am fine. 
Sharma: I am interested to know about man and his health. 
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Ahmad: What exactly do you want to know? 
Sharma: How man may be defined? 
Ahmad: A man is like tea bags, he does not know his strength until he gets 
into hot water. 
Sharma: Tell me tips to keep good health. 
Ahmad: The only way to keep your good health is to eat what you do not 
want, drink what you do not like, and do what you would rather not. 
Sharma: Are you serious? 
Ahmad: Certainly. 
Sharma: Can you tell me why surgeons wear a mask during operatic i. 
Ahmad: They wear a mask to cover their face like robbers as they hi ve to 
handover a huge bill to their patients. 
Sharma: Is there any permanent treatment of headaches? 
Ahmad: Yes, chope off your head, you will never experience any headache. 
Sharma: In some pathological reports NAD is written, what does it neant? 
Ahmad: Not Actually Done. 
Sharma: Please tell me about the relationship between hygiene and health. 
Ahmad: Hygiene impairs the health of bacterias. 
Sharma: What is the main cause of high blood pressure? 
Ahmad: Arrival of unwanted guest. 
Sharma: What is cancer? 
Ahmad: It removes all the worries of life. 
Sharma: How are you doing? 
Ahmad: Not bad considering our present work load. 
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Sharma: Well, we have to discuss Aleem's project. 
Ahmad: Yes, we should. 
Sharma: Tell me what it present status is? 
Ahmad: Unfortunately, it is going a little slow right now. 
Sharma: It is important that the project should be completed within six 
months. 
Ahmad: There are few problems. 
Sharma: Tell me what kinds of problems. 
Ahmad: One of the problem is that we have not gotten clearance cer ificate 
from the government. 
Sharma: Please try to get it as early as possible. 
Ahmad: I will, but you know how they are. 
Sharma: Try to get it within a month otherwise we will lose a big ac jount. 
Ahmad: Yes I know it quite well. 
Sharma: If you fail to get it, do the rest without it. 
Ahmad: Well, we will try. Can we delay the project?. 
Sharma: We must avoid that. 
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(C) Fictional conversation (Nonhumorous-Congruent) 
Prepared by 
Huma Hilal 
A.M.U. Aligarh. 
Sharma: Hello Ahmad. 
Ahmad: Hello Sharma. 
Sharma: How are you doing? 
Ahmad: Not bad considering our present work load. 
Sharma: Well, we have to discuss Aleem's project. 
Ahmad: Yes, we should. 
Sharma: Tell me what it present status is? 
Ahmad: Unfortunately, it is going a little slow right now. 
Sharma: It is important that the project should be completed within six 
months. 
Ahmad: There are few problems. 
Sharma: Tell me what kinds of problems. 
Ahmad: One of the problem is that we have not gotten clearance certificate 
from the government. 
Sharma: Please try to get it as early as possible. 
Ahmad: I will, but you know how they are. 
Sharma: Try to get it within a month otherwise we will lose a big account. 
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Ahmad: Yes, I know it quite well. 
Sharma: If you fail to get it, do the rest without it. 
Ahmad: Well, we will try. Can we delay the project? 
Sharma: We must avoid that. 
Ahmad: Sure, but is it still a possibility? 
Sharma: No, dejfinitely not. 
Ahmad: Well all right. 
Sharma: Request the DM for some help. 
Ahmad: Yes, I will seek the help of DM but I think he is very busy these 
days. 
Sharma: Is it not possible to ask the workers to work overtime? 
Ahmad: Yes, it is possible but they are already overloaded. 
Sharma: I think we should arrange a staff meeting to discuss how to spread 
our business. 
Ahmad: It is a good idea. 
Sharma: I think it might help. 
Ahmad: It probably would. 
Sharma: Is it possible to arrange the meeting in the last week of this month? 
Ahmad: I think that will be fine, what time? 
Sharma: Would 1 'o' clock be possible? 
Ahmad: Ok, let us make it tentative, and I will get back to you if there s 
any problem. 
Sharma: Make sure that all members of the board attend the meeting. 
Ahmad: I will not only send invitation to each member but also contact each 
one on telephone. 
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Sharma: It will be fine. 
Ahmad: Now I am leaving as I have to make a lot of arrangements "or the 
meeting. 
Sharma: Listen, heavy tea should be arranged for the meeting. 
Ahmad: Ok, I know the importance of the menu. 
(D) Fictional conversation (Nonhumorous-Incongruent) 
Prepared by 
Huma Hilal 
A.M.U. Aligarh. 
Sharma: Hello Ahmad. 
Ahmad: Hello Sharma. 
Sharma: How are you? 
Ahmad: I am fine. 
Sharma: I am interested to know about man and health. 
Ahmad: What exactly to you want to know? 
Sharma: Tell me how strength of people can be understood. 
Ahmad: People do not know how strong they are until they get it seiious 
troubles. 
Sharma: What is the mantra of good health? 
Ahmad: The only way to keep your good health is to eat good food, dink 
healthy drinks and do healthy activities. 
Sharma: It looks very simple but in practice it is very difficult. 
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Ahmad: In order to keep good health we have to follow this principle 
otherwise we have to pay heavy price to the doctors. 
Sharma: You are very right. Now a days doctor's fee is very high. 
Ahmad: I agree with you. Last year I got a bill for my surgery - those 
doctors were like robbers who charge very highly. 
Sharma: Not only doctors charge, but pathologists make huge money. 
Ahmad: Very much true. 
Sharma: Last week I got my urine examined. They charged Rs. 6*)/- with 
three letters in their report i.e., NAD. What does it mean? 
Ahmad: It simply means no abnormality detected. 
Sharma: Well, we have to discuss Aleem's Project. 
Ahmad: Yes we should. 
Sharma: Tell me what it present status is? 
Ahmad: Unfortunately, it is going a little slow right now. 
Sharma: It is important that the project should be completed within si> 
months. 
Ahmad: There are few problems. 
Sharma: Tell me what kinds of problems. 
Ahmad: One of the problem is that we have not gotten clearance certificate 
from the government. 
Sharma: Please try to get it as early as possible. 
Ahmad: I will, but you know how they are. 
Sharma: Try to get it within a month otherwise we will lose a big accouai. 
Ahmad: Yes I know it quite well. 
Sharma: If you fail to get it, do the rest without it. 
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Ahmad: Well, we will try. Can we delay the project? 
Sharma: We must avoid that. 
Ahmad: Sure, but is it still a possibility? 
Sharma: No, definitely not. 
Ahmad: Well all right. 
Sharma: Request the DM for some help. 
Ahmad: Yes, I will seek the help of DM but I think he is very busy these 
days. 
Sharma: Is it not possible to ask the workers to work overtime? 
Ahmad: Yes, it is possible but they are already overloaded. 
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ar^ 
Dr. R.C. Sinclair 
University of Alberta 
Dept. of Psvchology-EDMONTON 
Instructions: In this experiment, you will be shown a series of card^ with 
statements typed on them. These statements will represent a certain laood. 
Your success will be largely a question of your willingness to be receptive 
and responsive to the idea in each statement, and allow each idea to act on 
you without interference. 
You will respond the feeling suggested by each item. You will then thiak of 
yourself with as much clarity and realism as possible, as definitely being and 
moving into that mood state. 
You will continue to concentrate your full consciousness on experiencing 
and retaining the mood as you reach suggestion a certain amount of time 
would be devoted to each suggestion. You will continue, to disciple and train 
yourself in inducing a mood in your self by concentrating your full attention 
on the mood statements during any time interval. 
You will begin the series of statement yourself Then you will experience the 
mood as well as you can and continue to do so as you read the cards and you 
move further into that mood. You will think about the things in your life that 
make you feel more like the mood on the statement. This way, your mood 
will build further. 
And at last you have to read the incubation instructions for particaiar 
category of mood induction statements (elated/happy, depressed, md 
neutral). Which will be available on separate cards. 
Happy Cards 
Cover page 
These statements are designed to make you feel happy. 
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Cardl 
Today is neither better nor worse than any other day. 
Card 2 
I do feel pretty good today, though. 
Card 3 
I feel light-hearted. 
Card 4 
This might turn out to have been one my good days. 
Card 5 
If your attitude is good, then things are good, and my attitude is good. 
Card 6 
I 've certainly got energy and self-confidence to spare. 
Card? 
I feel cheerful and lively. 
Card 8 
On the whole, I have very little difficulty in thinking. 
Card 9 
My parents are pretty proud of me most of the time. 
Card 10 
I'm glad I'm in college-it's the key to success nowadays. 
Card 11 
For the rest of the day, I bet things will go really well. 
Card 12 
I'm pleased that most people are so friendly to me. 
Card 13 
My judgment about most things is sound. 
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Card 14 
It's encouraging that as I get farther into my major, it's going to less study to 
get good grades. 
Card 15 
I'm full of energy and ambition-I feel like I could go a long time w thout 
sleep. 
Card 16 
This is one of those days when I can grind out schoolwork with practically 
no effort at all. 
Card 17 
My judgment is keen and precise today. Just let someone try to put 
something over on me. 
Card 18 
When I want to, I can make friends extremely easily. 
Card 19 
If I set my mind to it, I can make things turn out fine. 
Card 20 
I feel enthusiastic and confident now. 
Card 21 
There should be opportunity for a lot of good times coming. 
Card 22 
My favorite song keeps going though my head. 
Card 23 
Some of my friends are so lively and optimistic. 
Card 24 
I feel talkative-I feel like taking to almost anybody. 
Card 25" 
I'm full of energy, and am really getting to like the thing I'm doing on 
campus. 
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Card 26 
I'm able to do things accurately and efficiently. 
Card 27 
I know good and well that I can achieve the goals I set. 
Card 28 
Now that it occurs to me, most of the things that have depressed me 
wouldn't have if I'd just had the right attitude. 
Card 29 
I have a sense of power and vigour. 
Card 30 
I feel so vivacious and efficient today-sitting on top of the world. 
Card 31 
It would really take something to stop me now! 
Card 32 
In the long run, it's obvious that things have gotten better and better during 
my life. 
Card 33 
I know that in the future I won't over-emphasize so-called "problems". 
Card 34 
I'm optimistic that I can get along very well with most of the people I meet. 
Card 35 
I'm too absorbed in things to have time for worry. 
Card 36 
I'm feeling amazingly good today! 
Card 36 
I am particularly inventive and resourceful in this mood. 
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Card 37 
I am particularly inventive and resourceful in this mood. 
Card 38 
I feel superb I think I can work to work to the best of my ability. 
Card 39 
Things look good. Things look great! 
Card 40 
I feel that many of my friendships will stick with me in the future. 
Card 41 
I can fmd the good in almost anything. 
Card 42 
I feel so happy and playful today. I feel like surprising someone by telling a 
silly joke. 
Card 43 
I feel an exhilarating animation in all I do. 
Card 44 
I feel highly perceptive and refreshed. 
Card 45 
My memory is in rare form today. 
Card 46 
In a buoyant mood like the one I'm in, I can work fast and do it right the first 
time. 
Card 47 
I can concentrate hard on anything I do. 
Card 48 
My thinking is clear and rapid. 
Card 49 
Life is so much fun it seems to offer so many sources of fulfillment. 
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Card 50 
Thing will be better and better today. 
Card 51 
I can make decisions rapidly and correctly: and I can defend them against 
criticism easily. 
Card 52 
I feel really industrious-1 want something to do! 
Card 53 
Life is firmly in my control. 
Card 54 
I wish somebody would play some good loud music! 
Card 55 
This is great-1 really do feel good. I am elated about things. 
Card 56 
I'm really sharp now. 
Card 57 
This is must one of those days when I'm ready to go! 
Card 58 
I feel like bursting with laughter-I wish somebody would tell a joke and give 
me an excuse! 
Card 59 
I'm full of energy! 
Card 60 
I feel great!!! 
Incubation Instruction Card-
Now that you're feeling very happy, concentrate on this feeling. Let ii How. 
Let it build. Feel the mood. Feel it get stronger. Think about other things that 
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have happened in your life that have made you very, very happy, Hke doing 
some things you love to do, or. like being with good friends, doing fun 
enjoyable things. Concentrate on it. As you do, you'll feel the mood build. 
It'll become more intense, more happy. This in turn will make you think of 
other things in your life that have made you very, very happy. The n ood 
will build. Let it. Feel it become more intense. Feel it get stronger. It will 
happen. Do and think whatever you can to build this very happy mood. Feel 
very, very happy. Close your eyes. Begin now. 
Depressed Cards 
Cover page 
These statements are designed to make you feel depressed. 
Card 1 
Today is neither better nor worse than any other day. 
Card 2 
However, I feel a little low today. 
Card 3 
I feel rather sluggish now. 
Card 4 
Sometimes I wonder whether school is all that worthwhile. 
Cards 
Every now and then I feel so tired and gloomy that I'd rather did rather just 
sit than do anything. 
Card 6 
I can remember times when everybody but me seemed full of energy. 
Card? 
Too often I have found myself staring listening into the distance, my mind a 
blank, when I definitely should have been studying. 
Cards 
It has occurred to me more than once that study is basically useless, because 
you forget almost everything you learn anyway. 
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Card 9 
People annoy me; I wish I could be by myself. 
Card 10 
I've had important decisions to make in the past, and I've sometimes made 
the wrong ones. 
Card 11 
I do feel somewhat discouraged and drowsy-maybe I'll need a nap when I 
get home. 
Card 12 
Perhaps college takes more time, effort, and money than it's worth. 
Card 13 
I'm afraid the potential for nuclear war may get a lot Worse. 
Card 14 
I just don't seem to be able le to get going as fast as I used to. 
Card 15 
There have been days when I felt weak and confiased and everything went 
miserably wrong. 
Card 16 
Just a little bit of effort tires me out. 
Card 17 
I've had daydreams in which my mistakes kept occurring to me-soraetin es I 
wish I could start over again. 
Card 18 
I'm ashamed that I've caused my parents needless worry. 
Card 19 
I feel terribly tired and indifferent to things today. 
Card 20 
Just to stand up would take a big effort. 
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Card 21 
I'm getting tired out. I can feel my body getting exhausted and heavy. 
Card 22 
I'm beginning to feel sleepy. My thoughts are drifting. 
Card 23 
At times I've been so tired and discouraged that I went to sleep rather face 
important problems. 
Card 24 
My life is so tiresome-the same old thing day after day depresses me. 
Card 25 
I coudtn't remember things well right now if I had to. 
Card 26 
1 just can't make up my mind; it's so hard to make simple decisions. 
Card 27 
I want to go to sleep-1 feel like just closing my eyes and going to sleep light 
here. 
Card 28 
I'm not very alert: I feel listless and vaguely sad. 
Card 29 
I'm doubted that I'm a worthwhile person. 
Card 30 
I feel worn out. My health may not be as good as it's supposed to be. 
Card 31 
It often seems that no matter how hard I try, things still go wrong. 
Card 32 
I've noticed that no one seems to really understand or care when I complain 
or feel unhappy. 
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Card 33 
I'm uncertain about my future. 
Card 34 
I've lain awake at night worrying so long that I hated myself. 
Card 35 
I'm discouraged and unhappy about myself. 
Card 36 
Things are worse now than when I was younger. 
Card 37 
My parents never really tried to understand me. 
Card 38 
The way I feel now, the future looks boring and hopeless. 
Card 39 
Some very important decisions are almost impossible for me to make. 
Card 40 
I feel tired and depressed; I don't feel like working on the things I know 1 
must get done. 
Card 41 
I feel horribly guilty about how I've treated my parent at times. 
Card 42 
I have the feeling that I just can't reach people. 
Card 43 
Things are easier and better for other people than for me. I feel like there's 
no use in trying again. 
Card 44 
It takes too much effort to convince people of anything; there's no po nt in 
trying. 
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Card 45 
Often people make me very upset. I don't like to be around them. 
Card 46 
I fail in communicating with people about my problems. 
Card 47 
It's so discouraging the way people don't really listen to me. 
Card 48 
I've felt so alone before, that I could have cried. 
Card 49 
Sometimes I've wished I could die. 
Card 50 
My thoughts are so slow and downcast I don't want to think or talk. 
Card 51 
I just don't care about anything. Life just ins't any fun. 
Card 52 
Life seems too much for me anyhow-my efforts are wasted. 
Card 53 
I'm so tired. 
Card 54 
I don't concentrate or move; I just want to forget about everything. 
Card 55 
I have too many bad things in my life. 
Card 56 
Everything seems utterly futile and empty. 
Card 57 
I feel dizzy and faint. I needed to put my head down and not move. 
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Card 58 
I don't want to do anything. 
Card 59 
All of the unhappiness of my past is taking possession of me. 
Card 60 
I want to go to sleep and never wake up. 
Incubation Instruction Card-
Now that you're feeling very depressed, concentrate on this feeling. Let it 
flow. Let it build. Feel mood. Feel it get stronger. Think about other things 
that have happened in you life that have made you very, very depressed, like 
being alone and lonely, or like when you failed a test, or when someone's 
broken up with you. Concentrate on it. As you do, you'll feel the niood 
build. It'll become more intense, more depressed. This in turn will make you 
think of other things in your life that have made you very, very depressed. 
The mood will build. Let it. Feel it become more intense. Feel it get 
stronger. It will happen. Do and think whatever you can to build this very 
depressed mood. Feel very, very depressed. Close your eyes. Begin now. 
Neutral cards 
Cover page 
These statements are designed to make you feel neutral. 
Cardl 
Oklahoma City is the target city in the world, in area, with 631.166 square 
miles. 
Card 2 
Japan was elected to the United Nations almost fourteen years after Pearl 
Harbor. 
Cards 
At the end appears a section entitled "Bibliography Notes". 
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Card 4 
We have two kinds of nouns denoting physical things: individual and nass 
nouns. 
Cards 
This book or any part thereof must not be reproduced in any form. 
Card 6 
Agricultural products comprised seventy percent of the income. 
Card? 
Satum is sometimes in conjunction, beyond the sun from the earth, and s not 
visible. 
Cards 
Some streets were still said to be listed under their old names. 
Card 9 
The system is supervised by its board of regents. 
Card 10 
There is a large rose-growing center near Tyler, Texas. 
Card 11 
Many states supply milk for grammar school children. 
Card 12 
Usually it is the fittest that survive. 
Card 13 
The typography, paper, and bind were of the highest quality. 
Card 14 
The machine dominated county posts for as long as anyone could remember. 
Card 15 
The desk is old, and scratched into its surface was a profusion of dates, 
initials, and messages. 
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Card 16 
The Orient Express travels between Paris and Istanbul. 
Card 17 
When the Banyan bent down under its own weight, its branches began to 
take root. 
Card 18 
There isn't a scientific explanation for every U.F.O. sighting. 
Card 19 
The Hope Diamond was shipped from South America to London through the 
regular mail service. 
Card 20 
The review is concerned with the first three volumes. 
Card 21 
The ship was ancient, and would soon be retired from the fleet. 
Card 22 
Slang is a constantly changing part of the language. 
Card 23 
There is a small article in the local newspaper which indicates acceptance of 
the kidnapper's terms. 
Card 24 
There are some forms in which no oath is required. 
Card 25 
Intramatics finds mates for the lonely. 
Card 26 
99.1% of Alaska is owned by the Federal Government. 
Card 27 
The two men dressed as repairmen will appear shortly after the van pulls UD. 
il8 
Card 28 
The wood was discolored as if it had been held in a fire. 
Card 29 
The light was noticed in the dark outside and it moved toward the house. 
Card 30 
Painting in a few other non-European countries is treated in a separate 
volume. 
Card 31 
A recent study revealed that one half of all college students were unable to 
find summer jobs. 
Card 32 
Provoked arousal and orientation are accompanied by steeper negative 
shifts. 
Card 33 
The names on the Christmas mailing list are alphabetically ordered. 
Card 34 
Significantly, these changes occur during the full moon. 
Card 35 
West Samoa gained its independence in 1965. 
Card 36 
The magazine's report was slated, as usual. 
Card 37 
The map would prove useless as a beginning course. 
Card 38 
The speaker outlined a plan where by the current deficits could be 
eliminated. 
Card 39 
The black and white pictures are arranged in ten sections. 
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Card 40 
The voices come only at night, and whisper words. 
Card 41 
The papers had been front-paging it for days. 
Card 42 
The notice made it clear that coffee breaks were being limited. 
Card 43 
No man worked harder than he. 
Card 44 
Potter wrote numerous satires on social cynicism. 
Card 45 
Boeing's main plant in Seattle employs 35,000 people. 
Card 46 
The doorkeeper was dressed in red. 
Card 47 
During the next ten years, the group participated in politics. 
Card 48 
The organization depended on the people for support. 
Card 49 
In 1965, Elizabeth made the first state visit by a British monarch to Germany 
in 56 years. 
Card 50 
It was their sixth consecutive best seller. 
Card 51 
It all fitted in with the officer's story. 
Card 52 
The merger did not change the company's policy. 
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Card 53 
The mansion was rented by the delegation. 
Card 54 
Ninety occupations were listed as eligible for the grads in business. 
Card 55 
Utah is the Beehive state. 
Card 56 
Changes were made in transport of lumber after the border incident. 
Card 57 
The Chinese language has many dialects Mandarin and Cantonese. 
Card 58 
Things were booming once again in the little gold rush town of Angel. 
Card 59 
At low tide the hull of the old ship could be seen. 
Card 60 
A free sample will be given to each person who enters the store. 
Incubation Instruction Card-
Now that you've begun to clear your mind and feel neutral we'd like tC' get 
you to sit and think about other neutral thoughts and statements in order to 
clear your mood further. We want no mood related thoughts in your mind. 
Just sit and concentrate on feeling neutral. Close your eyes. Begin now. 
